REPORT ON THE
44th
NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

American

Forensic

Association

June 15, 1990

Dear Students, Coaches, and Guests at the National Debate Tournament:

Those of us who participated in the Forty-fourth National Debate Tournament this past spring in Carrollton experienced outstanding competition and unequalled hospitality. To the debaters and coaches from Harvard University and the University of Redlands, we offer congratulations. To all from West Georgia College, but especially to Dr. Gibson, we extend our appreciation and gratitude. But more commendations are to be made as well, and those are extended to all who participated in the NDT.

To those of you who are students, your participation in this Tournament is testimony to the excellence you have displayed in intercollegiate competition. You have demonstrated your command of both the inquiry and advocacy so essential to success in this activity. To those of you who are coaches and judges, your participation reveals the commitment to education so necessary for this activity to continue. The time and energy spent improving the skills of your students, the effort and impartiality displayed in critiquing individual debates, and the personal and professional sacrifices incurred through your long hours of coaching, judging and travel are all components without which intercollegiate debate would falter. And, finally, to those of you who are involved in this tournament in other ways--as tournament staff, administrators, even observers, your participation demonstrates nourishment from beyond the "core." That nourishment is a necessary and appreciated element of the success and continued vitality of this activity. Your encouragement and support, even appreciation, for the efforts of those competing now provides the connection to a richer, deeper tradition of public argument that extends for two and half thousand years into the past.

The American Forensic Association has as its organizing principle the commitment to fostering forensic theory, education and practice; and it's sponsorship of this Tournament is an integral component of that commitment. Your participation is welcomed, applauded, and appreciated. But the NDT is a moment in time only, and your involvement in debate transcends those few days in Georgia. I hope that each of you who reflects upon this Report will experience in some way a remembrance and fondness for intercollegiate debate and for the tradition which you have helped to maintain and enhance. I hope, too, that the technical skills and ethical concerns developed through your experiences in debate will work to improve the quality of your own discourse, as well as that of the public sphere, well into the future.

Cordially,

Bill Balthrop

Bill Balthrop, President
American Forensic Association

West Georgia College

Carrollton, Georgia 30118
A SENIOR COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA

404-836-6442

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

March 30, 1990

TO: All Participants in the 1990 National Debate Tournament:

With much pleasure I extend a very cordial welcome to all Tournament participants on behalf of West Georgia College. All of us associated with West Georgia College wish for every one of you a pleasant and eventful Tournament.

Dr. Chester Gibson, Chairman Department of Mass Communication/Theater Arts, has been a long-time participant in these tournaments, and it is largely through his efforts that you have come to Carrollton, Georgia, at this time.

Dr. Gibson and his colleagues in the Department of Mass Communication have worked diligently to make this tournament successful in every way. We hope your stay is pleasant and eventful.

Sincerely,

Maurice K. Townsend
President

MKT/db

With Tournament Director, Al Johnson, looking on West Georgia College President, Maurice K. Townsend, welcomed the coaches and debaters at the opening assembly prior to their receiving their participation cups.

The National Debate Tournament

The National Debate Tournament began at the United States Military Academy in 1947. It was organized and conducted by the academy at West Point for its first twenty years. Initial tournament rules were determined by the West Point Administration in consultation with such debate coaches as A. Craig Baird of the University of Iowa, G. M. Musgrave of Des Moines, Alan Nichols of USC, E. R. Nichols of the University of Redlands, and Joseph O'Brien of Pennsylvania State University.

At the first tournament in 1947, twenty-nine colleges participated in five "seeding" rounds and four elimination rounds over a three day period. Some of the features of the tournament were that no school would meet a school within five hundred miles of itself during the seeding rounds and that no coach would judge a school from his or her own district. Many traditions were started at West Point that year, some of which still remain today: the "big board", oral announcement of round pairings, cadet escorts for each team, teams for each debate meeting under the banner of the affirmative team, and team signs in the rooms.

In 1967, the National Debate Tournament entered a new era as the American Forensic Association, the national professional organization of forensics educators, assumed responsibility for the tournament. The NDT was moved from West Point and has been hosted by a different school every year since. Control of the tournament became the responsibility of a national committee elected by those schools supporting the tournament. As debate has developed in recent years other refinements have been added to the tournament: the ten-minute preparation time rule, elaborate procedures for assigning judges, judge qualifications and published critiques of the final debate.

Over the years, the tournament has expanded in size, with various procedures used for selecting the participants. In the early days, teams were chosen by district nominating committees. This method was replaced by some form of qualifying tournaments in most districts. For the first twenty years of NDT competition the tournament host and previous year's winner received automatic invitations. Post-district at-large bids were initiated in 1968 and pre-district bids in 1971. Since 1970, it has been possible for a school to qualify as many as two teams for the NDT. This year seventy-two teams participated in the NDT.

The Forty-fourth National Debate Tournament was sponsored by the American Forensic Association with support from the Ford Motor Company Fund. The NDT is also indebted to Mr. Siguard S. Larmon (1891-1987) for donating the rotating Larmon Trophy, emblematic of the national debate championship; to Mr. and Mrs. George Walker for donating the rotating second-place Walker Memorial; to Robert Feldhale, top speaker in the 1976 NDT and now an attorney in Los Angeles for donating the Wayune Broackriede Top Speaker Watch; and to a most generous individual, who wishes to remain anonymous, for a $5,000 contribution for a new rotating First Speaker Award. Under the guidance of the Board of Trustees and with the invaluable assistance of Roth Jewelers of Waterloo, Iowa, a magnificent Tiffany Bowl was designed and engraved with all the previous Top Speakers in time for the 1989 tournament. The 1990 NDT was honored to have Samford University and the family and friends of Rex Copeland donate a perpetual award which will honor the Number One First Round-At-Large Team. Presentation of this award brings overdue recognition to an important accomplishment as well as honoring the memory of a fine debater and outstanding person. The NDT is also indebted to many other alumni who have contributed over the past few years since the formulation of the NDT Alumni Association. One person in particular, Mr. Donald Herrick (top speaker at the 1960 NDT from William-Jewel College) was responsible for the revival of this publication. Originally begun by the Military Academy the publication ended when the NDT left West Point, Mr. Herrick felt such a book was a significant memento for participants and a most meaningful legacy for a tournament and activity he personally cherished. We are extremely grateful to his yearly contribution which makes this book possible.

District and national committees expended considerable time and effort to insure that the tournament reflects the highest quality debating throughout the nation. Sixteen teams were selected at-large by the National Debate Tournament Committee on the basis of outstanding records prior to the District Tournaments. Forty-seven teams representing the nine Districts were invited on the basis of their superior debating in District Tournaments. Eleven additional teams were selected by the National Committee on an at-large basis after the District Tournaments.

All teams with minimum prelimary round 5-3 records, and 13 or more ballots, participated in the elimination rounds. Seeding was determined by win-loss records, total ballots, and adjusted team points after dropping high and low. The first elimination round featured a partial bracket so that sixteen teams remained after its conclusion, a format that the National Committee enacted for the 1987 NDT. Four subsequent elimination rounds culminated in the selection of one team as the national champion. Awards are given to the outstanding individual speakers after the eight round of preliminary competition.

The 1990 Final Round was no surprise, it had occurred eight times previously, most recently in Round III of the NDT with Redlands emerging victorious. Prior to that win, Redlands had won on the negative in the quarter-finals of Northwestern; the only team to beat Harvard's affirmative in an elimination round all year. Harvard's year long consistency certainly justified their top bid honor for the First Round At-Large, but along with Redlands there were two other teams entering the tournament "red-hot." Wake Forest University had taken third at Dartmouth, Northwestern and second at Heart of America entering the NDT and were 7-1 and second seed at the NDT. However, the hottest team and quite possibly one of the most impressive streaks in history was established by Aaron Hawbaker and Ken Schuler of Northern Iowa. After winning West Georgia they lost to Harvard in the finals at Dartmouth and then did not lose again until Round IV of the NDT. That included an incredible twenty-nine consecutive wins with first place finishes at Northwestern and Kansas. It was perhaps only appropriate that the streak should come to an end at the hands of Wake Forest the team Northern Iowa had defeated in the semis of Northwestern and the finals of Kansas. It was, however, their only loss, they were 7-1 with 21 ballots entering the elimination rounds. Northern Iowa, the top seed had the misfortune of hitting the University of Kentucky in the octos, clearly not the sixteenth team during the year, more like 7th according to the at-large balloting, but a team which had lost three debates and a few too many ballots. Kentucky's 3-2 win on the affirmative was not as major an upset as Dartmouth B's victory over Wake Forest in the quarters. This may well have been the "biggest upset" in NDT history.

The 1989-90 Intercollegiate Debate Topic was, Resolved: THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT AN ENERGY POLICY WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCES THE NON-MILITARY CONSUMPTION OF FOSSIL FUELS IN THE UNITED

STATES. A topic which was quite similar to the one debated during the 1973-74 season. In addition to Harvard's Nuclear Safety affirmative there were cases which sought to reduce Global Warming, Northern Iowa and Wake Forest enjoyed considerable success with that approach; there were many cases which analogized between the mid-1970's growing Mid-East dependence and how the United States is now increasing importation of oil; Redlands ran that approach most of the year. Suffice to say, debaters emerged from this season incredibly well educated on a variety of issues especially the current trauma associated with the Greenhouse debate throughout the world! If the judge critiques which follow the final round transcript are to be believed this was a superb debate, and obviously a close one!

J.W. Patterson, Lucy Keele, Chester Gibson "The Graciousness Committee." J.W. insured "liquid refreshments," Lucy saw to the organizational arrangements, and Chester kept the food flowing for four days; quite a trio!

At the NDT Committee & Board Dinner the first evening, Tournament Host, Chester Gibson brought out everything Carrollton had to offer from an excellent meal to the mayor and as a final touch his son Chris composed several songs from Les Miserables and performed them with his beautiful helper Miss Tony Anderson. It was an impressive evening to begin an equally impressive NDT!

The 1989-90 National Debate Tournament Administration

TOURNAMENT STAFF

James A. Johnson, Colorado College, Director
Tim Browning, Centralia Washington
Glen Clatterbuck, Butler University
Pat Ganer, Cypress College
Neil Phillips, University of Northern Iowa
Jack Rhodes, University of Miami of Ohio
Sharon Porter, Northern Arizona University

TOURNAMENT HOST

Chester Gibson, Chair, Department of Mass Communication and Theatre Arts, West Georgia College
Bruce R. Daniel, Director of Debate, West Georgia College

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District III Chair, Amy Fugate, Johnson County Community College
District IV Co-Chairs, John Bart, Augustana College and David Hingstman, University of Iowa
District V Co-Chairs, George Ziegelmueller, Wayne State University and Steve Mancuso, University of Michigan
District VI Chair, Chester Gibson, West Georgia College
District VII Chair, Warren Decker, George Mason University
District VIII Chair, Sherry Hall, Harvard University
District IX Chair, Sharon Porter, Northern Arizona University
AFA Eastern Rep, Cori Dauber, University of Pittsburgh
AFA Midwestern Rep, David Snowball, Augustana College Illinois
AFA Southern Rep, John Gossett, University of North Texas
AFA Western Rep, Becky Bjork, University of Utah

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Jack Rhodes, Treasurer, Miami University of Ohio
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EX-OFFICIO NDT COMMITTEE MEMBERS

AFA President, Bill Balthrop, University of North Carolina
Chair, AFA Public Relations, Tom Hollihan, USC
Chair, AFA Educational Practices, Craig Dudczak, Syracuse University
Director NDT Alumni Relations, Bill Southworth, University of Redlands
Director NDT Ranking System, Bob Chandler, Illinois State University

THE 1990 NDT TAB ROOM
Pat Ganer of Cypress College; Paul Slappey of University of Iowa; Sharon Porter of Northern Arizona; Al Johnson; Neil Phillips of Northern Iowa; Jack Rhodes of the University of Miami of Ohio; Tim Browning and Gary Larson.

NDT BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Bill Henderson, No. Iowa; Tim Hynes, Louisville; Lucy Keele, CSU Fullerton Chairperson; Jack Rhodes, Miami of Ohio, Treasurer; Michael Hazen, Wake Forest.

44th Annual
National Debate Tournament
Results

FIRST ROUND AT-LARGE RANKINGS

1. Harvard University	(Coale & Lennon)	(12)
2. University of Northern Iowa	(Hawbaker & Schuler)	(18)
3. University of Redlands	(Cole & Rubinstein)	(35)
4. Wake Forest University	(Coverstone & Kimball)	(47)
5. Dartmouth College	(Groussman & Katyal)	(52)
6. Loyola-Marymount University	(Breshear & Laird)	(62)
7. University of Kentucky	(McKinney & Rockefeller)	(62)
8. University of Iowa	(Coco & Smith)	(74)
9. Weber State College	(Bixby & Martin)	(96)
10. Harvard University	(Cooper and Schnall)	(121)
11. University of Texas	(Goodman & Hugin)	(121)
12. Emory University	(Bergman & Richardson)	(126)
13. Emory University	(Archibald & Summerville)	(129)
14. George Mason University	(Stewart & Tuell)	(132)
15. University of Iowa	(Sandler & Shearer)	(141)
16. University of Pittsburgh	(Bender & Crocker)	(158)

TOP SPEAKERS

1. Marc Rubinstein	University of Redlands 623
2. David Hugin	University of Texas A 620
3. Alan Coverstone	Wake Forest University A 619
4. Aaron Hawbaker	Northern Iowa University A 618/563
5. T. A. McKinney	University of Kentucky A 618/562
6. Judd Kimball	Wake Forest University A 616
6. David Coale	Harvard University A 616
6. Ken Schuler	Northern Iowa University A 616
6. Darren Summerville	Emory University B 616
10. Madison Laird	Loyola-Marymount University 615

QUALIFYING TEAMS

1. Northern Iowa University A	(Hawbaker & Schuler)	7-1	21	(1344)
2. Wake Forest University A	(Coverstone & Kimball)	7-1	20	(1348)
3. University of Redlands	(Cole & Rubinstein)	7-1	19	(1347)
4. University of Iowa A	(Coco & Smith)	7-1	17	(1330)
5. Harvard University A	(Coale & Lennon)	6-2	19	(1342)
6. University of Texas A	(Goodman & Hugin)	6-2	18	(1338)
7. University of Michigan A	(Kohl & Shors)	6-2	18	(1329)
8. Dartmouth College A	(Groussman & Katyal)	6-2	18	(1307)
9. Emory University B	(Archibald & Summerville)	6-2	17	(1343)
10. Dartmouth College B	(Agran & Young)	6-2	17	(1297)
11. George Mason University A	(Stewart & Tuell)	6-2	15	(1311)
12. Southwest Texas State University	(Mueller & Phelps)	6-2	14	(1299)
13. Loyola-Marymount University	(Breshears & Laird)	5-3	17	(1316)
14. George Washington University	(Del Signore & Greenwald)	5-3	16	(1306)
15. Georgetown University A	(Kuswa & Mabe)	5-3	16	(1308)
16. University of Kentucky A	(McKinney & Rockefeller)	5-3	15	(1334)
17. Weber State College A	(Bixby & Martin)	5-3	15	(1316)
18. Northwestern University A	(Alderete & Murray)	5-3	15	(1294)
19. Harvard University B	(Cooper & Schnall)	5-3	14	(1312)
20. University of Iowa B	(Sandler & Shearer)	5-3	14	(1304)
21. University of North Carolina	(Burgess & Goldstein)	5-3	14	(1307)
22. Augustana, S.D. A	(Aldridge & LeMay)	5-3	14	(1297)
23. University of New Mexico	(Millsap & Shu)	5-3	14	(1264)

1990 Elimination Round Results



OUTSTANDING SPEAKERS

David Hugin and Marc Rubinstein

Entering the 1990 NDT it probably would have been difficult to select an odds-on-favorite to win Top Speaker. As the year's results, found later in this book, suggest, there were eight different top speakers at the sixteen major national tournaments. Andrew Schrank of Michigan, probably would have been the favorite had he not retired after winning his third top speaker award out of four tournaments, he was second at the other. All of the top ten speakers at the NDT were regulars among top ten performers at other tournaments. David Hugin, a twenty-three year old debater for the University of Texas had been among the top five at most tournaments. David's success was all the more impressive given that he was the first affirmative speaker on his team. However, the Anthropology Major who plans on attending the University of Texas Law School in the Fall had long since established his speaking skills, for as a senior at Plano High School David won the NFL Extemp Tournament. The 1990 NDT outstanding speaker similarly hails from Texas, only from Dallas. Marc Rubinstein is only a junior and is majoring in Political Science at the University of Redlands. His victory was hardly a surprise. He had been among the top four speakers at seven of the ten tournaments he attended prior to the NDT. He and his colleague were among the top three point teams at every tournament they attended. Marc is the first junior to win top speaker since Lyn Robbins in 1986, and only five other non-seniors have been so honored. His victory was clearly a very popular choice, as the ovation continued long after the announcement had been made and the TIFFANY BOWL awarded.

Alan Coverstone of Wake Forest received the THIRD SPEAKER AWARD from AFA President Bill Balthrop. Alan and his colleague, Judd Kimball, the tournament's sixth speaker, had both consistently been among the top ten speakers. They were The Second Seed at the Tournament and a definite pre-tournament candidate to win.

Aaron Hawbaker of Northern Iowa receives the Tournament's FOURTH BEST SPEAKER AWARD from Host Chester Gibson. Aaron and his colleague Ken Schuler were probably the year's most successful duo both having been top speaker several times and always among the top ten. They were the TOP SEED and probably the Pre-Tournament pick given the streak they were on!

First Place Team

The Victorious Harvard Contingent
Sherry Hall, David Coale, Alex Lennon, Dallas Perkins

Harvard's victory in the 44th NDT was the culmination of a most impressive year. Top Honors at Kentucky, Georgetown and Dartmouth made their number one First-Round Ranking not only justified but near unanimous. As usual Harvard only attended eight tournaments, but by year's end their 84-15 record was outstanding, especially when one considers they lost only three affirmatives all year. This is not to suggest they were a weak negative team, but their two NDT losses were both on the negative and both to new cases. Like many Harvard teams before them, Alex and David enjoyed debating Nuclear Power, it would perhaps be stretching the word "substantial" and perhaps "reduction" to say the results of the plan were less fossil fuel consumption; but by running the same case most of the year topicality had long since left the scene and the debates became far more substantive.

It is not surprising that David Coale, a twenty-one year old will graduate with Honors in Economics and attend the University of Texas Law School in the Fall, returning home. David's only comment after the round was, "it was worth it!" Alex Lennon, a twenty-year old junior majoring in Government was more euphoric when he indicated it was "the best debate I've ever been in!" Alex is a little closer to home than David. He hails from Scarsdale, New York where he competed for Edgemont High School. Both debaters and coaches were consistently seeking recognition for the second team from Harvard, Sam Cooper and Matt Schnall, and justifiably so. With only two coaches and four debaters to sustain the incredible work effort necessary to compete successfully on the NDT level, it is clear that Sam and Matt were an essential component in Alex and David's success. Just as obvious was the contribution made by the two coaches Sherry Hall and Dallas Perkins. For Sherry it was her first NDT victory, for Dallas it was his second, having won in 1985 as well. The calibre of argumentation, the sophistication of approaches and depth of quality research once again brought Harvard a National Title. A significant victory it was. It tied Harvard with Northwestern for the most NDT wins at six each. With Alex only being a junior perhaps the tie will be broken in 1991?



Marc Rubinstein cross-examines David Coale as the 1990 Final Round began!

Second Place Team

Marc Rubinstein, Bill Southworth, the Walker Trophy and Rodger Cole. Nothing went right that night, even the team photo didn't turn out for Redlands as it did for Harvard. It was the glare from the banner, not Southworth's head, which caused the malfunction and necessitated a second photo later!

Not quite dejavu, a year ago Marc Rubinstein debating with Dave Herrick defeated this same Harvard Team in the first elimination round on the negative in a 5-0 decision. Of Harvard's three affirmative losses this season, Redlands had administered two of them and was the only team to defeat Harvard's affirmative in the elims, so the closeness of the round was no surprise. Cole and Rubinstein were enjoying a most successful year, especially the second half, they were 11-1 at Northwestern losing in the semis before entering the NDT as the Third First Round-At-Large and ultimately the tournaments Third Seed. Their final record of 90 wins and 30 losses included four victories over Harvard the most by any team, unfortunately for Redlands that impressive record also included five losses to Harvard, the most for them to any team.

However, like several final rounds during the 1980's this second place team returns intact for the 1990-91 season. Rodger Cole is a 21-year-old junior majoring in political science. Rodger, a California native, hails from Bakersfield where he debated for West Bakersfield High School. Marc Rubinstein is also a junior who was born in Baltimore but raised in Dallas, and is familiar with second place finishes at Nationals as he did while debating for St. Mark's School of Texas at the 1987 NFL Tournament. Of course, Marc has nothing on his coach, Bill Southworth, who has over the past fifteen years had three second place finishes at the NDT, all by 3-2 decisions.

Marc summarized his, and Rodger's position on the round and the activity in general, when he said at the end of his 2NR, "I truly enjoy the activity and the knowledge and experiences it has provided me." Both debaters spend an incredible amount of time researching, but also a lot of time at tournaments both college and high school. They truly do enjoy the activity and all it has to offer.



A larger than usual audience "stuck it out" to the bitter end. Considering the decision wasn't announced until two hours after the debate and that was seventeen hours after the day had begun, it is amazing anyone was present, let alone awake!

First Round At-Large Award



REX BARTLEY COPELAND
1969-1989
"He who has done his best for his own time has lived for all times."
Friedrich von Schiller

On September 21, 1989 the life of Rex Copeland was brought to a sudden and tragic close. With its end Samford University lost an outstanding student, the forensic community lost an excellent debater and his many friends were deprived of the friendship and love of a fine individual person. Rex initiated his commitment to competitive debate during his years at Huffman High School in Birmingham. Each year saw ever greater growth, success and recognition. Indeed, by the conclusion of his junior collegiate season at Samford (1988-1989) there was no question that he had established himself as one of the finest debaters in the entire country. No doubt his senior year would have witnessed a distinguished culmination to an outstanding career. Many of us knew how much he eagerly anticipated it.

Word of his tragic death first reached many of the forensic community at the Northern Iowa University Tournament. That event, and many others subsequently conducted, were all marked by a sense of acute professional, and even greater personal, loss. For Rex was seen as respected foe and valued friend by many students and coaches alike on "the circuit."

It is in recognition of those rare professional and personal qualities which Rex offered that Samford University together with his parents determined to endow a permanent award in his name. Therefore, with the agreement of the NDT Board of Trustees and the NDT National Committee, the Rex Copeland Memorial Award will be presented annually to the collegiate debate team ranked "Number One" in the First Round, At-Large team selections. A perpetual plaque will also be established and engraved with the names of all past rec ip-ients.

At the 1990 NDT at West Georgia College the first Copeland Award was presented to Alex Lennon and David Coale of Harvard University by Keith Herron, present coach at Samford University. Harvard's Director, Dallas Perkins, in accepting the honor fully conveyed the emotional loss which many of our community had continued to express throughout the year.

The NDT believes that this annual award will continue to bring well deserved recognition to its recipients and its namesake in the years to come.

Harold Hunt, Chairman Speech Department, Samford University;, Don Hall, former Debater for Samford; Mrs. Barbara Hunt, Keith Herron former Debater for Samford; Sherry Hall;
Mrs. Emila Copeland, Mr. Jim Copeland, Rex's parents, Dallas Perkins
Alex Lennon and David Coale

First Round AT-Large Teams

	FIRST	SECOND
1973	GEORGETOWN (Jay & Ziff) UNANIMOUS	NORTHWESTERN (Minceberg & Marmer)
1974	HARVARD (Garvin & Rosenbaum)	KANSAS (Goldman & Webster)
1975	GEORGETOWN (Rollins & Ziff)	REDLANDS (Clark & Webb)
1976	AUGUSTANA, Ill. (Feldhake & Godfrey)	GEORGETOWN (Rollins & Walker)
1977	GEORGETOWN (Ottoson & Walker)	KANSAS (Cross & Rowland)
1978	GEORGETOWN (Ottoson & Rollins)	NORTHWESTERN (Cotham & Singer)
1979	NORTHWESTERN (Wonnell & Winkler)	HARVARD (Foutz & Seville-Jones)
1980	GEORGETOWN (Kirkland & Thompson)	DARTMOUTH (Isaacson & Meagher)
1981	DARTMOUTH (Smith & Weinhardt)	KENTUCKY (Jones & Mancuso)
1982	KANSAS (Gidley & Grant)	WEST GEORGIA (Arrington & Peragine)
1983	SAMFORD (Gardner & Walker)	DARTMOUTH (Jacobsohn & Lyon)
1984	DARTMOUTH (Gail & Koulogeorge)	HARVARD (Massey & Weiner)
1985	CLAREMONT (Bloom & Mastel)	KENTUCKY (Mankins & Papka)
1986	MASSACHUSETTS (Friedman & Povinelli)	DARTMOUTH (Jaffe & Mahoney)
1987	BAYLOR (Vincent & Robbins)	KANSAS (Culver & Lopez)
1988	NORTHWESTERN (Attias & Mitchell)	DARTMOUTH (Martin & Wick)
1989	BAYLOR (Loeber & Plants) UNANIMOUS	NORTHWESTERN (Mitchell & Reiter)
1990	HARVARD (Coale & Lennon)	NORTHERN IOWA (Hawbaker & Schuler)

Begun in 1973 the At-Large system was devised to remove from the district tournaments the most outstanding teams who deserved automatic invitations to the National Tournament. In 1973 there were fifty-five applications for sixteen spots, and amazingly the first year there was a unanimous first. It was one of several top bids for Georgetown University, who during the Unger era dominated the At-Large Voting with five first bids in eight years. Several years found the difference between one and two to be very slim, the above lists of the number one followed by the number two First Round At-Larges is intended to give them the recognition they so richly deserve.

1989-90 National N.D.T. Tournament Highlights*

Teams & Speakers

TOURNAMENT	FIRST	SECOND	THIRDS
NORTHERN IOWA UNIV. September 1989	KENTUCKY A Kimball, Wake A	HARVARD A Rubinstein, Red. A	GEORGE MASON & WAKE FOREST A McKinney, KY A
EMORY UNIV. October 1989	LOYOLA Schuler, No. Iowa A	NO. IOWA A Bixby, Weber St.	WEBER ST. & TEXAS C Goodman, TX A
KENTUCKY ROUND-ROBIN October 1989	MICHIGAN A Schrank, Mich. A	WAKE FOREST A Schuler, No. Iowa A	HARVARD A Coverstone, Wake A
KENTUCKY "Clay" October 1989	HARVARD A Hawbaker, No. Iowa A	MICHIGAN A Schrank, Mich. A	EMORY (A&S) & REDLANDS A Hugin, Texas A
NORTH CAROLINA October 1989	LOYOLA Laird, Loyola	EMORY (A&S) Crocker, Pitt.	PITTSBURGH & EMORY (B&R) Greenwald, George Washington
HARVARD November 1989	REDLANDS A Schuler, No. Iowa A	WAKE FOREST A Coverstone, Wake A	NO. IOWA A & REDLANDS B Rubinstein, Red. A
WAKE FOREST "Dixie" November 1989	IOWA A Schrank, Mich. A	DARTMOUTH A Laird, Loyola	MICHIGAN (S&K) & KENTUCKY A Coale, Harvard A
GEORGETOWN November 1989	HARVARD A (Close-out) T.A. McKinney, Kentucky A	HARVARD B Schuler, No. Iowa A	IOWA B & NO. IOWA A Rochefeller, Kentucky A
USC "Alan Nichols" December 1989	LOYOLA Rubinstein, Red. A	WEBER STATE Coale, Harvard A	HARVARD A & HARVARD B Coverstone, Wake A
CSU FULLERTON January 1990	WAKE FOREST A Kimball, Wake A	TEXAS A Hugin, Texas A	GEORGE MASON & NORTH CAROLINA Stewart, George Mason
MIAMI OF OHIO January 1990	DARTMOUTH A Schrank, Mich. A	REDLANDS A Rubinstein, Red. A	EMORY (A&S) & EMORY (B&R) Katyual, Dart. A
WEST GEORGIA "Tisinger" January 1990	NO. IOWA A Stewart, George Mason	IOWA A Laird, Loyola	DARTMOUTH A & LOYOLA Wren, Redlands C
DARTMOUTH January 1990	HARVARD A Schuler, No. Iowa A	NO. IOWA A Lennon, Harvard A	WAKE FOREST A & WEBER STATE Coverstone, Wake A
BAYLOR "Glenn Capp" January 1990	TEXAS A Laird, Loyola	DARTMOUTH A Jencks, Texas B	REDLANDS A & SOUTHWEST TEXAS Katyal, Dart. A
NORTHWESTERN "Coon" February 1990	NO. IOWA A Laird, Loyola	KENTUCKY A Jencks, Texas B	REDLANDS A & WAKE FOREST A Cole, Red. A
KANSAS "Heart America" February 1990	NO. IOWA A Hawbaker, No. Iowa A	WAKE FOREST A Coverstone, WF A	DARTMOUTH A Bixby, Weber St.
44th N.D.T. March/April 1990	HARVARD A Rubinstein, Red. A	REDLANDS A Hugin, Texas A	DARTMOUTH A & DARTMOUTH B Coverstone, Wake A

*While there are many more NDT Tournaments held during the year, it was necessary to limit tournaments to those which had at least four ultimate First-Round-At-Large Teams in attendance.



David Breshears and Madison Laird
Loyola-Marymount University entered the NDT as legitimate contenders for the title being the 6th First Round, unlike their basketball team which entered the NCAA's as a sentimental underdog. Both however reached the quarter finals and were ultimately defeated by the ultimate winners, and here the debaters display their own recognition of Hank Gathers and what his memory meant to them and Loyola University.

Final 1989-90 N.D.T. Ranking System Results

In 1986 the NDT Committee established a year-long point system designed to provide national recognition to those programs which do well throughout the year at many different NDT Tournaments with multiple teams attending. Only institutions which subscribe to the NDT are eligible, and points are allocated on the basis of both preliminary and elimination round wins and ballots. The entire forensic community is grateful to Bob Chandler of Illinois State University for directing this most difficult task. Similar congratulations should be extended to Boston College and their coaches Dale Herbeck and John Katsulas for catapulting their program to the number one position for the 1989-90 season. There were seventy-nine institutions competing during the season, the TOP TWENTY-FIVE finishers are listed below:

1. BOSTON COLLEGE	379	14. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY	295
2. GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY	373	15. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	292
3. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY	354	16. ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY	282
4. DARTMOUTH COLLEGE	353	17. UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS	278
5. HARVARD UNIVERSITY	346	18. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY	272
6. JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY	341	19. TRINITY UNIVERSITY	269
7. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA	325	20. MARY WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	269
8. EMORY UNIVERSITY	319	21. BAYLOR UNIVERSITY	267
9. UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS	314	22. USC	258
10. U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY	309	23. WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY	256
11. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS	305	24. AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (Ill.)	255
12. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY	304	25. WEBER STATE COLLEGE	253
13. NORTHERN IOWA UNIVERSITY	298		

The RANKING SYSTEM also recognizes those institutions which show the greatest improvement from one year to the next, the TOP TEN MOST IMPROVED are listed:

1. PACE UNIVERSITY	814%	6. LOYOLA-MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY	239%
2. NEBRASKA WESLEYAN COLLEGE	678%	7. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS	205%
3. RANDOLPH MACON COLLEGE	320%	8. WASHBURN COLLEGE	184%
4. SOUTHWEST TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY	263%	9. FAIRMONT STATE COLLEGE	181%
5. BOSTON COLLEGE	261%	10. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA	177%

A group of judges between rounds discussing some of the key intellectual arguments which emerged in the last round they judged. Headed by the new Director of Debate at Northwestern, Scott Deatherage and aided by his predecessor Chuck Kauffman, the group is drawing numbers to see who speaks first. We should be proud of such dedication! I am sure the debaters were off somewhere fooling around or doing something stupid like picking a baseball rotisserie league!

1990 N.D.T. Participants
Team Photographs

DISTRICT 1
Bakersfield Community College
California State University at Fullerton
Loyola-Marymount University
University of LaVerne
University of Redlands
University of Southern California

DISTRICT III
Baylor University
Houston Baptist University
Odessa College
Southwest Texas State University
University of Kansas
University of North Texas
Washburn University

DISTRICT IV
Augustana College, S.D.
Concordia College
University of Iowa
University of Northern Iowa

DISTRICT V
Augustana College, Il.
Butler University
Central Michigan University
Illinois State University
Marietta College
Northwestern University
University of Michigan
Wayne State University

DISTRICT VI
Emory University
University of Georgia
University of Kentucky
University of Louisville
University of North Carolina
Wake Forest University
West Georgia College

DISTRICT VII
George Mason University
Georgetown University
George Washington University
James Madison University
Liberty University
University of Pennsylvania
University of Pittsburgh

DISTRICT VIII
Bates College
Boston College
Dartmouth College
Harvard University
Pace University

DISTRICT IX
University of New Mexico
University of Utah
University of Wyoming
Weber State College

"THE TRADITIONAL BIG BOARD"

DISTRICT I



BAKERSFIELD COMMUNITY COLLEGE
John Ford, Bob Lechtreck, Coach; Gene Williams

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FULLERTON
Jon Bruschke, Coach; Bob Gass, Director;
Jeanine Congalton, Coach
Walter Wright, Chris Daley

UNIVERSITY OF LaVERNE
Anthony Lacasmana, Robert Rivera, Director; Sean Doherty

LOYOLA-MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY
David Breshears, Madison Laird

UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS
David Herrick, Coach; Marc Rubinstein, Rodger Cole,
Bill Southworth, Director

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TEAM A
Jerry Burns, Coach; Carrie Crenshaw, Coach;
Greg Miller, Coach; Barb Pickering, Coach;
Jim Hanson, Coach;
Robert McDade, Tom Hollihan, Director; Evelyn Becker

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TEAM B
Burns, Crenshaw, Miller, Pickering, Hanson
Rene Lucaric, Hollihan, James Gaynor

DISTRICT III

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Griffin Vincent, Coach; Benny Voth, Coach;
Cary Voss, Coach;
Rich Edwards, Director; Lyn Robbins, Coach, Bill Trapeni,
Rod Phares

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Daniel Plants, Coach; Vincent Voth, Voss, Edwards, Robbins,
Jay Unick, Todd Wade

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS, TEAM A
Karla Leeper, Coach; John Fritch, Coach;
Ben Biermann, Coach;
Jeremy Phillips, Beth Skinner

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS, TEAM B
Leeper, Fritch, Biermann, Dan Francis, Tim Howard

HOUSTON BAPTIST UNIVERSITY
Brent Benoit, Erik Walker, Director; Gregory Pier

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS
Keith Woods, Coach; Kyle Garrison, Coach;
Terry Garrett, Coach;
Marty Sadler, Director; Chris Agee, James Cooper Johnson

ODESSA COLLEGE
Mark Spears, Becki Horn, Kyle Garrison, Coach

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, TEAM A
Craig Budner, Coach; Bill Shanahan, Coach;
Joel Rollins, Director
David Hugin, Ryan Goodman

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, TEAM B
Budner, Shanahan, Rollins, Nikheel Dhekne, David Wyrick

SOUTHWEST TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Russ Phelps, Rey Garcia, Director; Eric Mueller

WASHBURN UNIVERSITY
Cheryl Burbach, Nick Backus, Director; Greg Achten

DISTRICT IV

AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (SD) TEAM A
Heather Aldridge, John Bart, Director; Mike LeMay

AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (SD) TEAM B
Heidi Hamilton, Bart, Chris Moorhead

CONCORDIA COLLEGE
Courtney Ward, Coach; Gayle Borchert, Todd Trautman,
Phillip Voight, Director

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, TEAM A
Greg Abbott, Coach; David Hingstman, Director;
Michael Janas, Coach
Nathan Coco, Charles Smith

UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, TEAM B
Abbott, Hingstman, Janas
Shawn Shearer, Randal Sandler

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA, TEAM A
Bill Henderson, Director; Walter Ulrich, Coach
Ken Schuler, Aaron Hawbaker

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA, TEAM B
Henderson, Ulrich
Daniel Janssen, Jon Morphew

DISTRICT V

AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (IL) TEAM A
Terri Thomas, Stephen Anderson, Coach;
David Snowball, Director; Phil Wilson

AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (IL) TEAM B
Steve Miller, Anderson, Snowball, Craig Trepanier



BUTLER UNIVERSITY
Scott Kerin, David Waite, Director; Jim Cherney

Photo Missing

CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
Ed Hinck, Director; Mabb and Wolfe

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Robert Chandler, Director; Kathleen Edelmayer, Coach;
David Vanderport Coach, Doug Albritton, Andy Reisman

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Chandler, Edelmayer, Vanderport
Paul Cash, Jon Neuleib

MARIETTA COLLEGE
Liz Hamilton, Ralph Carbone, Director; Jon Hamilton

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, TEAM A
Jeff Mondak, Coach; Colin Kahl, Matt Shors,
Steve Mancuso, Director

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, TEAM B
Mondak, Rob Millimet, Dennis Devine, Mancuso

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Arnie Madsen, Coach; Erik Doxstader, Coach;
Catherine Palczewski, Coach; Scott Deatherage, Coach;
Chuck Kauffman, Director, Tim Alderete, Cameron Murray

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Madsen, Doxstader, Palczewski, Deatherage, Kauffman
Dan Sturgis, Brad Winter

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Dan Bloomingdale, Coach; Sydne Kasle, Coach;
P. Scott Thomson, Coach; George Ziegelmueller, Director
Bob Bryant, Patrice Arends

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Kasle, Bloomingdale, Thomson, Ziegelmueller
Steve Prannes, Scott Warrow

DISTRICT VI

EMORY UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Bill Newnam, Coach; Melissa Wade, Director;
Joe Bellon, Coach; Drew Dowell, Coach;
Frank Lowrey, Coach
Jeffrey Richardson, Jason Bergmann

EMORY UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Newnam, Wade, Bellon, Dowell, Lowrey
Jim Archibald, Darren Summerville

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
Lynne Coyne, Coach; Bob Frank, Coach;
Edward Panetta, Director; Mark Bailey, Coach;
Allison Ashe, Kelly Happe

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, TEAM A
Roger Solt, Coach; T.A. McKinney, Calvin Rockefeller,
J.W. Patterson, Director

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, TEAM B
Solt, David Walsh, Jerry Gallagher, Patterson

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE (We Think?)
Scott Harris, Director; John Delicath, Kevin Duddlesten,
Eric Vessels, Judge

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
Yuzuru Yamashita, Coach; Mike Greco, Coach;
Kevin Sargent, Coach; Bill Balthrop, Director
Tom Goldstein, Geoffrey P. Burgess

WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Allan Louden, Director; Gordon Mitchell, Coach;
Dan Lingel, Coach; Kevin Hamrick, Coach;
Ross Smith, Asst. Director
Judd Kimball, Alan Coverstone

WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Mitsuhiro Fujamaki, Coach; Hamrick, Mitchell, Brian Lain,
Mike Ridge

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE, TEAM A
Bruce Daniel, Coach; Dan Turner, Michael Hester,
Chester Gibson, Director

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE, TEAM B
Daniel, Chris Olliff, Brian Key, Gibson

DISTRICT VII

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Ron Bratt, Coach; Jeff Parcher, Coach;
Warren Decker, Director; Star Muir, Coach;
Leonard Bennett, Coach
Laura Tuell, Alan Stewart

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Bratt, Parcher, Decker, Muir, Leonard
Neil Butt, Doug Frye



GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Marc Del Signore, Steve Keller, Director;
Glenn Greenwald

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Kevin Kuswa, David Chesier, Director; William Mabe

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Timothy McRae, Chesier, Cynthia Bright

JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY, Team A
Rob Russell, Coach; David Foley, Sue Pester,
Cecilia Graves, Director

JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY, Team B
Russell, David Hall, J.P. Lacy, Graves

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
Brett O'Donnell, Coach; David Kester, Eugene Han



UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Rob Hernandez, Scott Segal, Coach; Tom Schmidt

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, TEAM A
Terry Check, Coach; Ron Wastyn, Coach;
Peter Bsumek, Coach; Carl Craver, Coach;
Jarle Crocker, Cori Dauber, Director; Frank Bender

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, TEAM B
Check, Wastyn, Bsumek, Craver
Anand Rao, Dauber, Stefan Bauschard

DISTRICT VIII

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, TEAM A
Shaun Martin, Coach; Frank LaSalle, Coach;
Ken Strange, Director;
Neal Katyal, Scott Groussman

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, TEAM B
Strange, LaSalle, Martin
Kenny Agran, Ernie Young



BATES COLLEGE
David Kim, Steve Dolley, Coach; Evan Medeiros

BOSTON COLLEGE
Dale Herbeck, Director; Darren Schwiebert, Craig Cerniello,
John Katsulas, Coach

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, TEAM A
Dallas Perkins, Coach; Charlie Synn, Judge;
Sherry Hall, Director;
Jonathan Wiener, Coach, Alex Lennon, David Coale

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, TEAM B
Perkins, Synn, Hall, Wiener, Samuel Cooper,
Matthew Schnall

PACE UNIVERSITY (Photo Missing)
Winston Sapaijao, Douglas Wipper, Urcil Peters, Coach

DISTRICT IX

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
D'Andra Millsap, Thomas Jewell, Director; Glen Shu

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Shawn Whalen, Coach; Jim Groutage, Mike Holton,
Rebecca Bjork, Director



WEBER STATE COLLEGE, TEAM A
James Martin, Michael Bryant, Director; Ted Bixby

WEBER STATE COLLEGE, TEAM B
Randy Butterfield, Bryant, Danny Fitzgerald

UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING
Wendy Irving, Lee Templar, Coach; Sue Balter, Coach,
Wayne Callaway, Director; Dyann Michel

Tournament Facts, 1947 - 1990

From 1947 to 1966 the NDT was held at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.

1967
Site: University of Chicago
Host: Richard L. LaVarnway & Thomas B. McClain
Director: Stanley G. Rives

1968
Site: Brooklyn College
Host: Charles E. Parkhurst
Director: Richard D. Rieke

1969
Site: Northern Illinois University
Host: M. Jack Parker
Director: Roger Hufford

1970
Site: University of Houston
Host: William B. English
Director: David Matheny

1971
Site: Macalester College
Host: W. Scott Nobles
Director: John C. Lehman

1972
Site: University of Utah
Host: Jack Rhodes
Director: John C. Lehman

1973
Site: U.S. Naval Academy
Host: Philip Warken
Director: Merwyn A. Hayes

1974
Site: U.S. Air Force Academy
Host: David Whitlock
Director: Merwyn A. Hayes

1975
Site: University of the Pacific
Host: Paul Winters
Director: Michael David Hazen

1976
Site: Boston College
Host: Daniel M. Rohrer
Director: Michael David Hazen

1977
Site: Southwestern Missouri State University
Host: Rita Rice Flaningam
Director: Michael David Hazen

1978
Site: Metropolitan State College, Denver
Host: Gary Holbrook
Director: Michael David Hazen

1979
Site: University of Kentucky
Host: J.W. Patterson
Director: Michael David Hazen

1980
Site: University of Arizona
Host: Tim A. Browning
Director: Michael David Hazen

1981
Site: California Polytechnic State University, Pomona
Host: Robert Charles
Director: Michael David Hazen

1982
Site: Florida State University
Host: Marilyn J. Young
Director: Michael David Hazen

1983
Site: Colorado College
Host: James A. Johnson
Director: Michael David Hazen

1984
Site: University of Tennessee
Host: Russell Taylor Church
Director: David Zarefsky

1985
Site: Gonzaga University
Host: Darrell Scott and Joan Archer-Cronin
Director: David Zarefsky

1986
Site: Dartmouth College
Host: Herbert L. James
Director: David Zarefsky

1987
Site: Illinois State University
Host: Arnie Madsen
Director: David Zarefsky

1988
Site: Weber State College
Host: Randy Scott
Director: David Zarefsky

1989
Site: Miami University of Ohio
Host: Jack Rhodes
Director: David Zarefsky

1990
Site: West Georgia College
Host: Chester Gibson
Director: Al Johnson

Top Speakers, 1957 - 1990

1957
1st: **Patricia Stallings,** University of Houston
2nd: **Phillip Hubbard,** Augustana College (Ill.)

1958
1st: **Michael Miller,** University of Southern California
2nd: **Phillip Hubbard,** Augustana College (ill.)

1959
1st: **James Ray,** United States Military Academy
2nd: **Ray Nichols,** University of Kansas

1960
1st: **Don Herrick,** William Jewell College
2nd: **George Schell,** Baylor University

1961
1st: **George Schell,** Baylor University
2nd: **Laurence Tribe,** Harvard University

1962
Tie: **Lee Huebner,** Northwestern University
Tie: **Harold Lawson,** Kansas State Teachers College

1963
1st: **Daniel Kolb,** College of the Holy Cross
2nd: **Robert Roberts,** University of Alabama

1964
1st: **Robert Roberts,** University of Alabama
2nd: **John Hempelmann,** Georgetown University

1965
1st: **Robert Shrum,** Georgetown University
2nd: **Douglas Pipes,** University of the Pacific

1966
1st: **William Snyder,** Northwestern University
2nd: **John Holcomb,** Augustana College (Ill.)

1967
1st: **Rick Flam,** University of Southern California
2nd: **Thomas Brewer,** Dartmouth College

1968
1st: **David Zarefsky,** Northwestern University
2nd: **Richard Brautigam,** Michigan State University

1969
1st: David Seikel, University of Houston
2nd: **Joel Perwin,** Harvard University

1970
1st: **Mike Miller,** University of Houston
2nd: **Jim Caforio,** Loyola University (Los Angeles) and **David Goss,** Canisius College

1971
1st: **Joe Loveland,** University of North Carolina
2nd: **Joseph Angland,** Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1972
1st: **Terry McNight,** Canisius College
2nd: **Ron Palmieri,** University of Southern California

1973
1st: **Elliot Mincberg,** Northwestern University
2nd: **Frank Kimball,** University of California at Los Angeles

1974
1st: **Michael Higelin,** University of Southern California
2nd: **Marvin Isgur,** University of Houston

1975
1st: **Thomas Rollins,** Georgetown University
2nd: **Robert Feldhake,** Augustana College (Ill.)

1976
1st: **Robert Feldhake,** Augustana College (Ill.)
2nd: **Thomas Rollins,** Georgetown University

1977
1st: **Gilbert Skillman,** University of Kentucky
2nd: **John Walker,** Georgetown University

1978
1st: **Thomas Rollins,** Georgetown University
2nd: **Stuart Singer,** Northwestern University

1979
1st: **Mark Fabiani,** University of Redlands
2nd: **Michael B. King,** Harvard University

1980
1st: **Steven Meagher,** Dartmouth College
2nd: **Don Dripps,** Northwestern University

1981
1st: **Jeff Jones,** University of Kentucky
2nd: **Paul Weathington,** West Georgia College and **Scott Harris,** Wayne State University

1982
1st: **Steve Mancuso,** University of Kentucky
2nd; **John Barrett,** Georgetown University

1983
1st: **John Barrett,** Georgetown University
2nd: **Leonard Gail,** Dartmouth College

1984
1st: **Leonard Gail,** Dartmouth College
2nd: **Bill Brewster,** Emory University

1985
1st: **Danny Povinelli,** University of Massachusetts
2nd: **Doug Sigel,** Northwestern University

1986
1st: **Lyn Robbins,** Baylor University
2nd: **Scott Segal,** Emory University

1987
1st: **Lyn Robbins,** Baylor University
2nd: **John Culver,** University of Kansas

1988
1st: **Gloria Cabada,** Wake Forest University
2nd: **Barry Pickens,** University of Kansas

1989
1st: **Gordon Mitchell,** Northwestern University
2nd: **Daniel Plants,** Baylor University

1990
1st: **Marc Rubinstein,** University of Redlands
2nd: **David Hugin,** University of Texas

Tournament Results

YEAR	CHAMPIONS	RUNNERS-UP
1947	**Southeastern State College** W. Scott Nobles and Gerald Sanders Coach: T.A. Houston	**University of Southern California** Potter Kerfott and George Grover Coach: Alan Nichols
1948	**North Texas State College** Keith Parks and David Cotton Coach: S.B. McAlister	**University of Florida** Alan Weston and Gerald Gordon Coach: Wayne Eubank
1949	**University of Alabama** Oscar Newton and Mitchell Latoff Coach: Annabel D. Hagood	**Baylor University** Thomas Webb and Joseph Allbritton Coach: Glenn Capp
1950	**University of Vermont** Richard O'Connell and Thomas Hayes Coach: Robert B. Huber	**Augustana College** Dorothy Koch and Charles Lindberg Coach: Martin Holcomb
1951	**University of Redlands** James Wilson and Holt Spicer Coach: E. R. Nichols	**Kansas State Teachers College** Robert Howard and Robert Kaiser Coach: Charles Master
1952	**University of Redlands** James Wilson and Holt Spicer Coach: E.R. Nichols	**Baylor University** John Claypool and Calvin Cannon Coach: Glenn Capp
1953	**University of Miami** Gerald Kogan and Lawrence Perlmutter Coach: Donald Sprague	**College of the Holy Cross** Michael McNulty and John O'Connor Coach: Henry J. Murphy, S.J.
1954	**University of Kansas** William Arnold and Hubert Bell Coach: Kim Giffin	**University of Florida** Robert Shevin and Larry Sands Coach: Douglas Ehninger
1955	**University of Alabama** Dennis Holt and Elis Storey Coach: Anabel D. Hagood	**Wilkes College** Harold Flannery and James Neveras Coach: Arthur Kruger
1956	**United States Military Academy** George Walker and James Murphy Coach: Abbott Greenleaf	**Saint Joseph's College** John Gough and J. Foley Coach: Joseph Erhart, S.J.
1957	**Augustana College** Norman Lefstein and Phillip Hubbard Coach: Martin Holcomb	**United States Military Academy** James Murphy and George Walker Coach: Abbott Greenleaf
1958	**Northwestern University** William Welsh and Richard Kirshberg Coach: Russell R. Windes	**Harvard University** David Bynum and James Kincaid Coach: Robert O'Neill
1959	**Northwestern University** William Welsh and Richard Kirshberg Coach: Russell R. Windes	**Wisconsin State University of Eau Claire** James Shafer and Charles Bush Coach: Grace Walsh
1960	**Dartmouth College** Anthony Roisman and Saul Baernstein Coach: Herbert L. James	**San Diego State College** John Raser and Robert Arnhym Coach: John Ackley
1961	**Harvard University** Laurence Tribe and Gene Clements Coach: James Kincaid	**King's College** Frank Harrison and Peter Smith Coach: Robert Connelley
1962	**Ohio State University** Dale Williams and Sarah Benson Coach: Richard Rieke	**Baylor University** Calvin Kent and Michael Henke Coach: Glenn Capp

YEAR	CHAMPIONS	RUNNERS-UP
1963	**Dartmouth College** Frank Wohl and Stephen Kessler Coach: Herbert L. James	**University of Minnesota** Andre Zdrazil and David Krause Coaches: Robert L. Scott and Donn W. Parson
1964	**University of the Pacific** Raoul Kennedy and Douglas Pipes Coach: Paul Winters	**Boston College** Jamers J. Unger and Joseph McLaughlin Coaches: John Lawton and Lee Huebner
1965	**Carson-Newman College** John Wittig and Barnett Pearce Coach: Forrest Conklin	**Northeastern State College** David Johnson and Glen Strickland Coach: Valgene Littlefield
1966	**Northwestern University** Bill Snyder and Mike Denger Coach: Thomas B. McClain	**Wayne State University** Douglas Frost and Kathleen McDonald Coach: George Ziegelmueller
1967	**Dartmouth College** Tom Brewer and John Isaacson Coach: Herbert L. James	**Wayne State University** Don Ritzenheim and Kathleen McDonald Coach: George Ziegelmueller
1968	**Wichita State University** Robert Shields and Lee Thompson Coach: Quincalee Striegel	**Butler University** Donald Kiefer and Carl Flanigam Coach: Nicholas Cripe
1969	**Harvard University** Richard Lewis and Joel Perwin Coach: Laurence Tribe	**University of Houston** David Seikel and Michael Miller Coach: William B. English
1970	**University of Kansas** Robert McCulloh and David Jeans Coaches: Donn W. Parson and Jackson Harrell	**Canisius College** David Goss and David Wagner Coach: Bert Goss
1971	**University of California, Los Angeles** Don Hornstein and Barrett McInerney Coach: Patricia B. Long	**Oberlin College** Scott Lassar and Joe Misner Coach: Larry E. Larmer
1972	**University of California, Santa Barbara** Mike Clough and Mike Fernandez Coach: Kathy Corey	**University of Southern California** Ron Palmieri and Dennis Winston Coach: John C. DeBross
1973	**Northwestern University** Elliot Mincberg and Ron Marmer Coach: David Zarefsky	**Georgetown University** Bradley Ziff and Stewart Jay Coach: James J. Unger
1974	**Harvard University** Greg. A. Rosenbaum and Charles E. Garvin Coach: Mark Arnold	**Augustana College** Bob Feldhake and Rick Godfrey Coach: Dan Bozik
1975	**Baylor University** Jay Hurst and David Kent Coach: Lee Polk	**University of Redlands** Greg Ballard and Bill Smelko Coach: William Southworth
1976	**University of Kansas** Robin Rowland and Frank Cross Coaches: Donn W. Parson and Bill Bathrop	**Georgetown University** Charles Chafer and David Ottoson Coach: James J. Unger
1977	**Georgetown University** John Walker and David Ottoson Coach: James J. Unger	**University of Southern California** Leslie Sherman and Steven Combs Coaches: John C. DeBross and Lee Garrison
1978	**Northwestern University** Mark Cotham and Stuart Singer Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight	**University of Southern California** Steven Combs and Jon Cassanelli Coaches: John C. DeBross and Lee Garrison
1979	**Harvard University** Michael B. King and John M. Bredehoft Coaches: Charles E. Garvin and Greg. A. Rosenbaum	**Northwestern University** Don Dripps and Mark Cotham Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight

YEAR	CHAMPIONS	RUNNERS-UP
1980	**Northwestern University** Don Dripps and Tom Fulkerson Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight	**Harvard University** John M. Bredehoft and William C. Foutz Coaches: Dallas Perkins and L. Jeffrey Pash
1981	**University of Pittsburgh** Michael Alberty and Stephen Marzen Coach: Thomas Kane	**Dartmouth College** Cy Smith and Mark Weinhardt Coaches: Herb James and Ken Strange
1982	**University of Louisville** Dave Sutherland and Dan Sutherland Coach: Tim Hynes	**University of Redlands** Bill Isaacson and Jeff Wagner Coach: William Southworth
1983	**University of Kansas** Mark Gidley and Roger Payne Coach: Donn W. Parson	**Dartmouth College** Robin Jacobsohn and Tom Lyon Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, and Steve Mancuso
1984	**Dartmouth College** Leonard Gail and Mark Koulogeorge Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, & Tom Lyon	**University of Louisville** Cindy Leiferman and Mark Whitehead Coach: Tim Hynes
1985	**Harvard University** Jonathan Massey and Ed Swaine Coaches: Dallas Perkins and Jonathan Wiener	**University of Iowa** Robert Garman and Karla Leeper Coaches: Robert Kemp, Dale Berbeck, Greg Phelps, and John Katsulas
1986	**University of Kentucky** David Brownell and Ouita Papka Coaches: J.W. Patterson and Roger Solt	**Georgetown University** Michael Mazarr and Stuart Rabin Coach: Greg Mastel
1987	**Baylor University** Lyn Robbins and Griffin Vincent Coaches: Robert Rowland, David B. Hingstman, Cary Voss, Bob Gilmore and Mark Dyer	**Dartmouth College** Craig Budner and Chrissy Mahoney Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, David Rhaesa, and Erik Jaffe
1988	**Dartmouth College** Shaun Martin and Rob Wick Coaches: Ken Strange, John Culver, Jeff Leon, Eric Jaffe and Lenny Gail	**Baylor University** Daniel Plants and Martin Loeber Coaches: Cary Voss and Erik Walker
1989	**Baylor University** Daniel Plants and Martin Loeber Coaches: Cary Voss, Lyn Robbins, David Guardina, and Griffin Vincent	**University of Michigan** Andrew Schrank and Joe Thompson Coach: Steve Mancuso
1990	**Harvard University** David Coale and Alex Lennon Coaches: Sherry Hall and Dallas Perkins	**University of Redlands** Rodger Cole and Marc Rubinstein Coach: William Southworth

Ken Agran & Ernie Young **Scott Groussman & Neil Katyal**

Dartmouth dominated the recent coaches poll for selecting the "Best of the 1980's" and quite obviously they have similar designs on the 1990's. Two teams in the semi-finals is quite a rarity, for everyone but Dartmouth who managed it two other times in the 1980's. This time, however, Dartmouth B was debating together for the first time. Illness necessitated combining Mr. Agran and Mr. Young and they in turn combined for a 6-2 record and perhaps the biggest upset in NDT History when they defeated Wake Forest in the quarter-finals. The Dartmouth NDT preparation paid off again, as they clearly had the "goods" on Wake's affirmative. Ken Strange, Dartmouth's Director, obviously not satisfied with third has attempted to insure continued dominance in the 1990's by hiring away from Harvard Sherry Hall. That acquisition, in combination with the fact that only Ernie Young graduates suggests 1990-91 will be another great year for Dartmouth!

NDT Participants, 1947 - 1990

Abilene Christian College: 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 65, 69, 70
University of Alabama: 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 71, 73, 75-79
Albion College: 67, 69
American University: 61
University of Arizona: 49, 50, 69, 76-85
Arizona State University: 47, 67, 87, 88, 89
University of Arkansas: 50
Auburn University: 85, 86
Augustana College (Illinois): 47-60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73-81, 87, 88, 89, 90
Augustana College (South Dakota): 76-85, 87, 89, 90
Bakersfield Community College: 90
Bates College: 48, 76-79, 90
Baylor University: 48-53, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 71, 74-78, 79, 81-90
Boston College: 62, 63, 64, 65, 67-72, 74, 75, 79, 87, 88, 89, 90
Boston University: 60, 73, 74, 75
Bowling Green State University: 50, 51, 70, 75, 76, 78
Bradley University: 51, 69, 79
Brandeis University: 65, 67
Brigham Young University: 55, 56, 60, 62, 63, 66, 78
Brooklyn College: 61
Brown University: 69, 70, 72
Butler University: 59, 61, 67, 68, 80, 81, 83, 88, 90
University of California at Berkeley: 68, 77, 81
University of California at Los Angeles: 48, 54, 66, 68-76, 78
University of California at Santa Barbara: 64, 71, 72, 73, 75
California State University, Fullerton: 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 85-90
California State University, Los Angeles: 55, 56, 61, 66, 73, 76
California State University, Northridge: 65, 67, 68, 72, 74
California State University, Sacramento: 74-79, 81, 82
California State University, San Diego: 49, 52-63, 72
Canisius College: 69-74, 77, 78, 79
Capital University: 48, 73, 74
Carson-Newman College: 64, 65, 66
Case Institute of Technology: 73
Catholic University: 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78
University of Central Florida (Florida Tech): 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83
Central Michigan University: 74, 76, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90
Central Oklahoma State University: 52, 53, 54, 56, 61, 63, 72, 73, 85, 86, 87, 89
Champlain College: 49
University of Chicago: 48, 49
Claremont McKenna (Men's) College: 78-85, 87
Coe College: 48
Colgate University: 51
Colorado College: 75, 77, 79
University of Colorado: 47, 48
Concordia College: 67, 68, 73, 87, 88, 89
Cornell University: 76
Dartmouth College: 48, 51, 54-61, 63-73, 75-90
David Lipscomb College: 55
University of Denver: 54, 67, 68, 69, 70, 85
DePaul University: 48, 49, 51, 57
University of Detroit: 67
Drury College: 72, 80
Duke University: 56, 57, 58, 61
Eastern Illinois University: 71, 74-86, 88, 89
Eastern Nazarene College: 58, 60, 61
Emory University: 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 81-90
Emporia State University: 51, 53, 58-63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82
Fairmont State College: 76, 78
University of Florida: 48, 50-57, 59, 62, 68, 69, 70
Florida State University: 75
Fordham University: 57, 59, 66
Fordham University School of Education: 58, 59, 61
Fort Hays State College: 61
George Mason University: 74, 75, 80, 84-90
George Pepperdine College: 49, 50, 51, 52, 53
George Washington University: 49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62-66, 68-73, 76, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90
Georgetown College: 49
Georgetown University: 49, 52, 56, 61-67, 70-90
University of Georgia: 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 90
Georgia State University: 84, 85, 86, 88
Gonzaga University: 47, 48, 59, 60, 62, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87
Greenville College: 56
Harvard University: 50, 54-90
Hiram College: 52
College of the Holy Cross: 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62, 63
University of Houston: 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 67-83
Houston Baptist University: 87, 89, 90
Howard University: 52, 54
University of Idaho: 53, 57, 61
Idaho State University: 53, 57, 61
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle: 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 64, 65
Illinois College: 54
Illinois State University: 52, 54, 55, 62, 63, 72, 73, 81, 88, 89, 90
Indiana State University: 47, 73
University of Iowa: 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83-89
Iowa State University: 52, 71, 74, 82, 83, 84
James Madison University: 79-84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90
John Carroll University: 78, 80, 81
John Hopkins University: 77, 78, 79
University of Kansas: 48-60, 63, 64, 66, 68-90
Kansas State College of Pittsburgh: 61, 63, 67
Kansas State University: 55, 64, 75, 76, 77, 83
University of Kentucky: 60, 64, 67, 68, 73-82, 84-90
Kent State University: 51
King's College: 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 77, 83
University of La Verne: 88, 89, 90
Lewis and Clark College: 64, 66, 67, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80
Liberty University: 89, 90
Louisiana College: 47, 48, 49, 53, 54
University of Louisville: 79-90
Loyola-Marymount University: 62, 63, 64, 65, 67-74, 76, 77, 78, 80-88, 90
Loyola University (Chicago): 60, 70, 72
Luther College: 50
Macalaster College; 56, 61, 71, 73-87
Marietta College: 59, 89, 90
Marquette University: 58, 59
University of Maryland: 67
University of Massachusetts: 73-88
Masschusetts Institute of Technology: 48, 49, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79
Mercer University: 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87
University of Miami (Florida): 52, 53, 54, 55, 57-63, 66, 68, 69, 74
Miami University (Ohio): 76, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89, 90
University of Michigan: 71, 72, 76, 77, 87, 88, 89, 90
Michigan State University: 53, 66, 68, 69
Middlebury College: 55
Middle Tennessee State University: 70, 72, 77
Midland College: 53
Midwestern College: 69
University of Minnesota: 62-67, 73, 82, 83
University of Mississippi: 47, 51, 52
University of Missouri, Columbia: 68, 71, 72
University of Missouri, Kansas City: 61, 62, 66, 68
University of Montana: 49, 50, 51
Montana State University: 51, 60
Morehead State University: 77, 78, 79, 80
Mount Mercy College: 53
Nebraska State College at Kearney: 65, 66
Nebraska Wesleyan University: 51, 52, 54, 55
University of Nebraska, Lincoln: 80, 83, 86, 87
University of Nebraska, Omaha: 77
University of Nevada: 48
University of New Hampshire: 71
University of New Mexico: 51, 52, 54, 85, 90
State University of New York, College at Genesco: 53
Northeastern Oklahoma State University: 62-70, 72, 73, 81, 82, 84, 85
Northern Arizona University: 87, 88, 89
Northern Illinois University: 65

Final Round Transcript

When West Point began publishing THE REPORT ON THE NDT its primary purpose was to publish the Final Round Transcript. Since the NDT left West Point the final round transcript has been published in various publications, including the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION and in CHAMPIONSHIP DEBATES & SPEECHES put out yearly by SCA. This year's final round was transcribed by Marc Rubinstein from a video tape of the round. His first hand knowledge facilitated a quicker and we hope more accurate transcription of the debate; naturally if you think the negative really won the debate you might like to view the video tape first hand? Another version of the transcript may be acquired in the 1990 CHAMPIONSHIP DEBATES & SPEECHES to be published by SCA later this year. It will include a more detailed footnoting of all the quotations utilized by the debaters. It also includes the final rounds of CEDA Nationals and the National Individual Events final winning speeches. At the completion of the transcript the five judges of the final round have submitted a brief summary of their reasons for decision.

AFFIRMATIVE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
First Affirmative Speaker, David Coale
Second Affirmative Speaker, Alex Lennon

NEGATIVE

UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS
First Negative Speaker, Rodger Cole
Second Negative Speaker, Marc Rubinstein

FINAL ROUND PANEL
Scott Deatherage, Northwestern University
Erik Doxtader, Northwestern University
Catherine Palczewski, Northwestern University
Daniel Plants, University of Michigan Law School
Erik Walker, Houston Baptist University

THE DECISION WAS 3-2 FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The FINAL ROUND PANEL had Erik Doxtader, returning from last year's panel; Danny Plants, returning from last year's final round; Erik Walker; Scott Deatherage; and barely visible Catherine Palczewski. A surprisingly large audience was able to stay awake long enough to find out how the five resolved the clash, even to the end Prof. Gibson was keeping everyone well fed!

The 1990 Final Round Transcript

IAC — David Coale, Harvard

I have some comments before I start, both in the immediate sense and the general sense. In the immediate sense Alex and I and everybody at Harvard Debate want to thank Chester Gibson, Bruce Daniel and their staff running the tournament. This is my fourth NDT, and I've found it far and away the most enjoyable one and the most convenient one. There was a lot of shrimp and neat things like that, (laughter). I really enjoyed that, and I also want to thank Al Johnson, the tournament director and the tab room staff, even though he didn't know my name (laughter). But I do hope that seeing this in front of the room will educate him, as to which Cole is which, but seriously he did an outstanding job, and I was, I felt the tournament went very smoothly. In the more general sense, it's a long way from Allen, Texas to the final round of the NDT, and there's been a lot of special people, a lot of really nice people on the way, and I can never really hope to name all of them. Certainly, Dallas Perkins, Sherry Hall, have been incredible. Dedicated, incredibly hardworking and incredibly commmitted to debate, and God knows why to me and Alex. Special friends like Matt Schnall, Sam Cooper, who's intelligence and friendliness and hard work are just without compare. I can't imagine anybody else I'd rather have around, and I wish that they could be up here, it's their cards we're reading (laughter). Distinguished alum Jonathan Weiner went far above and beyond the call of duty, working on Northern Iowa when they were going to run a new case, but he did a lot of work. Charlie Synn also, went out of his way to come down here with us. From the past, I wish Chris Decker could be here. He taught me how to debate, and meant a lot to me as a friend. And from a long time ago, two friends of mine Troy Ficklin, Cindy Brady — I wish they could be here to see this. I'll thank Alex after I see if he covers in the 2AC (laughter). All right, let's do it.

OBSERVATION I: The Status Quo has adopted a policy of reducing fossil fuel consumption through the increased use of nuclear power.

We'll turn to nuclear power because of rising electricity demand and maintaining environmental integrity. J.C. Levine of the Electric Power Research Institute testified in March of 1989:

> "We strongly believe there will be a market in the United States for a new generation of nuclear reactors . . . new base loaded plants will be essential to accomodate the steadily increasing demand for electricity and to replace existing older plants. Furthermore . . . it is clear that nuclear technology is fundamentally sound and that nuclear economics are fundamentally attractive."

The industry has already mobilized the support both of the Congress and Bush, Mariott continues in 89:

> "The nuclear industry believes that a resurgence is on the horizon. With the help of the greenhouse effect and an amenable administration and Congress, the industry hopes that the 1990s and beyond will bring a nuclear age. There is reason for such optimism: Congress has in recent years repeatedly shown itself to be far more pro-nuclear than the public it represents . . . and President Bush, and his chief of staff John Sununu, represent the most vocally pro-nuclear administration ever."

Nuclear power plants reduce fossil fuel consumption; here's why, as S.D. Thoms of the Energy Programme at the University of Sussex detailed in 1988:

> "Electricity supply systems are run in what is known as a 'merit order'. This means that a plant available for service is brought on or shutdown to meet fluctuations in demand in order of marginal generation cost; that is, all things being equal, the cheaper the operating costs, the higher the utilization. The effect of adding a new nuclear power plant to an electricity generating system will be that, since it will be placed near the top of the merit order, all other things being equal, the utilization of the stations beneath it in the merit order, predominantly fossil-fired plants, will be lower than it would have been without the nuclear plant."

We have no quarrel with this general idea of nuclear policy. However, we find the policy which the status quo has chosen disastrous.

OBSERVATION II: Flaws in the nuclear regulatory process tempt disaster.

Every power-generating reactor currently operating in America is a light water reactor design. These were good for the Navy once upon a time, but not good for civilian today. The Commission structure of the NRC is incompatible with effective safety enforcement. Marcus Rowden, who served on both the Atomic Energy Commission and the NRC, testified in July of 1985:

> "The commission structure (of the NRC) impedes the agency's regulatory (effectiveness) . . . One of the principal findings of both the Presidential and NRC post-TMI studies was that, as a result of its collegial management, the NRC was (in the words of the NRC-sponsored study) "An organization that is not so much badly managed at all." The managerial inefficiency of the NRC, those studies concluded, is directly attributable to the diffusion of authority among the five commissioners."

Two problems with this. First, it perpetuates light water reactors. Priory, Vice President of Duke Power Company, in December of 1985:

> ". . . the SDC [Standard Design Certification] process leading to preapproval of designs would initially be based on current reactor designs . . . Thus current light-water reactor technology is the prime candidate for standardization."

Second, once outmoded designs are standardized, however incompletely, the process will exclude all further improvements. Mariotte in 89:

> "The NRC's proposed rule would also make it virtually impossible for the public, or even the NRC itself, to make safety improvements in reactors using standardized designs."

Hence, the plan.

First, legislation shall be adopted which abolishes the NRC and replaces it with a Nuclear Power Safety Administration, NPSA, under the direction of a single Administrator. Procedural changes in the licensing process shall be Mandated.

a. The NPSA shall promulgate a rule providing for the licensing of standardized reactor designs, provided such designs are 90 percent complete; have been the subject of hearings which allow full public participation, at least equal to that previously allowed for construction or operating permits; and a working example of the reactor has been experimentally demonstrated to be safe from catastrophic failure. In all cases, the requirements for standardized licenses shall be expressed in terms of performance; however, graphite modulated modular high temperature gas cooled reactors shall receive early consideration.

b. The NPSA shall promulgate a rule which provides for one-step, construction and operating licenses.

c. Standardized design approvals shall be reviewable after a period of 10 years, and one step licenses may be reviewed, at the discretion of the NPSA.

d. The NPSA shall promulgate a rule which requires that existing nuclear plants comply with performance standards including comprehensive safety reviews and safe operation.

e. If necessary, the plan will guarantee a substantial increase in the use of nuclear power. The intent of the plan is to increase the use of nuclear power.

Second, enforcement through normal provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Any funding possibly necessary will be guaranteed. Aff. speeches shall serve to clarify intent.

Marc, here's the plan, two advantages, the first is accidents.

Subpoint A: Nuclear Accidents are Common

NRC Regulations promulgated after the TMI accident haven't done anything. New York Times in 1989:

". . . (Congressman) Markey . . . said the data shows that "we may be as vulnerable to a meltdown in the 21st century as we were in 1979." Only 24 of the nation's 112 licensed commercial reactors have completed all the changes outlined in the TMI Action Plan . . . (The Congressman) said. "The difference between coming close and getting the job done can mean the difference between safety and catastrophe."

A single malfunction snowballs. Former NRC Commissioner Asselstine in 1987:

". . . actual plant operating experience demonstrates that losses of reactor safety systems, multiple and simultaneous equipment failures, human error, poor maintenance practices, poor management, and rapid unplanned reactor shutdowns, known as SCRAMS, still frequently occur at American nuclear power plants. These vulnerabilities in plant performance can both trigger accidents and act as complicating factors to turn less serious operating problems into severe accident situations."

Subpoint B: A serious accident is devastating.

The radioactive release is ruinous. Physicist Jan Beyea of Audubon in 1982:

"The "first wave" of radioactive materials released . . . would spread far beyond the ten-mile evacuation radius . . . contaminating land . . . hundreds . . . hundreds of miles from the reactor . . . thousands of cancer deaths would result years later, regardless of weather conditions or the effectiveness of evacuation within the ten-mile area."

Subpoint C: The plan improves power plant safety.

First, the single administrator format improves the agency's safety effectiveness significantly. The Edison Electric Institute reported in 1985:

"The NRC should be structured to better carry out its complex duty of managing a comprehensive nuclear safety program. It is clear that the Commission-type organization as currently administered by NRC does not result in an efficient and effective decision-making process . . . The NRC Chairman has recommended abolition of the Commission in favor of a single adminstrator . . ."

Second, the Modular HTGR design offers near-perfect safety; a core meltdown is physically impossible. Lidsky, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at MIT testified in 1988:

"It is possible to design a commercially attractive power reactor with demonstrable inherent passive safety. In the case of the MGR, this is a direct result of the unique capability of the fuel to maintain integrity and contain fission products at extremely high temperatures. These properties make it possible to build a reactor that has *no* chance of a core damaging accident due to any combination of system failures and operator actions . . . Not even the combined effect of instantaneous loss of coolant and full withdrawal of all control rods would lead to either core damage or radioactivity release. Either of these events would be castastrophic in our existing commercial reactors."

The unique structure of HTGR and the fact that it may by buried assures safety. U.S. News '89:

"The key is the encapsulating of tiny pellets of uranium fuel in the four layers of ceramic and carbon coatings that could withstand high temperatures without failing. Even if all the plant's helium leaked out while its operators were asleep, heat produced would be conducted through the reactor walls into the earth fast enough that fuel could never get hotter than 2,900 degrees Fahrenheit, far below the (melting point of) 3,600 degrees . . ."

It's been empirically proven in West Germany. Gray President of MIT in '89.

"Such "passively safe" reactors can be designed to suffer the simultaneous failure of all control and cooling systems without danger to the public. And their safety can be demonstrated by an actual test: a West German modular reactor has passed such tests three times."

The second advantage, Prolif. The A subpoint, we're on the brink.

U.S. Panel on New Approaches to Nonprolif. '86

"The risk of several additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons is clear and present. It is particularly acute in some of the world's most volatile areas where the addition of a nuclear dimension to regional hostilities could have disastrous consequences."

American power stops indigenous capability which will develop without the plan. Eibenschutz, former member IAEA, '85

". . . as long as assurance of nuclear fuel supply is not fully established, the pressure will persist — despite economic considerations — toward indigenous self-sufficiency in the nuclear fuel cycle."

The time frame is overnight once the initial decision is made. Meyer, Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT, in '84:

"The convergence of motivation with pre-existing technical capability . . . can give rise to rapid changes in nuclear propensity. The classical admonition that "capabilities change slowly, but intentions can change overnight" is particularly accurate in describing . . . the nuclear proliferation . . . Here, "overnight" connotes about a year's time, since in all cases proliferation decisions lagged no more than a year or so behind the convergence of motivation and technical capability."

It snowballs once it starts. Sokloski, senior aide to Senator Quayle for Intl. Security, '85:

". . . a series of countries "going nuclear" in the 1990s, could bring down the whole structure. Israel and South Africa may well be followed by Pakistan, Iraq, South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina, or Brazil. With increased safeguard commitments, IAEA inspection failures are more likely to increase."

Subpoint B: Prolif. is bad.

Initially, it undermines crisis stability. Potter, CISA, '82:

"The possibility of inadvertent superpower involvement in a regional conflict among nuclear armed parties is increased by the absence in most Nth countries of many of the technical and political conditions which in the . . . (superpowers) limit the unauthorized and unintended use of nuclear weapons. . . . these are systems of command, control, and communication; effective intelligence-gathering and -processing capabilities; reliable early warning systems; and domestic political stability. The absence of these conditions, together with the lack of secure and reliable second-strike forces, would undermine deterrence stability in a crisis situation involving Nth countries and would increase pressure for one of the parties to preempt."

Prolif is the most likely scenario for war. Sheinman, Cornell, '85.

". . . world attention is focused on ways to avoid nuclear war. There is little doubt that this is the paramount challenge facing contemporary civilization. Political competition, mutual mistrust, and the nuclear . . . arsenals of the superpowers are the major causes of the problem. Soviet-American relations, however, are not . . . even . . . the most probable, cause of this challenge. It is the spread of nuclear weapons to even more states that affords the most danger to U.S. security and international peace."

Independently, causes accidents and miscalculation. Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of State, '85.

"The notion that more proliferation may be better is equally false. Proliferation can only increase global instability and adversely affect the interests and well-being of all. It would threaten international order as we have known it and could lead to the breakdown of the nuclear peace . . . not only by choice, but also by accident or miscalculation."

Independently, fast rate of proliferation is uniquely bad, more stuff on this below. Waltz the source on all the prolif. good cards in 1984.

"Rapid change may be destabilizing. The slow spread of nuclear weapons gives states time to learn to live with them, to appreciate their virtues, and to understand the limits they place on behaviour."

Even if wars become less likely, one is all it takes to go nuclear. We outweigh the impact turns. Gallucci, State Department, '83:

". . . those who manage to be sanguine about the spread of nuclear weapons may or may not be correct . . . in believing that strategic relations among new nuclear-weapons states will tend to be stable, essentially dominated by minimum deterrence. War may indeed be less likely . . . Even if that very unlikely prediction turns out to be a good one, however, when war does occur, it will have the potential to be many more times destructive than ever before. More proliferation will not be better unless we are willing to accept the greater probability of catastrophic nuclear wars in exchange for less frequent conventional regional conflicts."

Independently there are many other scenarios for war. Ramberg, CISA-UCLA '86:

"In a Hudson Institute report, Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn suggest that unintended or inadvertent nuclear war could result from a low-level conflict escalating under pre-emptive pressures, or accidental or unauthorized nuclear attacks. Catalytic war might result from one country attempting to provoke an exchange between two others. Even anonymous nuclear attack is conceivable. History provides numerous examples of first strikes or preventive wars. Finally, the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons may erode and the weapons may be viewed as (legitimate) conventional alternatives."

Subpoint C: We solve.

First of all, increasing American power increases American leadership, U.S. leadership in the non-proliferation regime. Wolfe, Vice President, General Electric, in '85.

"If the U.S. wants to help control the future of a vital energy option and to successfully pursue its nonproliferation objectives, it can only do so through a strong domestic nuclear power program and technological leadership."

American leverage stops proliferation. Wolfe continues in '89:

". . . the success of the U.S. non-proliferation policy in the past was due to our technical leadership that allowed us to constructively influence nuclear energy development and use in peaceful directions . . . If we hope to continue such leadership, we must provide consistent support to key programs aimed at timely advanced reactor development and build upon the excellent results in these programs to date. Otherwise the U.S. will send a message to the world that it is giving up its nuclear power leadership role."

A second reason we solve. We save the non-proliferation treaty. Small reactors are important to it.

Weinberg, director of the IEA, in '85:

". . . certain new technical ideas for accident-proof small reactors might be incorporated into new approaches for nonproliferation. Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty commits the weapons states to helping the other signers of the treaty to develop their own nuclear power programs."

We continue with Mr. Griffith from the Department of Energy in '89.

"The HTGR forms an excellent future reactor because . . . it has passive safety and . . . export potential. Many people think we will never be able to penetrate Third World market with nuclear power. . . . I believe the HTGR gives us an opportunity to consider . . . that because it comes in power sizes and a manageability that Third World countries should be able to handle with support from the advanced countries."

The plan has to act before the 1995 Review Conference even if nobody ever actually orders a reactor or builds one.

Williams, Senior Research Physicist, and Feiveson, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton, in April of 1990:

"The fundamental reorientation of nuclear policy cannot be accomplished overnight. It is critical, however, that it be well underway before the 1995 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the international regime for nuclear power will be renegotiated."

This will stop the snowball.

Scheinman, Professor of International Relations at Cornell University, in 1985:

". . . these states more likely than not would have succumbed to the pressures of garrison-state mentality and sought countervailing capabilities. Barring the establishment of some form of nonproliferation treaty, the metaphor of the "nuclear armed crowd" would have become a reality."

The next reason we solve.

A black market exists through emerging suppliers, we'll solve it. The black market exists, evidence from McGrew, Open University, '84:

"A related, but much more intractable problem, is that of what one author refers to as 'nuclear grey and black marketing'. Evidence exists of covert nuclear deals involving Third World states and sometimes so-called 'reliable' suppliers."

The plan solves waste and proliferation issues which incidentally means there's no way we can't beat Amory Lovins' arguments about why technology causes proliferation. Gray, of MIT in '89:

"These new reactors do not eliminate the waste disposal problem, but their . . . encapsulated fuel does simplify it. A fuel that can survive unscathed . . . during an accident is obviously securely packaged for disposal under more benign conditions . . . This same feature also makes it much more difficult for the discharged fuel to be processed to produce unauthorized nuclear weapons."

Solving waste solves the pressure to sell in the black market.

Gummett, of the University of Manchester, in '84:

"The settling of public concern about waste management could, moreover, have some positive non-proliferation implications if it stimulated a resumption of nuclear orders in the *developed* world, thereby reducing the pressure on suppliers to offer whatever inducements seem necessary to secure export orders to *developing* countries."

Even if people don't accept the reactors from America, non-accepting signals a proliferation risk, we'll still be able to act. Keely, of University of Calgary, in '87:

". . . the spread of nuclear capabilities changes the basic nature of the safeguarding function: where once it was above all a means for suppliers to guard against misuse of nuclear assistance . . ., now perhaps it is better regarded as a means by which nuclear recipients might offer public assurances, partially symbolic given the limits of safeguarding, of their peaceful intentions."

The final argument is that politics is more important than technology. Even if every nuclear power plant disappeared from the world tomorrow, there would still be sufficient knowledge to cause proliferation. Avory, a physicist at Argonne National Lab, and Bethe, a Nobel Prize winning physicist, '82:

". . . any nation determined to make an atomic bomb would surely choose a more direct route. The basic driving force of nuclear proliferation is motivation, since the knowledge to build nuclear weapons exists and will certainly not vanish even if all nuclear power activities were to cease. Thus the real question is political."

Cross-Examination of the IAC

Marc Rubinstein cross-examining David Coale

Marc: Okay, so does the plan mandate that we use modular HTGRS?

David: In the lengthy set of things at the beginning of the plan, the graphite modular (good Lord, lots of time going off there), the HTGR receives early consideration. So, if I show up at the licensing procedure, and there's another guy who hasn't got an HTGR design, I get to go in front of him in line.

Marc: Okay, now what is, now the plan says something like well, we'll do whatever is safe. Now if it is determined that the HTGR is not safe, then will the plan still encourage early action on the HTGR?

David: It seems darned unlikely to me that the HTGR is unsafe.

Marc: Well?

David: Our position at this point in the debate, Marc, is that the HTGR is such a safe reactor, and I really wouldn't care to speculate further than that. If a bomb fell on the NRC headquarters . . .

Marc: A lot of evidence that you read on the HTGR is safe, inherently safe, is from Lidsky . . .

David: One card.

Marc: Now Lidsky designed the HTGR, right? Am I correct? Lidsky designed the HTGR.

David: You're correct. There's evidence from Lidsky. There's also evidence from U.S. News in the summary article about safe reactors, and the final card is from the President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Marc: Okay, just for interest, Lidsky was the one who did design the HTGR?

David: Lidsky is a big engineer at the agencies, you are correct.

Marc: Prolif, now, what exactly is U.S. leadership, and the fact that we have nuclear power, why does that give us leverage to stop prolif?

David: The two Wolfe cards say that unless we have strong domestic nuclear programs and are willing to be developing advanced reactors and things like that, we have no position, no chair on which to stand (that doesn't sound right) we have no credibility to try to talk about nuclear power issues elsewhere in the world.

Marc: What if we enacted a policy per se that we think nuclear power is a bad idea. Why couldn't we use that as leverage to push our position?

David: We are doing that, we've signed the non-proliferation treaty; we've signed Article IV of the NPT, we've done that Marc, and the reason that's not credible is because we haven't lived up to it.

Marc: No, No, No.

David: Article IV, hypothetically, of the non-proliferation treaty says that developing countries will give up the prestige of nuclear weapons if we provide them with safe nuclear power.

Marc: The other thing the NPT says is that the Third World will agree not to proliferate if we and the Soviets agree to stop the Arms Race and do something like a comprehensive test ban treaty. That's also in the non-proliferation treaty. Now, how do you solve?

David: Something like a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, is a little speculative perhaps.

Marc: But right. That's part, a lot of the literature on prolif says, that the only way we can really maintain any credibility at stopping prolif is if we say that we are willing to stop the Arms Race. Now, are we willing to do that?

David: I think there's several levels of answers to that. I think there is some movement towards arms control now. I don't see any evidence anywhere in the debate at this point (sneers), that says nuclear energy isn't a uniquely important part of the bargain, um it seems to me there's a great deal of arms control now.

Marc: So, we're right now, are using this leverage from the INF accord to stop prolif? The question is will the government take your plan and use it as leverage?

David: You can have all the arms control in the world you want to, Marc, but unless we're living up to the crucial Article IV bargain (time) there are hundreds of countries, dozens of countries in the world perhaps, that are getting close.

First Negative Constructive

1NC — Rodger Cole, Redlands

Marc and I would like to thank Jack Rhodes and Al Johnson, for doing a great job in the Tab room, and Chester Gibsen for hosting the best NDT we've ever been to. We'd like to personally thank Southworth. He's been a great coach and he is really underrated, I think. We'd also like to thank Leon, Jeff Leon, and Dave Herrick for coming to the NDT and helping coach us here. We'd also like to thank the squad members who can't be here, Kevin Tessier, Paul Derby, Brett Lilly and Bruce Wren, who helped us out somewhat, this year (laughter). We'd also both like to thank our parents for all their support during all the years of debate. I'd like to especially thank my brothers of the fraternity Alpha Gamma Nu at Redlands, Okay, we'd like to dedicate this debate to all the people who should have been here. All the people like, you know, we all know, Bixby, Aaron and Ken, Jud and Al, Madison, all the seniors. Hugin, you guys all deserve to be here. Okay, you guys ready. They should have run their new case.

First observation is substantially reduce. The A Subpoint, the definition. First, substantial must have meaning. Random House in '87:

"Substantial: of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size."

Second, the burden is to compare.

Words & Phases in 1966:

"The word 'substantially' is a relative term and should be interpreted in accordance with the context of claim in which it is used."

B. Affirmative violates: in comparison to the status quo, there is not net reduction in the consumption of fossil fuels. Contention one claims that it is the status quo policy to reduce fossil fuel consumption using light water reactors. HTGR's may be claimed to be safer, but they do not reduce fossil fuel consumption more than light waters.

C. Subpoint, superior interpretation:

First, the affirmative destroys negative ground. The basis of negative position on this topic is that reducing fossil fuel consumption is disadvantageous. None of these disadvantages could be unique according to the affirmative case, contention one.

Second, negative provides clear meaning to the term 'substantial'. It will be the negative position that the affirmative must prove some way in which the status quo consumes fossil fuels and reduce that consumption. Instead, the 1AC only proves two ways fossil fuel consumption can be reduced and makes safety comparisons.

The second violation is reduce consumption.

The A Subpoint is the definition. First, reduce means to lessen. Random House, '87:

". . . to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number."

Second, consumption end use.

Dictionary of Energy, '88:

"In economic usage, the act by individuals of using goods and services to satisfy wants, which is the end purpose of economic activity."

The B Subpoint, the violation, the Affirmative does not reduce consumption. The status quo reduces consumption just as much as the Affirmative does especially compared to the 2AC turns. Listen to these.

C Subpoint, superior interpretation. First, fair limits. It makes sure the Affirmative reduction, makes Aff not read its turns. Second, it moots the word substantial, no real reduction is achieved if you allow this interpretation.

Now the counterplan: we ban nukes.

Through all necessary means the following proposal:

A safety board identical to that of the affirmative will be established to monitor the decommissioning of all civilian nuclear power plants and those currently under construction in the United States. In addition, all future construction of civilian nuclear power plants will be prohibited. All necessary personnel, research for disposal of plant components, and other essential resources will be guaranteed. Negative speeches will clarify intent.

Observation: dejustify affirmative.

A Subpoint. Structurally: The affirmative promotes the utilization of HTGR's, the negative prohibits it.

B Subpoint. Net Benefits: The counterplan solves the risk of accidents in the status quo while preventing future nuclear use, thus avoiding the disadvantages.

C Subpoint. Is Permutation Standards:

First is, ground must be divided; no permutations allowed. The affirmative must defend nuclear power while the counterplan eliminates it. The permutation cannot oppose atomic power.

Second is, anti-topicality illegitimate: the affirmative will permute with do the counterplan. This clearly increases fossil fuel consumption.

D Subpoint is, we solve the Japan agreement. Banning Nuclear power would break the U.S./Japan agreement, and that agreement violates the NPT, flipping the prolif advantage back on them.

Leventhal in '88:

"Original sponsors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, including . . . Cranston . . . and . . . Glenn, regard this arrangement as a violation of the law's basic requirement for careful case-by-case review of plutonium-related requests."

Now the first disad. CO_2. The A Subpoint is you need an increase in CO_2 to stop hunger. Idso '89:

". . . it would be like cutting our own throats — or, more properly, the throats of "generations yet unborn" — to attempt to thwart the very phenomenon (the steady rising atmospheric CO_2 concentration) which has the proven ability to dramatically boost crop yields, enhance plant water use efficiencies, and give us the edge we need in our fight against world hunger."

B Subpoint. Affirmative decreases CO_2, fossil fuel consumption is key.

Houghton '89:

"The largest source of carbon dioxide emissions is the combustion of fossil fuels, which releases about 5.6 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere annually. Industrial nations contribute about 75 percent of these emissions . . ."

C Subpoint. Hunger equals war.

Soth '82:

"Relieving hunger and malnutrition seems to be an essential short-term as well as long-term strategy for reducing tensions and the causes of war. The relief of hunger is the best foundation for attacking poverty and inequality, the underlying causes of unrest, revolution, and war in the world."

Only an increase in CO_2 solves. Idso '82:

". . . the already burgeoning world population continues to grow at a rapid rate, and that this increase in humanity will put great pressures on the world's agricultural systems in the days ahead, such that we may not be able to meet the demand for food without the added productivity edge provided by a high atmospheric CO_2 content, which could also mean the difference between war and peace."

Second disad is Gorbachev.

A Subpoint, he's on the brink. Parks, March 26th:

"The Soviet Union is now facing the gravest dangers, both political and economic, since it began the process of reform five years ago . . . further policy mistakes could plunge the country into chaos."

B Subpoint, Affirmative causes. Oil fired plants, spurred by rising electricity demand, cause high oil demand. U.S. Council for Energy Awareness '89:

"Eighty percent of our reserve electrical capacity is in oil-fired plants. Reserve capacity maintains the reliability of our electricity. As the demand for electricity increases, these plants will be used more and more. Full use of these reserve oil-fired plants would lead to an increase in oil imports of almost two million barrels per day — over twice the amount we import from the Persian Gulf."

U.S. is key to the world market. Renner '87:

"America's energy problem . . . is a global problem . . . consumption trends and fluctuations in the U.S. market have a tremendous impact on the world oil market: U.S. domestic policies can tip the scale toward either stability or instability."

Oil price swings kill the Soviet economy. Arbatov '90:

"Oil plays a particularly important role in the country's economy . . . Western goods and equipment with the aim of alleviating food shortages, raising the technological standards of industry and improving the internal trade balance. The Soviet economy is therefore extremely sensitive to price changes on the world oil market."

Economic failure kills Gorbachev. Goldberg '90:

". . . a collapse of the Soviet economy could give Moscow's hard-liners a chance to regain power and reinstitute the kind of "hostile foreign policy" that prevailed during the Cold War."

C Subpoint. Soviet lashout, crisis causes. Hyland '88:

"At some point, probably by the early 1990s, Gorbachev may well face an internal crisis. If he prevails, he may profoundly change the Soviet Union; if he fails, he may lose power. If he senses that he will fail, a period will follow that could be dangerous for the United States; in either event the temptation to attempt foreign adventures to compensate for domestic failures may prove irresistable . . ."

The impact is nuclear war. Krickus '87:

"[A] societal crisis in the Soviet Union could lead to a situation that contains all the elements of an international crisis . . . [The] Soviet leaders may make miscalculations that lead to a nuclear war."

Now the second advantage, A and B Subpoints. Group it.

Number one, this is empirically denied, we've had lots of prolif nations in the past and it hasn't snowballed.

Number two, number of nations irrelevant, numbers irrelevant.

Lefever in '79:

"There are now 5 or 6 nuclear states and there may be as many as 10 by the year 2000 but an increase in number does not necessarily increase the probability of nuclear war."

Number two. Recent Prolif Disproves Intrilligator in '78.

". . . the predictions of global nuclear warfare that were to have ensued upon the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons have not been realized."

Also, also prolif doesn't mean war.

Intrilligator, no.

No snowball.

Dunn, '81:

"Historical experience clearly indicates that each new member of the nuclear club has sought to close the door after its entrance. Doing so may be important to preserving its newly gained perogatives from lesser countries."

Also, no miscalculation. Wektman, '80:

"The dangers represented by a nuclear forces actually or prospectively in the hands of an opponent do not make a situation complicated; instead they simplify it."

Now the C Subpoint, solvency, nothing but turns.

Number one, the time frame evidence is bad. Don't let them claim this 95' thing in the 2AC.

Number two, IAEA solving Third World prolif now. Spector '89:

"There is, fortunately, a very successful regime in place helping to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons . . . The IAEA sends carefully trained inspectors to nuclear installations throughout the world and verifies that material is being used only for peaceful purposes and is not being used for weapons. The inspectors now inspect about 95 percent of all of the plants in the world."

Now also turn: increased nuclear material destroys safeguards. Bolt '88:

". . . safeguarding standards can only decline as the amount of material within the margin of error, based on throughout, increases. And throughput or inventories will increase sharply as (reactors increase) . . ."

Also, turn, U.S. nukes allow materials diversion. Booth in '89:

"Another problem is the diversion of fissionable materials to make nuclear weapons . . . if a 'born-again' nuclear industry were to play a significant role . . . there would have to be a tenfold increase in nuclear power generation. This would produce more than 1 million pounds of plutonium a year . . . It is difficult to imagine a human institution capable of safeguarding these plutonium flows against occasional diversions of significant quantities to nuclear weapons . . ."

Also, turn: influence which turns their Avery card back on them. Rejection of nuclear sets the precedent, proving the advantage to the counter plan. Kraushaar '88:

". . . since nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons originated here, we have a moral obligation to set an example for the world by renouncing entirely the use of nuclear energy. Such a step, it is argued, would be a moral deterrent to any nation further developing a nuclear reactor program."

Also, turn: grids. Modular reactors allow Third World use of grids. Auer '85:

"Should nuclear power plant suppliers conclude that there is enough of a market for smaller reactors to warrant design, demonstration, and supply of smaller units, far more countries could join the civil nuclear power club. Bennett of IAEA claims that as many as 20 additional countries could accommodate nuclear power reactors in the range of 200 to 600 MWe on their electrical grids."

Also, turn: costs. Modular reactors financially allow Third World nukes. This is, Ryan '89:

"Moreover, most developing countries can't afford the nuclear giants. Cost has stalled plans for 1,000-MW plants in Turkey, Egypt, and China . . ."

Also, turn: Nuclear use justifies military programs, causing the prolif internal link; it's better evidence. Bojcun '88:

". . . the civilian and military applications of nuclear power have become inseparable and interdependent. The former grew out of the latter; today it provides the latter with its indispensable explosive fodder. Unless the civilian nuclear industry is dismantled, the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be arrested, let alone reversed."

Also, turn: it improves access to technology. Also this takes out black market solvency specifically. Lovins '89:

"They (civilian nukes) provide the materials, skills, equipment, data and above all the innocent cover for bomb programs . . . all these ingredients, though obtainable on the black market, would be harder to get, more conspicuous to try to get, and politically far costlier to be caught trying to get — because for the first time the reason for wanting them would be unambigiously military."

Also, the last argument is uniqueness: the slow rate of prolif now is due to the collapse of U.S. nukes, which takes out the political argument below. Lovins '89:

"The global collapse of the nuclear enterprise . . . is thus a timely opportunity to inhibit proliferation. Nuclear capacity in 2000 will be at most 6-8 percent in industrialized countries and 2-3 percent in developing countries . . . this double edged venture is dying of an incurable attack of market force (and) is the best possible news for world peace . . ."

Now, the first advantage, the A Subpoint.

Number one, accident risk is low. Woodhouse in '89:

"Calculations showed that nuclear reactors posed much lower risks than other technologies widely accepted by the public . . . it estimated the probability of such a severe accident to be one in a billion per reactor per year."

Also scientific consensus proves. Rothman and Lichter, '87:

More significantly, among scientists who have published on nuclear energy in professional journals, only 1 out of 10 believes that the possibility of an accidental release of radioactivity from reactors is a very serious problem."

Also containment structures prevent now. U.S. Council for Energy Awareness in '89:

"As a further backup, a formidable containment structure is designed to 'contain' the radioactivity, in the unlikely event of an accident. U.S. reactors have containment structures that include four-foot-thick outer concrete walls and a steel lining."

Now the C Subpoint solvency. Number one is turn around.

New technology carries unknown risks. Please star this evidence. Rogers '88. "While the MHTGR fuel configuration and the passive features of the overall design do indeed appear to offer very significant safety benefits for a wide range of postulated accident scenarios, there are still some scenarios, particularly those involving primary coolant leaks and certain low probability severe events, where the presence of a containment could improve safety by preventing the release of primary coolant to the environment . . . Perhaps more important than these low probability identified

events are the unknowns. The history of technological development, in the nuclear industry, as well as in other industries, amply demonstrates that we have seldom if ever embarked on the development of a new technology with a thorough understanding of all the problems well in hand. We have always discovered, over the course of time, technological problems we hadn't envisioned, synergisms we hadn't expected, and societal impacts we couldn't have imagined."

Also, turn: HTGR's are vulnerable to graphite fires. Hamins '89:

"HTRs are operated with hundreds of thousands of uranium filled graphite pebbles. The nuclear industry claims that an HTR is 'inherently safe' because, they say, a core meltdown is impossible. But if the primary cooling system fails in an HTR due to loss of a cooling agent, then air, steam or water may get into the cooling circuit where it would rapidly react with the graphite or liquid sodium — leading to tremendous pressures and the possibility of fire or explosion.

Also, turn: lack of containment increases the risk. Hamins '89:

"Without a containment system, large amounts of radioactivity could be released into the environment. The NRC's own . . . has challenged HTR designs over safety questions. In a . . . letter to the NRC Chairman, the ACRS stated that it does not accept the notion that advanced reactors can operate safely without conventional containment structures." Also, turn: it increases vulnerability to earthquakes.

Franklin in '89:

"There are other safety concerns about the new designs. The gas-cooled system, for example, relies on vents that could get blocked by earthquakes. GE's liquid sodium system has a built-in danger. Liquid sodium is extremely chemically reactive, . . . so the coolant itself could catch fire."

Also, empirically, the St. Vrain HTGR has failed. King '89:

"It is true that Fort St. Vrain has had a variety of operational problems over its service life which have affected plant availability and that Public Service Company of Colorado . . . notified us in December 1988 of early termination of Fort. St. Vrain operations."

Also, the next argument is, they wouldn't get any snowball of success, their evidence assumes that once they get the nuclear weapons they would all commercialize, but the St. Vrain HTGR denies that. Also, the particle coating is not successful, HTGRS doesn't solve.

Franklin in '89:

"The company has been unable to prove . . . that the particle-coating theory would work in actual commercial operation. The ACRS . . . has shown an unwillingness to do away with the containment structure. But the containment itself presents a different problem — it would hinder the helium's ability to circulate and cool the reactor, effectively undermining the passive design."

Also, advanced reactors do not solve management problems. Rader '88:

"Finally, many of the worst safety problems associated with the current generation of nuclear reactors have been the result of the utilities' own management failures rather then poor reactor design . . ."

Last argument is HTGR has not been proven safer than light water. Cohen '85:

"Improving reactor safety is frequently advanced (time) as a motive for introducing new reactor types. A new reactor with a new coolant and moderator (e.g., the HTGR) will require many years of operating experience before its relative safety can confidently be assessed (compared to light waters) . . ."

Cross-Examination of the First Negative Constructive

David Coale cross-examining Rodger Cole

David: Can I see the Japan cards off the counterplan, and the Gorbachev link evidence please?

Rodger: The Gorbachev links, that's what you wanted? All of them or which one?

David: All the cards you read under the B Subpoint.

Rodger: It's this one, this one and those two.

David: This one, this one, and these two at the bottom?

Rodger: No, the top two.

David: What percentage of American electricity is generated by oil?

Rodger: It depends what part of the country you're talking about.

David: Take the whole country, I'm not picky.

Rodger: The whole country, the average right now is probably between like 5 and 10 percent. In Northern England, Northeast sectors it's probably around 40 percent.

David: Now, what percentage is that of the global oil market?

Rodger: Of nuclear?

David: No, what percentage is that, is the American demand of the world oil market, Renner says it's a substantial part, but how big is the substantial part?

Rodger: It's quite substantial. As soon as you make this argument we will read evidence that says . . .

David: Can I see the text of the counterplan?

Rodger: Sure.

David: So it's a substantial . . .

Rodger: We'll read evidence that says that the electricity sector right now is uniquely important for energy demand.

David: Okay, that's fine.

Alex: You guys don't put oil plants on line?

Rodger: No.

David: They just ban nuclear power. It seems to me that oil prices, in the general sense tend to swing around quite a bit. Say in '86, after Gorbachev first came to power oil prices went eoooooo.

Rodger: Well, that's true.

David: And, it was a drag, oil revenues fell everywhere throughout the Middle East. Great instability in the Middle East. What happened in the Soviet Union? They just sort of coasted on through?

Rodger: No, the Soviet Union was hurt economically a great bit, in fact its probably one of the major reasons the economy is harmed now. Fortunately for Gorbachev . . .

David: Fortunately he wasn't on the brink yet.

Rodger: No, that's not it at all. Fortunately for Gorbachev, he had just come into power when the collapse of the economy had occurred, I mean when the collapse of oil prices had occurred.

David: General questions about the prolif arguments. How many countries in the world today have military nuclear weapons military nuclear capability as the result of a civilian electrical power program.
Rodger: Ah, Pakistan and India.
David: I must have missed the Pakistani nuclear test.
Rodger: There have been nuclear tests, you must have missed that, yeah.
David: All right. You're going to stand by Pakistan as an empirical example?
Rodger: Well, I mean that's one yes. We can ask the same thing about your solvency.
David: I was just asking for if they had an empirical example. All right.

Second Affirmative Constructive

2AC — Alex Lennon, Harvard

At best we only offset future oil demand, we would be able to solve for any fossil fuel disads and outweigh. The substantially debate. First, the plan mandates, the plan mandates a substantial decrease, we solve it. Second subset enough, can pick a subset like electricity, no case covers all. Third, is don't know what set, what is all fossil fuel, don't know what substantially is. You don't know what the whole set is. Fourth, is overlimit, no case would be topical, you could never meet their interpretation. No case could be substantial if nuclear power isn't. Fourthly, the narrow version of the topic, the narrow version of the topic says reduction of fossil fuels can be expected from nuclear power, we uniquely do that. Sixth, not in context, what energy policy is substantial? We will define. Seventh, substantial changes are tiny, Yergin, Cambridge Energy Research Association in '78:

"After all, in 1973, the countries that embargoed the United States were supplying only about five percent of total U.S. demand."

The next is all the answers below will cross-apply. The reduce violation. The first is you don't have to compare to the status quo, even if status quo is topical so are we, the status quo is one policy of reducing fossil fuels through light water reactors, we are a different policy by using HTGRS. Second, immediate effects crazy, any case requires building plants with fossil-fuels to set up the technology i.e. solar power etc., requires fossil fuel input in order to get the solar technology decreasing it in the long run. The third or fourth, effects forever crazy. If status quo did conservation when status quo ran out of fossil fuels, because of effects, at that point plan would be not-topical, since conservation would exist, rather than fossil fuels existing. Next, our standards are reasonable technological inputs. Since both immediate effects and forever are crazy, our standard is to allow the plan to be fully implemented and allow interpretation. Next is merit order meets, the Thomas '88 evidence at the bottom of observation I. Next, can't have evidential interpretation, determination of topicality, based on card wars. Next is we meet the narrow version of the topic. Last we solve by shutdowns, that's the case evidence. Now, the counter-plan. We'll first turn accidents, that's Wolfe in '85:

"We may soon see a shortage of trained technical personnel — the people we need to keep existing plants operating safely or regulated soundly — as our young people are discouraged from entering the nuclear field."

The second is the Japan stuff. First, we solve this. We solve for Japan by increasing nuclear power. Second is turn, necessary for the NPT. Inoue from Kansai Power in '88:

"The agreement was reached with a view to promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy in a predictable and stable manner, taking into consideration the long lead time required for planning and development of nuclear power. For these reasons, the revised agreement is of great importance to both Japan and the United States as well as to the assured worldwide nuclear non-proliferation . . ."

Next, is necessary to stop proliferation. Smith, a former director of the ACDA in '88, remember we'll qualify our sources, Redlands does not qualify one card.

"The new nuclear agreement does two basic things. First, it strengthens American influence over the Japanese nuclear energy program as compared with the existing agreement. This is in compliance with the enactment of our stiff non-proliferation law as approved by President Carter in 1978. Second, the agreement provides greater stability in nuclear commerce between the two countries. It does this by replacing a lengthy and contentious case-by-case review of certain American exports . . ."

The first disad to the counterplan is energy wars.

The A Subpoint. Lack nuclear power equals energy wars. Blair in 1983:

"If there is insufficient development on a world scale of such a major energy source as nuclear power this could possibly lead, in the not too distant future, to an ugly scramble for the remaining reserves of fossil fuel. This also carries the risk of sparking off a major war."

The B Subpoint is this causes escalation to nuclear war. Ehrlich in '80:

"One must note also that the ultimate breakdown of the ecological systems might not come gradually. One potential abrupt cause is thermonuclear war, which itself could be triggered by increasing competition for increasingly scarce resources."

The second disad is economy. Economy, the A Subpoint is you need expansion of nuclear power. Jones in August '89:

"If is seems difficult to envision the construction of more nuclear plants in the future, it seems impossible to imagine our economy . . . remaining healthy for long without them. A great deal depends on how well we get on with the job."

The B Subpoint is banking collapse, it will be caused. Spero in '89:

"A major mechanical breakdown, liquidity problem or, even worse, default in one of these systems has the potential to seriously and adversely affect all other direct and indirect participants in the system."

C Subpoint, this causes a depression. Miller '87:

Each of these authors . . . believes that the next recession in the U.S. economy could trigger a debt crisis that ultimately leads to a monsterous world-wide crash and depression in the 1990s."

The impact is war. Silk in '79:

"If the world economy breaks down, the nations will resort to war — both economic and military — as they always have in the past when they saw no other way to avoid their own destruction."

The Disad, off the top. CO_2. The first is emissions decreases minimal. Bossong and Rader from Critical Mass in '89:

"Nuclear power can at best eliminate just a small portion of the gases causing global warming — specifically, those from fossil-fueled electrical generating plants."

Second, can't build plants fast enough. Mintzer of the World Resource Institute in '88:

". . . It would require us to build nuclear power plants at a rate between now and the year 2000 where they'd be opening one about every couple of weeks. It's unlikely that this could be accomplished."

The third is time horizon is too long. Mintzer of the World Resources in '88:

"Nuclear power is not and could not make a large enough contribution to U.S. energy supply over a time horizon of interest to policy

makers to substantially reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases."

The fourth is all our answers from below will crossapply to this, we'll answer more on the second disad. The second disad, now the first is, the link is only in the future. The link only indicates future oil consumption. There is no reason why this is important. Second, the brink card says you need present revenues, there's no reason we decrease this. In other words, we only offset a future increase, we don't decrease which is their link card. The third, not-unique more increases to come. Coal Magazine February '89:

"It will be more than two years before the bulk of the nuclear bubble is absorbed by the utility industry. In the meantime, we can look for nuclear generation to grow by at least another 30 bkwh in 1989."

Next, observation one disproves. Even if they counterplan it out, it's empirically false.

Next, gas will come on line, not oil. Business Week in August of '89:

". . . deregulation has lifted a decade-old prohibition . . . against using the fuel to fire electric power plants. Gas claims only 11 percent of that market. But nearly 50 percent of the new power facilities planned in the U.S. will run on gas . . ."

Next, can get currency from gold, oil isn't important. Bush in 1990:

"Several courses are open that could alleviate the situation. Partial and swift relief could be obtained by selling more gold from the Soviet reserves on the world market."

That's not the president; that's an economist I'm using from Munich. Next can get hard currency from US-USSR Trade Agreement in June. Robinson, a former National Security Councilman, March of 1990:

"The Soviet Union intends to use the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement to be signed in June to eliminate two major legislative obstacles to its financial strategy: the restrictions on access to U.S. Export-Import Bank credit programs and to the U.S. securities market."

Next, no more gains to be made in electricity, from Public Utilities Fortnightly in '88:

"Second, oil consumption has been reduced by a sharp shift in the mix of fuels used for electric generation from oil to coal and nuclear fuel. Between 1973 and 1987, the share of the nation's electricity generated with oil fell from 17 percent to 5 percent . . ."

Next, any decreases will be offset by the transportation sector which we don't effect. Public Utilities Fortnightly in '88.

"Between the increasing penetration of electricity in energy consumption and the shift away from oil to coal and nuclear fuel in electric generation, the nation's oil consumption . . . was mostly offset by an increase in oil consumption in the transportation sector of 2.6 million barrels per day."

Next, is only 4 percent of electricity generation is oil. Abbots of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in February of '89:

"Despite the industry's advertisements, atomic energy saves very little oil . . . Moreover, electrical generation accounts for only 4 percent of U.S. oil use. Any serious oil-saving measures must concentrate on motor vehicles, which represent 63 percent of national oil consumption."

Next is, link cards are biased. Link cards are from nuclear energy hacks, that card specifically indicts it. The next card is turn we trade off with conservation. Investor's Daily, September '89:

"Conservation advocates say half or more of the country's projected need for additional electricity supplies in the 1990s could be avoided through aggressive conservation programs. They bemoan the use of scarce government research money for nuclear projects."

These gains are greater which is a net turn. Mintzer, of the World Resources Institute, in '88:

"What seems to have been demonstrated in the last 10 years is that improving the efficiency of energy use is the cheapest, safest, cleanest, most direct way to increase the level of energy services that are available to the economy, and it's not by waiting 10 years to build another nuclear plant."

Next is turn, we trade off with energy innovations. Sylvan from Ohio State 1985:

"Seldom, if ever, would a potential energy innovation draw any serious attention . . . unless it was well along in the innovation process. In other words, any potential innovation that had the status of either a recently conceived idea or one in which the initial application had just been . . . developed would be highly unlikely to garner attention in a marketplace dominated by nuclear power."

Next, these gains are greater. Bossong and Rader of Critical Mass in '89:

". . . investments in nuclear power would divert funds that could be used to pursue more promising solutions that can be effective in addressing not only electrical generation as a source of global warming emissions . . ."

The prolif debate, he says empirically denied, empirically denied. However, it doesn't assume the NPT will collapse which we'll win down below. He says numbers irrelevant, however doesn't assume fast prolif. That's the Waltz in '84 evidence who is an advocate of prolif good. It's the fifth card on the B Subpoint. He says is recent evidence. First of all, is '78 evidence, like it all assumes, and it goes to the NPT. In other words, the NPT slows it down which is our solvency evidence, that's the Sheinman card which is the sixth card on the C Subpoint. He says no snowball. First of all, doesn't assume the NPT. Second of all, it will. Meyer, assistant professor of political science at MIT, in '84.

"In the case of the former, many countries have gone on record as declaring that they will remain nonnuclear weapons countries only as long as the global non-proliferation regime holds up. In other words, if the acquisition of atomic weapons seemed to be becoming the rule rather than the exception, they would feel compelled to follow suit."

He says fifth, no miscalculation. However, we have four other scenarios including accidents. Also, it's the most likely scenario for war. Also card says stability. Our card says it causes miscalc. Brenner '87:

"The stakes, though, will remain high. The presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the regional foes could make them more recalcitrant. Moreover, as Dunn has argued, nuclear weapons can be expected to increase the tempo of events and, thereby, the risk of miscalculation."

Please extend the third card on the A Subpoint. Meyer '84, indicates a one year time frame, 1975. That gives us the time frame scenario. Also the second card on the B Subpoint, the Sheinman evidence indicates it's the most likely scenario for war, on balance means superpower competition which includes Gorbachev which means it outweighs the disad. C Subpoint. He says at the top that, the time frame is bad. It's excellent evidence, Williams in 1990. Look at the card fifth in the IAC. He says, IAEA solves. First of all, we uniquely stabilize that, that's Epstein in '85. It must be remembered that in 1995 the conference will be held to decide the future treaty of the NPT, which is the chief holder against proliferation who's viability or even credibility is subject to the whole non-proliferation regime, and that include's the IAEA. He says, third and fourth. Please group these. First of all, the Avory evidence, the bottom of the C Subpoint, political link. Second, Gray evidence, fourth card from the bottom indicates we have non-proliferation now. In other words, there's no technology. He says third is, tech shift, the second card on the A Subpoint indicates they will develop them indigenously, and if they don't get them from us, in other words they'll inevitably get nuclear power, and it they don't get them from us there's no safeguards, because they'll do it themselves. The fourth is turn, we need leverage in order to stop technological dominance from the real proliferation threats. Simpson in '84:

". . . the greatest causes for concern in sustaining a system of physical denial of nuclear-weapon production capabilities probably lies in the limited scope of the safeguards regime and the shift in the center of gravity of the global nuclear industry away from the USA."

Next is power doesn't cause prolif. Alonzo, executive director of FITRE, in '85:

"The connection or linkage between nuclear power and nuclear weapons, to date, has been hypothetical. None of the five nuclear weapon states . . . has relied upon civilian fuel cycle facilities . . ."

Next is not unique: Other routes besides power. Scheinman, '85:

". . . the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle is neither the normal nor the preferred route to nuclear weapons and that its abandonment would not materially change the risk of proliferation . . . (a bit)"

Next is 35 countries will proliferate if you don't do the plan. Christian Science Monitor in '87:

"First, the technology and infrastructure required to develop nuclear weapons has spread significantly in the past two decades. Roughly 35 additional countries now have the financial base, technical know-how, industry, and resources for a nuclear weapons program, according to proliferation experts."

That's all I want there. Now I need number five, indicates precadent. The first, he indicates the '78 card. Second of all, third world not follow. Kennedy, special advisor on nonproliferation, which is a much better source than they have, in '85:

". . . more importantly, there is no evidence that self-denial on the part of the industrialized world is likely to lead to similar forbearance on the part of Third World nations."

Next, quick shifts will cause them to proliferate, Kennedy in '85:

"It is quite apparent that the sharp turns in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years have led to serious friction with our nuclear trading partners and a consequent decline in our ability to win their support for important nonproliferation objectives."

The next is all the stuff off number four turns above. Next is, Lovins is a hack, he doesn't know anything about the non-proliferation treaty, he doesn't know anything about the nuclear process, he's just flaming. Number six he says Modulars and cost, please group these. That's exactly our solvency evidence, we can use these to give it to them. However, they will get them anyway, that's the Weinberg evidence, remember he's the co-writer of the NPT. They will inevitably prolif, the only way you can stop them is through politics. He says eight is, access to military. However, that's only symbolic. That's number three. He says, access to technology. That's a Lovins hack, I've also answered that above. He says, they solve because they decrease nuclear power; however, a lot of this evidence, he has no qualification for Lovins. We're reading experts on non-proliferation, which we're reading our sources, they don't even have the qualifications on the blocks. Observation one on inherency indicates the disads are empirically false, it should have caused the perceptual disads anyway. The accidents stuff. He says, risk is low and scientific consensus containment solves, three cards off this. My accidents will increase in future. Weiss in '85:

". . . there is much reason to believe that they are optimistic . . . Moreover, as the current generation of plants age, one can expect to see more safety problems attributable to that process."

C Subpoint. Solvency. He says, new technology. First of all, it doesn't assume that the technical issues are resolved. Lanning and Lidsky in '85:

". . . the outstanding technical issues with regard to the use of the MHTGR for electric power production can be entirely resolved by 1990 . . ."

Second, administration stats are independent. He says, graphite reactors, however they're too small. Kerr in '89.

". . . oxidation of graphite would be so slow that after many hours only a small fraction of the graphite would be consumed . . ."

Three through seven, please group. First of all, not modular HTGRS, St. Vrain was a big HTGR. Second of all is, fuel design is unique. Hoffman, '89:

"The modular HTGR by its design is one in which the specifics of the fuel design itself provide, in our view, its own containment."

Eight, he says, advanced reactors not solve management, (time) That's all the answers up above. Remember he's dropping the US Electricity in '85 card in the 1AC.

Cross Examination of the Second Affirmative Constructive

Rodger Cole cross-examining Alex Lennon

Rodger: Okay, I need to see. First of all, I need to see our evidence?
David: They want it back.
Rodger: I want back our Gorbachev answers?
Alex: What do you want back?
Rodger: Our Gorbachev evidence. Now, if nuclear weapons capability exists now clearly, right, this is your argument.
Alex: Uh, huh.
Rodger: Okay, now if the United States says that we're not going to use nuclear power, and neither should any of the Third World, why wouldn't that be just as much influence as the United States saying, go hellbent and develop?
Alex: Because the reason we get the development regime is because we meet the Third World's needs. In other words, the non-proliferation treaty incorporates the Third World energy and economic requirements, which gets the peaceful benefits in exchange for them relinquishing proliferation.
Rodger: Okay, now why . . .
Alex: And just saying, don't do nuclear weapons, they say well what are we supposed to do if its economical for us and we have uranium in our country, and we say, you can think of what I'm going to say they're going to say, without saying it on stage (laughter).
Rodger: Now, why does the Affirmative make it more economical?
Alex: Why does the affirmative make it more economical? Because the modular HTGR, you're turn on case, says it decreases cost that gives them the unique thing. That incorporates it into before, and we fulfill our commitment to them to give them nuclear energy, which we're not doing now, and in 1995 they're going to get really upset with us.
Rodger: So, why didn't, exactly, so why don't countries who are energy dependent now, after the plan, say fine we'll all develop modular HTGRS?
Alex: It depends on whether it's economic for their system or not. I mean, how do you fit into small electricity grids? Remember, the Third World countries we're talking about are countries whose electricity grids are too small to incorporate the big light water reactors. What in the world is their impact? And, your U.S. key card on the DA says the Third World will grow, during a crisis.
Rodger: Right, we're agreeing on the costs and grids stuff.
Alex: Well, I'm also saying what our answers are if you say Third World, which hasn't been made so far.
Rodger: Okay, all right, let me see this. You read a card that says gas is going to be used, not oil. That says because of the '78 Fuel Use Act right?
Alex: No, no, it's talking about deregulation, it's a very recent card, its not talking about the Fuel Use Act. That's not the card we're talking about.
Rodger: Do you have these together?
Alex: Those cards.
Rodger: What about the Japan cards? Do you know where they are?

Alex: I think we spaced out on those.
David: Alex, they never reached over here. They're not here.
Rodger: Our cards. (Time)

Second Negative Constructive

2NC — Mark Rubinstein, Redlands

I think we'll win this debate. They're never denying that if you ban nuclear power that ends the Japan nuclear agreement, which flips both the advantages to the case.

Counterplan.

All current fossil fuel consumption will be maintained at least at existing levels. Future increases concomitant with rising electricity demand are allowed. All efforts at conservation or renewable energy technology will be banned for at least 20 years. The loss of electricity from the riddance of nuclear power will be replaced with fossil fuel powered plants.

Little a., it's not topical — it does not decrease consumption — in fact it would increase consumption.

Little b., it's mutally exclusive — you can not build nuclear power plants and replace them with fossil fuel plants at the same time.

Little c., net benefits — the counterplan solves for the turns to the disads and the economic collapse scenario. In addition it gets the net benefit of allowing CO_2 to be pumped in the air and Gorbachev to get his necessary revenue.

Little d., permutations can't be anti-topical — apply from the INC. They're never answering the arguments out of the INC which means they can't get any new answers to the permutation standards, which means they can't be antitopical.

Next argument, the counterplan is feasible.

Oil is incredibly abundant meaning we can use it. Sperling, '88:

> "This planet has been blessed with large quantities of easily accessible petroleum . . . petroleum is a superior source of energy. It has a high energy density, is easily and inexpensively transported, and can be transformed into a large number of products at relatively low cost. And despite our rather profligate use of petroleum, the planet Earth still has tremendous quantities of petroleum stored away in its crust."

This counterplan takes out their turns to the disad. Now, please go to the top of the counterplan. He says turn, accidents. First, no the counterplan solves for this, his evidence says personnel, but the counterplan text hires the personnel, it maintains them. Also we do the same.

Safety board as the Affirmative, guaranteeing all safety solvency, taking out the turn.

Second, turn: lack of trained staff increases the risk of HTGRS. Kerr, '88:

> "Little is said in the staff paper about requirements for operation and staffing of advanced reactors. We find this to be a serious oversight. Experience with LWRs has shown that issues of operation and staffing are probably more important in protecting public health and safety than are issues of design and construction."

Now, please go to the Japan nuclear agreement. He says, we solve because we increase the NPT. This is not an argument; a lot of arguments in the 2AC are simply not arguments. You can't understand them. Our second argument here is that the banning of nuclear power ends the US-Japan agreement. The Japan nuclear agreement depends upon us trading nuclear technology with Japan. The counterplan would ban any and all U.S. nuclear power, which means we could never do it anymore which would turn the advantage. Now they say second and third, necessary for the NPT to stop prolif., group them. First, U.S. Japan agreement violates the NPT, that is the Leventhal evidence, he's the President of the Nuclear Control Institute, more evidence from Leventhal in '88:

> "But critics argue that the administration has renegotiated the current agreement, which will not expire for 15 years, in order to weaken U.S. nonproliferation laws, since Congress would never agree to amend these laws. The principal sticking point is the so-called programmatic consent: advance U.S. approval for Japan to transfer, separate, and use in its power program . . ."

Next the Agreement allows Diversion of Plutonium. Epstein '88:

> "Traffic in plutonium creates opportunities for "acts of nuclear terrorism involving mass destruction," the Pentagon warned. The NRC said Japan might lose track of so many kilograms of plutonium that terrorists would be able to build hundreds of nuclear weapons."

Next argument, the Agreement Gives Japan Permission to Reprossess. Epstein '88:

> The Administration submitted a new U.S.-Japan nuclear-cooperation agreement to Congress in November that appears to violate the 1978 Nuclear NPA . . . Under a current agreement that expires in 2003, the United States controls Japan's use of plutonium contained in spent nuclear fuel obtained from the United States. The United States supplies 80 percent of Japan's nuclear fuel in the form of low-enriched uranium, and Japan needs to get approval from the United States before reprocessing the burned fuel into plutonium. But the new agreement which would supercede the old one, would grant Japan thirty years of "programmatic" approval to reprocess and air-ship plutonium without case-by-case clearance from the United States."

The next argument, the slow growth in nuclear power prevents reprocessing, it alleviates prolif risks proving the turn is unique. Rose '85:

> "The nuclear slowdown delays for decades the commercial deployment of breeder reactors; this, plus hopes to extract uranium from seawater . . . leads to the possibility that the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle could consist only of disposing permanently of spent fuel under international supervision, without any chemical treatment. That would sever a major link between civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons."

The next argument, there's no reprocessing now, it proves turn unique. Aver '85:

> "Given the present unfavorable economic climate for reprocessing, it would not be surprising to see a complete lack of major commitment to reprocessing at least until the end of the century."

The final argument here is that reprocessing causes prolif. Spence '84:

> "The technical points of linkage between 'peaceful' and military nuclear programmes should be briefly spelled out . . . More modern reactors have tended to use enriched uranium as a fuel, which involves the construction of *enrichment* plant. Once again, plutonium can be extracted after the use of enriched uranium fuel, but enriched uranium itself can serve as a nuclear explosive. Once uranium has been enriched to reactor grade, it requires only a comparatively little extra work to bring it up to weapons grade . . . it is possible to use plutonium taken straight from a reactor in order to construct a crude but effective nuclear weapon."

Now an underview here. First, the U.S. Japan-Nuclear agreement results in air crashes and plutonium accidents. Epstein '88:

> "A mere speck of plutonium causes lung cancer if inhaled. And Japan would be flying a lot of specks: as much as eighty-five tons of plutonium by the year 2000, according to a report by the Nuclear Control Institute . . . Planes carrying plutonium would make two to three trips each month, the Institute estimates. A crash by one of these planes could have devastating consequences. "A tiny amount of plutonuim

can kill half a million people, which is about all we have here . . ."

Also the risk of an accident is greater than in power plants which outweighs the case. Epstein '88:

"The risks of such air traffic are, indeed, enormous. Transporting plutonium by air is dubious because of the large possibility that a plane will crash, . . . Commercial plutonium flights could make nuclear-power reactors look safe by comparison . . ."

Now, I think we're flipping the case, now please go to the top of the accidents advantage.

He doesn't get here in time. Extend accident risk low, and Light Water Reactors are safe which takes out the perception argument. Also, the scientific consensus proves that Light Water Reactors are safe which is the reason why we should not do HTGRS. He says that, increases the risk, but that assumes there's a containment structure on the HTGR, which there isn't, which is our third argument, and the Light Water Reactor has containment structures. Now, extend all the turns. He says not assume tech issue, but remember this evidence is from Lidsky, he designed the HTGR, what do you think he's going to say? Also, the Rogers evidence says that any new technology carries unknown risks, which increases the risk of an accident, this evidence is specific to HTGRS. Also, extend graphite fires and the lack of containment structure. Remember, there's not a containment structure within the HTGR which means that there would be more radiation released, flipping it back on them. Extend, that increases vulnerability to earthquakes, earthquakes are inevitable, which means that there is a possibility that an HTGR could catch fire and cause an accident. Also, extend the St. Vrain HTGR has failed which proves that empirically there's no safety from an HTGR and also the particle coating is not succesfsful, their evidence assumes that there is a particle coating on the HTGR which prevents an accident, but our evidence says it's not any safer. Extend the last card which says it's not any safer than a light water reactor. I think we're flipping accidents. The impact to this is a hundred thousand lives. Now, please go to prolif. I'll grant them the impacts to prolif, but I think we're going to flip the links. At the top, extend the second argument, the IAEA solves. He says we're prolifing now, First, no, there's no indigenous production. It proves only voting Aff risks prolif. Weinberg '85:

"Part of the reason for this fortunate development can be traced to the measures created since 1945 to inhibit proliferation directly . . . Probably more important, however, has been the general absence of motivation to obtain nuclear weapons. Many nations with the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons have concluded, at least for now, that their security would not be furthered by development of indigenous nuclear weapons."

Second, slow nuclear power growth proves no prolif breakout, proving it's a unique turn to the case. Weinberg '85:

". . . only modest expansion in the number of countries involves in the nuclear power enterprise is expected over the next decade and a half, countering fears of a "nuclear breakout" prevalent as a recently as four or five years ago. Incremental nuclear power growth is seen, on balance, as positive for nonproliferation since it reduces fuel requirements and the subsequent demand for fuel cycle facilities. It also allows the international community the time to reassess the efficacy of our trade and nonproliferation regime and to suggest new elements that can be incorporated within them."

Third argument is, those with capability have no motive it proves that there's no indigenous production. Aver '85:

". . . those non-nuclear weapon states . . . with the most advanced capabilities are clearly with superpower spheres of interest, with their security concerns guaranteed by the respective superpowers. with credible pledges of superpower support, these nations have little incentive to develop indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities for national defense.

Now extend off the third and fourth arguments, where he groups them. His first is, Avory. Great, but our evidence in the INC says the cause is technology transfer which increased the risk of prolif, which takes out his evidence. Now group three through six, here, is first, that's handled above where we say there's no indigenous production, now, second increased nuclear power increases the risk of diversion. Tech Review '87:

". . . this technology also increases the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Spent fuel is too radioactive to handle directly and cannot be used in a bomb, but extracted plutonium is relatively easy to handle and cna be so used. And as noted, safeguards may not always be able to detect diversion of plutonium from either reprocessing plants or plants where fuel assemblies are fabricated.

Also, even small amounts equal prolif which means we don't have to win a big link. Epstein '88:

"All a terrorist has to do is divert a tiny fraction, fifteen pounds to have enough plutonium to fashion a nuclear bomb of the type dropped on Nagasaki . . ."

The next argument, now extend off, no, he says six, no his last argument is thirty-five countries prolif without the plan, but our evidence above says there's no countries prolifing indigenously right now. Now the fifth argument, turn.

Influence, that we set a counterprecedant. Extend that stopping prolif requires banning nuclear power-which means you must vote for the counterplan. Spence '84:

". . . nuclear power and nuclear weapons are, in the nature of the thing, inseparable. So-called 'peaceful' nuclear technology is being bought and sold in the full knowledge that it will be applied to military ends. A strategy for nuclear disarmament must therefore entail the abandonment of nuclear power, for the maintenance of 'peaceful' facilities would constitute a standing invitation to re-open the military option."

Second, the Aff doesn't solve the political link — this takes out their Avory card, which he's going to flame about in the 2AR. Zaleski '85:

". . . using civilian nuclear power as a means of pressure seems inefficient and can only suppress potential civilian nuclear power development . . . convincing some states that nuclear weapons capability is not in their interest is not so easy for weapons states, which themselves have made the opposite decision."

Which proves the CTBT argument which I made in cross-examination.

Now the 6th argument grids, he's granting these arguments. If I win that smaller grids cause proliferation I win the debate. Extend that the turn is unique — small grids prevent nuke power spread now — it proves that it won't prolif if the grids are large. They don't prolif now because of large grids. Aver '85:

"Perhaps the most fundamental drawback, however, is the mismatch between reactor size . . . and the limited electricity grids in developing countries. Since a generally accepted guideline is that no single power plant should represent more than 15 percent of the capacity of a power grid, only those developing countries with relatively large grids can safely add a 600 MWe nuclear plant to their power systems."

Second, modular reactors increase prolif threat because of grids. Rose '85:

Smaller reactors in the future — a topic of recent lively debate could lead to more widespread nuclear power, to fit smaller electric power grids of many countries, thus increasing the risk of weapons proliferation somewhat on that account."

Third, the plan will equal small reactor sales to the Third World — given the connection between prolif and power proven on number seven — this guarantees prolif. Aver '85:

"Whether there is, indeed, a market for relatively small-scale nuclear power reactors has been a matter of speculation for years . . . If the utilities in OECD countries were to seek power reactors this size . . . suppliers would have a strong incentive to supply reactors suitable for meeting the needs of both developing and developed countries.

Also, there is no risk of prolif now — Light Waters have empirically not led to prolif only the Aff can equal prolif. Fisher '85:

". . . it is also interesting that no proliferation has so far directly resulted from the export of light water reactors (LWRs) whether for research or power generation. Nor has an LWR research or power program been used as a cloak for developing a nuclear weapons capacity. Yet the LWR accounts for the vast number of power reactors built or being built today."

Now the cost argument, he grants this to an extent. The turns are unique, the high cost of current large reactors is why prolif is stalled now. Rose '85:

"Regarding the first of these — reactors and cadres — the fact that power reactors these days come only in very large sizes and at great expense is some impediment to weapons proliferation by that route. What rational government would spend several billion dollars on a civilian program, with the aim of subverting it in secret."

Now the 8th argument turn, nuclear use justifies the military. That's the evidence in the INC, more evidence from Spence '84:

"Nuclear weapons proliferation in the Third World is not a random process. It has a clear pattern, and that pattern is comprehensible only within the context of sharpening inter-imperialist rivalries in recent years. In the nuclear export market generated by those rivalries, the 'peaceful atom' is a fiction: nuclear power is inseparable from nuclear weapons."

Also, nuclear power provides cover for prolif — nations will do it. Holden, 1983:

"Most importantly, a commercial nuclear power program provides a legitimate cover for nuclear-energy-related facilities and activities, that, without the manifest rationale of electricity generation, would be unambigiously weapons related."

Now the 9th turn, improve access to technology, extend the evidence, more evidence that U.S. policy key — banning power will make the non-proliferation effort successful. Bhatia '88:

"U.S. policies towards nuclear energy . . . may be characterized as stop-go . . . As the Americans have been the world's largest suppliers of nuclear technology, their policies have a direct bearing on the nuclear programs of countries outside the Communist Bloc. They can make or break the non-proliferation effort."

Also, it's empirically true — past prolif is from U.S. nuclear exports. Steinberg, 1984:

". . . the second section clearly shows the link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and nuclear power in the Third World . . . the United States gave countries such as India, Pakistan, Brazil and Iran their first practical experience with nuclear materials by eagerly providing 'civilian' nuclear reactors through the 'Atoms for Peace' program. These reactors usually enabled these countries to manufacture nuclear weapons."

(time) empirically proving the turn, with several indications of specific countries that have prolifed because of U.S. nuclear exports.

Cross Examination of the Second Negative Constructive

Alex Lenon cross-examining Marc Rubinstein

Alex: Okay, Marc that last card just says it enables the countries to do proliferation. Is there a card, I mean obviously these countries haven't proliferated. Right?

Marc: Well, India tested a bomb in 1974.

Alex: Did they build . . .

Marc: Pakistan hasn't officially disclosed.

Alex: Right, right, I'm on that.

Marc: But, they definitely have . . .

Alex: Do we know whether India built a nuclear weapon, is there any overt disclosure?

Marc: Well, they obviously built a nuclear weapon if they tested one.

Alex: They don't have a nuclear arsenal, I mean.

Marc: They might or they might not, it's unclear. They don't have a disclosed nuclear arsenal.

Alex: I'd like to see, the fourth card on the top of prolif, capability not equal motivation, and the card where you say Light Water reactors didn't cause proliferation. That's, the 3rd card off of 6 and 7 that you read?

Marc: Capability, those with the capability don't have the motive.

Alex: Right, I need to see that.

Marc: Okay, and then the Light Water reactors card.

Alex: Who are the countries that have electricity grids, that are too small to fit?

Marc: A lot of developing countries in places like Africa, and usually Latin America.

Alex: Can you name one that has an electricity grid that is too small for nuclear power?

Marc: Can I name a particular country? Probably a country like Senegal, for example, would have a fairly small electricity grid.

Alex: So your link on modularity is to Senegalian prolif?

Marc: No, I'm just giving an example. Probably most countries in the Third World have small power grids because they live, they're like villages where there's not as many big cities, where there's more rural rather than urban. I mean this is not rocket science.

Alex: So if they're village systems they're decentralized and out of government power. The electricity grids are too small.

Marc: Excuse me.

Alex: How do the government co-opt it? If they're village systems that have decentralized power systems?

Marc: Well, because, our evidence says there is absolutely no distinction between nuclear power for civilian and nuclear power for military technology, so even if the reactors are smaller once they're there . . ."

Alex: How does government get control of village based small scale electricity?

Marc: Well, it's not like the little villagers run around controlling the nuclear power plant, obviously there's some sort of cityfolk that go in there (laughter) and run the powerplant.

Alex: And the cityfolk carry the buckets of uranium away from the local plant back to . . .

Marc: No, it's not like they carry it away, it's that right there, at the nuclear reactor the people who are nuclear scientists . . .

Alex: So in these tiny little villages, they're going to covertly build a nuclear weapons arsenal because of the modularity of reactors for electricity grids that are too small.

Marc: Let's not let the rhetoric get away from reality, I mean it's not like . . .

Alex: I would ask the same question of the 2NR.

Marc: A nuclear reactor serves the power grids of probably several tiny villages. It's not like there's this big nuclear reactor in some small village, probably it's serving the villages.

Alex: How to they covertly do that?

Marc: How do they covertly do it? It's not even necessarily covert;it's the government policy. Obviously, they don't want to tell the United States about it, because we'd probably cut off aid to them or something, but they want to do it, because then they have the ability to do it, because they have the reactors on their power grids which means that the nuclear scientists who have the technique . . .

Alex: One more, one more question. If the NPT collapses how do you solve for the 35 countries that have the proliferation capability now?
Marc: Excuse me.
Alex: If the NPT collapses, how do you solve for the 35 countries?
Marc: We might not be able to, but our evidence says that you would collapse the NPT, also . . . (time)
Alex: Where's that card?
Marc: That's the Japan stuff.

First Negative Rebuttal

Rodger Cole

I think we'll win a link to the disad as well as turning the case.

Now number nine, one more card the turn outweighs the blackmarket — decreasing availability of materials decreases risk of prolif, only the counterplan will solve this. Weinberg '85:

"Imposing technical and institutional barriers on a nation's capabilities can increase the economic and political costs of weapons acquisition. By increasing the costs and obstacles associated with weapons acquisition, one influences the cost-benefit calculus that national leaders invariably perform."

Now number ten. Extend this, it's the Lovins card. All turns unique — slow rate of prolif now is because of slow growth of nuclear power which means the counterplan solves. Eibenshbutz: '85:

". . . proliferation is less of a risk now because nuclear power has not proliferated to the degree that was expected a decade ago. Fewer countries are installing or planning to install nuclear power plants. All over, less nuclear power is being installed."

Now the disad to the counterplan. The first one, energy wars, first argument is it will never happen. The SPR solves. Wampler '89:

"The greatest value of the Strategic Patroleum Reserve . . . it is an insurance policy, if you will."

Also Soviet cooperation is more likely than conflicts, no impact to escalation. Murarka '90:

"Soviet foreign policy is being transformed under Gorbachev, and nowhere more so than in the Middle East . . The Middle East is now more likely to become a region of superpower cooperation than confrontation . . ."

Also the U.S. won't protect our interests, we won't intervene. Khazin in '86:

"And, like many of the Third World regions, the Middle East will become a conglomeration of marginal states. The United States is no longer a power that needs to intervene in the Middle East either to end conflicts or to defend vital interests."

Last, the Soviets recognize our oil interests, and won't counter-escalate. Fukuyama '84:

". . . while the balance of superpower stakes may seem to be comparable, the Soviets appear to have tacitly recognized the superiority of the American interest throughout most of the postwar period, particularly its interest in oil."

Now the second one, nothing but turns. First argument, it's empirically denied, we've had the bank collapse and recessions in the past with no impact. Number two, there's no scenario why would a bank collapse cause a depression, the silk card is so old and awful. Also economic downturn won't cause conflict. Russett '83:

"At moments of greatest economic crisis, those who are most economically deprived may be too busy just surviving to achieve enough political organization for successful revolt. Thus the rough of an economic cycle is not necessarily the time of greatest conflict." which takes out the Silk card.

Also, turn - arms race.

Little a. A poor economy prevents an arms race. Cohen in '83:

"Economic problems will probably lead to reversing the arms race more than any other issue."

Little b., arms race inevitably equals war. UN study in '85:

"The build-up of arms, far from helping to strengthen security, erodes it. It aggravates the many divisions and tensions which cast a dark shadow over the world. It increases the threat of nuclear war."

Next turn, turn 3rd World Development.

Little a., a depression in the U.S. is good. It's the only way to free up enough resources for Third World development and avert a nuclear war. Trainer '85:

". . . the Third World's most serious problems cannot be solved unless the rich nations de-develop and shift to far lower per capita resource use rates so that the Third World can use more of the available wealth to produce the things it needs . . . If we refuse to face up to de-development . . . we must accept a situation in which our affluence can be guaranteed into the future only by an increasingly unequal distribution of global resources, by the increasing use of force on our part, by intensifying struggles between countries for dwindling resources and therefore by further deterioration in global security."

Now CO_2, we'll concede number one, we'll concede this out emissions increasing, they won't build plants fast enough, that's fine. Now Gorbachev, he says future links, he says future link, but the INC proves this, remember rising electricity demand guarantees an increase in prices, increases Soviet revenue in the future.

He says the brink, but the brink only says that chaos equals overthrow. Remember the initial links, is if you decrease demand in the nineties, which will kill Gorbachev. Now number three and four, he says, more nukes to come. First, the counterplan solves for this, the counterplan prevents future nukes and the ones in the status quo. Second, increase in nukes is bad that will be on point link evidence below. Number five, gas not oil. First argument, oil imports will still increase because natural gas increase in electricity demand would have been substituted for oil imports now. DOE '87:

"Without adequate advance planning, utilities or others may once again have to rely on combustion turbines for extended periods to maintain reliable service. This could lead to an uneconomic use of gas that otherwise could be substituted for oil in many applications throughout the economy."

Second, the oil links take this out, that will be below. Number six, he says gold solves. First, gold just crashed, which means it wouldn't be profitable for the Soviets to sell it. LA Times, March 27th:

"Gold prices . . . as a strong dollar and rumors of heavy selling by the Saudi Arabians . . . panicked the market. . .gold prices . . . fell $23."

Also, gold is too important to the Soviets to sell. Shelton '89:

"The most obvious alternative, rarely mentioned in Moscow, is to sell gold. The Soviets seem to attribute near-mythical qualities to their gold holdings . . ."

Third, South Africa prevents — if the Soviets start doing it, South Africa would retaliate, meaning they wouldn't get any revenue.

Number seven, U.S./U.S.S.R. Agreement. First, this is only in agriculture. There is no evidence that indicates this would solve other hard currency needs. Number two, oil exports are critical, which is the link evidence in the INC. Number three is turn, oil key to other parts of the economy. The INC link evidence from Arbatov says that oil is key to do other parts of the economy like the technical standards and the stuff for the people which would take out agriculture now. Number eight. First argument is rising electricity use of oil key to revenue in the future. Stauffer — March 20, '90:

"The Saudis . . . now believe that their strategy of cutting prices to encourage demand and to increase competition has worked well . . . Much of the increased demand is from the United States, where lower prices have . . . led to rapidly-growing imports. With U.S. electric utilities burning more and more oil, OPEC sees the U.S. as a key factor in its future."

Also utilities shifting back to oil, now, it will continue PIW on March 12th.

"The reasons for U.S. utilities' revived appetite for fuel oil are chronic . . . financial constraints, cancellation of nuclear orders, environmental opposition to new plant construction . . . high electricity demand growth coincided to force utilities back to old, often inefficient oil-burning units that had been partially or wholly retired over the previous 15 years . . . virtually all forecasts show a significant upswing by 1995 . . ."

Last argument, electricity shift is the key determinant in increasing oil consumption this is PIW on March 12, '90:

". . . there is now strong evidence that worldwide use of the bottom-of-the-barrel product has flattened after a 15-year plunge and will begin an extended upswing . . . This sudden reversal can be traced to one dominant factor — a resurgence in oil burning for electricity generation."

Now number nine, he says the evidence doesn't say this, they've underlined the cards so the evidence doesn't say anything. Number two, electricity is key to the future market, which is Nuclear Engineering International in '89:

"Despite heavy spending by utilities on efficiency programmes, electricity demand is rising much faster than new capacity to meet it is being installed, and there is a return to dependence on imported oil for electricity generation."

Also, electricity demand increases oil prices. DOE '87:

". . . consumption of oil . . . by electric utilities could increase significantly after 1995 . . . Demand for such large quantities of oil . . . for electricity generation would help to drive up oil . . . prices."

Also, increased electricity demand equals the Soviets have revenue. Beckmann '89:

"Furthermore, almost the entire spare capacity of the United States is oil-fired . . . When demand exceeds supply, these oil-fired plants will come back . . . We are back to 1973 where the energy, which means the economy, of the United States lies in the trustworthy hands of the Soviet Politburo . . ."

Now number ten is the same as Number eight. Number eleven, the Affirmative can be dependant on this as well. Number twelve, first argument is, turns empirically untrue — should have happened in the past.

Number two, no increase in consumption — they don't prove this.

Number three, utilities not spending dollars on it now. They don't prove this.

Number four, nukes don't compete with conservation. Rossin '89:

"As any utility engineer knows, solar and nuclear energy are natural partners, never competitors. All solar energy comes during the day when the sun shines and when electricity loads are the highest."

Also, it's not unique, we're not pursuing soft path now. Progressive '89:

"Through the U.S. Government has generously subsidized the production of nonrenewable fuels, it plays only a negligible role in energy conservation or the development of renewable sources."

Also, soft path will cause an electricity shortage, no, I don't want that. Okay, now Thirteen. First argument, it assumes the Affirmative spends money for building nukes. They don't. The second argument, they don't prove an increase in consumption. They would have to do this to increase consumption, but they don't. Also, it's irrelevant, the immediate perception would kill oil prices. Lennox '89:

"The loss of oil markets brought about by nuclear power's displacement of oil has had a demonstrable effect on oil prices . . . Since nuclear power displaces the marginal barrel, and changes in world oil demand of only a few million barrels of oil per day can be critical in determining oil prices, nuclear's effect on oil prices may be much greater than 20 percent."

Also, the link turn is long term: even if oil consumption is eventually increased it will not come for awhile.

Also, it's empirically disproved: If the turns were true, the status quo, because we do not currently encourage nukes, should be reducing oil consumption, which we haven't been doing.

Also, there's no solvency, conservation doesn't reduce oil. Coltrane '86: (time)

"One study of this phenomenon concluded that 'no correlation existed between reported household conservation actions and amount of energy actually saved in the households."

First Affirmative Rebuttal

David Coale

Last one will be the best one. Accidents, group it together. First, no, they won't solve it, there's no economic incentive; they get a bunch of bad workers without the industry. Second, there's no evidence. I'll show you the Lidsky evidence, they have all the staff and everything right now. Also, administration will solve, that's the evidence on the case, our evidence is on balance better. Japan, group his arguments together. The first and that is there's incredible perceptual value elsewhere in the world before they ever actually get anything. He says, no reprocessing now, means there's no impact on the underview. The second argument, evidence says nothing, says there's potential but there wouldn't be any actual impact. Here's why. The third argument here is safeguards, which means that all the NPT has deliberate safeguards and there wouldn't be any argument or impact. The next argument is the quick change arguments on the case side takes this out. What it proves is there would be mixed signals sent by the counterplan which would cause on balance, the destruction of the non-proliferation treaty. Their next argument is that, otherwise they would develop indigenous sources, cross-apply the Eibenschutz evidence on the case side, that takes out this argument. Next argument, we could solve with the case side, we could do HTGRS for god sake. The next argument is the agreement doesn't cause proliferation. Smith in '88:

"In any event, allowing Japan to see its plutonium is not a binding precedent for either. The Reagan policy is clear; that we will allow long term approval for the processing and use of plutonium only for those importing countries having advanced nuclear programs and which poses no risk of proliferation. There is no better example of such a country than Japan."

The next argument is that even former critics agree, indicting all his sources. Washington Post in '87:

"Solarz, a leading critic of the agreement, said the policy statement "goes a long way" toward resolving his questions. "Even those who had

deep concerns about the agreement can rest easier . . ."

The next argument is that Japan uses breeders right now, meaning the diversion impacts are not unique. Washington Post in '88:

"If Japan should reprocess all its spent fuel, however, it could end up with more plutonium than exists in the entire U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. Although the material is destined for peaceful uses, the agreement has raised questions about the safety of treating plutonium as a global commodity."

The next argument is, there's nothing moved by air, there's no link to this Japanese AAPS thing. New Scientist, February '90:

"The Japanese government's first choice was to cut the risk of hijack by transporting . . . over the North Pole . . . However, the American government has effectively prohibited this by refusing to set technical specifications for containers that would survive a plane crash."

The next argument is, the technology link isn't unique, the case side evidence proves this. Next is that reprocessing, is incredibly important symbolically. Inoue, Kansai Power in '88:

"Revision of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement . . . will strengthen efforts to guarantee nuclear non-proliferation, the *sine qua non* of world-wide promotion of preceful uses of nuclear energy, and will mark acceptance by Japan, ahead of any other major nation, of nine requirements as stipulated in the U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, thus significantly strengthening the United States' power to control nuclear proliferation. Acceptance of this agreement by Japan demonstrates its strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and willingness to support significantly the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States."

We're reading perception links, energy wars, group it together, first argument is that the Third World is our scenario; if we don't export technology they will fight otherwise. Secondly, even if there's plenty of oil in the transition there would be problems with this. Absent that there would be nuclear war. Wolfe of General Electric in '85:

"In the first part of the next century the 3 billion energy-starved people in the Third World will double in number when conventional oil and gas supplies, now providing two-thirds of the world's energy, will be in steep decline. Studies indicate that nuclear power may have to expand many-fold to make possible an economically healthy and stable world."

Next, this escalation evidence applies to the LDCS, attacking outside sources to provide for themselves. Second disad, which is a unique scenario. Extend the Ehrlich evidence more from Higgins '82:

"Heilbroner sees 'wars of pre-emptive seizure' among the potential strategies. As resources dwindle, the desire to lead to desperate acts of self-preservation."

Now, off the next disad which is economy. Group it together. First, our arguments are nuclear power has unique multiplier effects on the economy and it generates a uniquely reliable electricity source. It would cause economic instability and a banking collapse, as a result would collapse. Next is, empirically there's never been conflict from a, uh, the next argument is group arms race together. First, there's no recession, there's no growth right tnow which means the turns are unique. Time, February of '90:

"Said Sinai, chief economist of the Boston Co.: "It shows that the economy ground to a virtual halt in the fourth quarter, with signs of weakness everywhere. The economy is flirting with a recession."

The next argument is, empirically, there haven't been any arms races in the past, empirically it's resulted from depressions. Altaf Gauhur in '83.

"A little reflection would show that the reverse is also true, prolonged periods of depression invariably lead to conflicts between nations and major wars."

Next is, it would cause unimaginable Hitlers, which would turn arms race back on them, Brookings in '76 — actually it's Silk in '76:

"If there should be a breakdown in the world economy, the new nationalism might be transformed into old nationalism with the present generation of leaders giving way to a new generation of unimaginable Hitlers who would arise to establish a new order over economic and political chaos and who would see utility in foreign ventures leading to World War III."

Also proliferation outweighs all of this. He says development. Group it together. First, this is solved elsewhere; the nuclear power takes this out. Second, what resources? Whatever, there's no scenario, however our evidence gives it. Next, scenario, it would decrease living standards if we had a depression. Futurist '80:

"The possibility of a second Great Depression in the 1980s is not something to be taken lightly . . . The collapse of living standards would be calamitous for many millions of people, and the political and social consequences would threaten the stablity of democratic institutions . . ."

Also the counterplan leaves it at the same level, also energy wars turns it. CO_2, extend the three takeouts, they prove it takes too long which takes out all the technology links to proliferation and the links to Gorbachev. All the perceptions happen in the short run which we will solve for now on the solvency contention. Off the first answer, from INC group his arguments together. First, is the IAEA's screwed right now because we do not have nuclear power, extend the evidence it's a more qualified source, it's an expert on the non-proliferation treaty. Second, the second arguments prove the case, there's no motivation right now because of the non-proliferation treaty, it works now. Third, it also proves that technology doesn't cause proliferation. I'll argue below that with light water reactors there should be proliferation now, because the link evidence is fundamentally true. Extend now off Alex's dump. Please extend the Avory, our links outweigh theirs, the Gray evidence proves we are prolif proof. Now, everything else off Alex's dump, group it together. First, the HTGR doesn't have any spent fuel. Ryan in '89:

"GA has changed fuels for its MHTGR . . . For the MHTGR, however, enrichment is reduced to 19.9 percent U-235, slightly below the 20 percent weapons-grade limit."

Extend also the Gray evidence in the IAC. Next argument is, this is terrorism, not proliferation. He's reading cards that say why no escalation is bad, there's no reason why this is uniquely bad. Next, there's no qualificaiton on any of this evidence. We're reading qualified sources throughout the constructives. Next is denial is important; it was a blanket denial which is on number 4. On balance we would get better denial, flipping back all of his arguments. Next argument is the 2NC evidence assumes leverage not leadership, our scenarios are independent. Extend number six, through eight, and seven through eight on everyone has capability. Everyone can build one right now who wants to; he gives no reason why any of his turns are unique. Number five, group his arguments, extend all the arguments. Quick change is incredibly bad which means the counterplan locks in all sorts of trouble. The evidence is from Kennedy, Special Advisor on Nonproliferation in '85:

"It would damage the national interest to jeopardize these hard-won gains by taking actions that would prompt our close nuclear trading partners once again to question the constancy and reliability of the United States as a partner in peaceful nuclear cooperation."

Proving they erode the non-proliferation treaty regime. Group grids together. First, the political value of these things outweigh. He's just proving there's a link to technological, we're proving we save the entire non-proliferation treaty. On balance would be better. Second, what the hell is the escalation risk, sorry about that; what the heck is the escalation risk of these countries if it's too small to fit a reactor in? What is the escalation risk? Next is this is all answered above on technological link. Next is, this supply evidence indicts the status quo, we have light waters now, it should be happening. There's no indigenous suppliers. He says no alternate suppliers, but they can develop, that's the technology link. Also measures have separated any link. Alonso in '85:

". . . the measures taken to date to sever the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons have been quite successful. There is no justification therefore, for a radical departure from established practices."

He says, no distinction. There's no qualification on any of this evidence. Secondly, it's never happened. Third argument is, none of the countries he says right now have built anything, the impact is, there's no impact to an undisclosed proliferation. Also, we solve more. Extend all the evidence from the 1AC. Also, you have to have leverage to get this which we uniquely solve for. Remember 35 countries go away otherwise. Now the second negative counterplan, group it. First is you can do both, you can do the Affirmative and you can maintain the current level of fossil fuel consumption. Second is, permutations don't have to be topical, just a test of competition. The next argument is second negative counterplans are illegitimate, you shouldn't listen to it, we don't have time to answer it. Next argument is time constraints. next is new counterplan; that's why I have new answers here. Next is, if permutations have to be topical you can run WOMP and things like that, also if the resolution is the focus of the debate it would justify counterwarrants. Now, Gorbachev. At the top, of the first two link presses, group together. First, the counterplan locks in at the present level which means he would never increase. Second, if he's on the brink right now there's no offsetting increase in the future. Extend number three, nuclear bubble, which means there's a big change right now, which is coming post-brink. Four and five, proving the gas increasing right now. His evidence does not assume the regulatory change. Number six, gold. Group his arguments. First of all 1NR, empirically denies the disad. There was a big economic downturn past the brink which proves it won't happen. Number seven, he says, 'just agriculture', what does that mean? It's talking about all the arguments up above. He says other oil increases. This is talking about Saudis, an OPEC country, there's no link to anywhere else in the world. He says, not possible, but it proves it's a very small set. Extend only 4 percent, there's no evidence that proves perception of anything like that. Off the turns, group them together. First is, not unique, there's conservation now, Brown in '89:

> "Strong electricity demand and public opposition to new power plants have made conservation a must. Moreover, no utility wants to be blamed for the greenhouse effect . . ."

Extend the evidence which empirically proves that they'll have to invest. Also ideology and things like that will inevitably cause a tradeoff. It's happening right now. Also, they would preceive the turns as much as they would perceive the link. Advantage one, safety. Group it together. First is, empirically proven, extend the evidence from Gray. Secondly, there's no empirical proof. Nothing in graphite could cause a fire. Third, don't need reactor containment, fuel containment is sufficient. Also, St. Vrain, the only example he's extending is an HTGR, not a modular HTGR. (time) The NRC is independent, proving that better safety would overwhelm all these things. We're comparative safer if nothing else. They're winning no link for years and years to Gorbachev or the technology turns on proliferation. We're winning a clean reason why you want to decrease the political incentives to stop proliferation right now. Thanks, I really enjoyed it. (applause)

Second Negative Rebuttal

Marc Rubinstein

Don't allow 2AR explanation of blips in the 1AR, the 2NC counterplan answers are virtually incomprehensible. He says, do both. Why? You can't. Remember, the permutations make them anti-topical because that would mean they're increasing oil consumption. He says, It doesn't make them not topical, which is not true, the counterplan mandates fossil fuel plants replace nuclear power plants, they are physically incompatible. It's mutually exclusive. Also to do a permutation would prove they are anti-topical which is illegimate permutation standard. They say it's not unlimiting. Why? There's no explanation. They say it's true to the countries, or something like that. I don't understand all these arguments. He says this would justify WOMP, for some reason, but I have no idea why. The counterplan does the opposite of the Affirmative. The plan mandates nuclear power, the counterplan keeps fossil fuel consumption, it solves the disads to the counterplan, the original counterplan, and it gets the net benefit of, by solving the turns to the disad. Now, CO_2, he says it takes out Gorbachev. It's not true. All the evidence says is that it doesn't solve fast enough for warming, which doesn't mean the power plants don't come on line quick enough to get the link to prices. Also, he's dropping the Lennox evidence at the bottom of Gorbachev which says perceptually they crash the price of oil which would kill Gorbachev. Now, the top of Gorbachev. He virtually has no answers here. He says that demand is never increasing. Remember we're reading three cards from March 12th of 1990 which says that right now the electricity sector is key to the revenue of the OPEC countries, and given that it's key to the oil market which proves that it is key to Gorbachev as well because that's where the electricity demand goes. Extend off number three. He says, not soon enough, remember increased nuclear power will come quick enough and even if they prove that it's not going to come for awhile, it doesn't matter because the Lennox evidence says they crash the world price of oil, and he's dropping it at the bottom. Number five, gas not oil. He says, not assume, but that's not true, the DOE '87 evidence says that oil imports are substituting for natural gas, and also the evidence below proves that oil is increasing in the electricity sector. Number six, gold. He says, empirically denied. Remember, it's crashed, the price has crashed now. Also, the gold, the Soviets will never sell their gold, which is the Shelton evidence, that South Africa would prevent them, this is a logical argument. Number seven, our card, he says, not true. He says, the Saudis, but no, the oil is key, the electricity is key to maintaining the high price on the world oil market. Three cards on March 12th which he's not answering, extend that rising electricity demand is key and it's useless unless we do this. Now, he's dropping the evidence off number nine that says electricity is key. Also extend the Beckmann evidence which says it directly goes to the Soviets, and please star that card. Read it after the round. Now, off number twelve. He extends the turn, he says, not unique. Remember, first the counterplan bans existing conservation which takes out the turn, which proves the only thing there is a link. Second, extend all the cards. There's no trade off with conservation, not unique we're not doing conservation now. In addition, conservation probably doesn't solve anyway; there's no evidence that says it would decrease consumption. Extend the answers off numbers fourteen and fifteen. Remember if there's any risk of a turn the counterplan solves for it, all there is, is a link. The Lennox evidence says, indicates we get the impact which is a nuclear war, which would outweigh the case. Now, the top of the original counterplan. He says, not solve. Remember, we do all the mechanisms of the plan to solve the safety as well as they do. Also extend the personnel turn from Kerr which says that advanced reactors increase the risk. Now, the Japan debate. His arguments are not easy to understand. He says, incredible perception; but this violates the NPT directly, which is the two Epstein cards, he's the president of the Nuclear Control Institute in '88. He says, not say anything, but the cards are good. They say it allows diversion, even if we have extra safeguards, the agreement violates the safeguards, proving the uniqueness to the turns. He says, quick change, but the agreement is a break with the past which proves we flip this back on them. He says, development, but we're beating this on prolif because there's no indigenous production now. He says, it solves case, which is not true. He says, it equals prolif. First, no this causes the NPT, this allows diversion even if it doesn't break the NPT directly, it allows diversion which causes the NPT to breakup and flips their 35 countries argument back on them. Off number eight, he says that, all the evidence is wrong, they've admitted it, but our evidence is from '88 which empirically proves that the '87 people might be wrong, but our evidence is not. Now, off the reprocessing stuff, he says, they have breeders now, but the agreement allows the breeders to be diverted, which increases them. Also, this only applies to Japan, not other places. He says, they will develop, that it's not important. First argument here is that reprocessing is unique now, also it increases the risk of prolif, which turns the case back on them. Now, energy wars. He says, it's a Third World. First the counterplan solves, remember we have unlimited supplies of energy, also, oh that's right. He says they're not moved by air, but this evidence only says there's no risk of a hijack by air. It also says it won't go over the Arctic. Extend the accidents turns, which says it's more likely than a nuclear power accident and that it could kill half a million people. These are

deaths you should prevent. Now, energy wars, he says. First argument here is there's no escalation. His evidence is old; it's from '85 and '82. Our evidence is from '86 and '90, which says it won't escalate beyond a regional war. Second, the counterplan solves for this; we have lots of oil. Also, we import it which means, we're protecting the economy. Now, the economy disadvantage, he says, we won't effect it, remember there's no scenario for this. Also, the counterplan maintains the current electricity demand, which means we replace nuclear power, so the economy never collapses. I'll grant him the arms race, but this Hitlers card is the same card read in the 2AC. Now off the depressions stuff, he says, they solve for this. No, the evidence says it causes de-development which reverses nuclear war in the Third World and turns the scenario back on them. I think this flips the Silk in '76 nationalism evidence, also, remember the counterplan from the 2NC solves because we have enough oil to solve. Now, please go to the top of the prolif advantage. He says, it's because of nuclear power, but no, there's no indigenous production, we're reading three cards from Weinberg who's an incredibly qualified source. He says, tech not equal prolif, remember that even small amounts of diversion allow for prolif. Now, the third argument in the 2NC, he says, Avory outweighs, but the evidence comes from Auer, that I read in 2NC specifically denies that they can solve for the political link, which takes out their Avory card. He says, ev is specific to terrorism not prolif. First, it doesn't matter, even small amounts, this doesn't depend on waste, it depends on diversion which comes from the increased amount of nuclear power, subsumes his arguments. Please extend the evidence. He says, do not qualify sources. He is just making an ad hominem attack, I don't think it applies. He says, 2AC, it assumes prolif, but we're flipping this below. Remember, the reason that nuclear prolif is decreasing now is because of the collapse of nuclear power, which the counterplan collapses completely. Now, the 5th turn, incluence. He says, lack in '85, remember there's three cards in 2NC from Auer, that says they can't solve the political link. Also, you can only stop prolif by banning nuclear power. Now he says, we flip delay. We're beating that. He says, what in the heck is escalation, but he's dropping all the grids cards, the turns that modulars fit grids, that modulars increase prolif. and that the plan will cause small reactors to be sold to the Third World, which increases the risk of prolif. The Auer evidence and the reasoning were not taken out because of the grids cards. He says, they're not going to be built, but the plan causes them to be built. Now remember, there's never been prolif from Light Water Reactors which proves that the only way there is ever going to be prolif is if you decrease thes size which allows them to prolif. Also, the cost evidence is dropped which proves that since small reactors are cheaper that increases the risk of prolif. Extend, that this outweighs the black market, the Weinberg evidence, that he's dropping. At the bottom, all the evidence, that it's unique, that the escalation risks are low, that the Weinberg turn says it outweighs the black market. Off the 10th argument, extend the evidence that the Spence evidence, that is the only card that says empirically all these countries have only prolifed when we have given them. India, Pakistan etc. Even, if they are small, extend the U.S. policy is key, the Bhatia evidence. And it's empirically true, which is the Steinberg evidence at the bottom. We're flipping cold, we're flipping their Avory evidence. Now, he's dropping the accidents debate. I think this is something important to weigh in the debate. He just says, empirically and graphite, remember future tech carries unknown risks, which is the Rogers evidence. He is reading evidence in the 1AC that says there is a high risk and that 100,000 people could die, he's dropping all the evidence. Extend the third argument, the lack of containment structure increases the risk, and the increased vulnerability to earthquakes, the St. Vrain HTGR failed, and they'll never solve. There's no particle coating which proves they cause an accident. Only the counterplan can solve for this. This debate is all very cohesive, the counterplan solves for the turns to the disad. The counterplan also solves for the disads to the original counterplan. (time) It also turns prolif. I just want to say one more thing at the end. Answering Marty Loeber's 2NR from last year. I really like this activity, and it's taught me, I think, more in an educational sense, more than the fifteen years I've been in school. I really have no regrets. I'm really glad to be here in the final round of the NDT. It's sort of the culmination of a lot of work and time that I've spent in the activity. I want to thank, one thing keeps me interested is my friends. I'd like to thank Rick Fledderman, Jay Unick and a lot of other people keeping this activity fun. You'll probably be up here one day too. Thanks a lot. (applause)

Second Affirmative Rebuttal

Alex Lennon

This debate is extremely easy; there is no way they can solve 35 countries proliferating in 1995. It's the most likely scenario for war which is the Sheinman evidence, this occurs within one year. All the disads become completely irrelevant. All I need to do is win any hint of solving proliferation. We solve an inevitable war by 1996, the most likely nuclear war. He says off the top, there's no indigenous suppliers. First of all, this only occurs with indigenous suppliers. Remember, he's dropping the evidence that says no country has ever caused technology. All his cards talk about the technology availability, and the capability to proliferation. Our evidence on point says that they have never transferred this availability into an actual capability to proliferate decision. None of this has ever happened empirically. There's never been a decision, and they sacrifice 35 countries proliferating into the most likely scenario for war. He says technology allows, that's exactly right, it only allows it, no country has ever made the decision. He says not solve political motive. First of all, that's false. It's empirically worked. That's the Sheinman evidence in the IAC which is the sixth card down, indicates we solve it. Second of all, this is only talking about leverage. Remember, the distinction we make is that leverage is talking about cutting off electricity supplies. However, leadership in the non-proliferation regime is not answered. That's the Avory evidence on the bottom. It's also the Williams evidence in 1990, the fifth card down, and they indicate it's because of leadership. Their evidence is only talking about leverage, talking about cutting off electricity supplies. Please read it. He says only small amounts diverted, however there is no link to technology. Extend number five, says, power has never caused prolif. Extend number six, its not unique, other ways to proliferation. Extend number seven, 35 countries will proliferate, remember he says in cross-ex, there's no way for him to solve that. He says the qualification is a pimp, bull, the qualifications we're reading is from the non-proliferation negotiators, not like Lovins and all the hacks that they do.

They say prolif can only collapse with nuclear power. However, the Avory evidence answers this. Also, the sixth answer, it's not unique. In other words, proliferation. Please read both these cards. It says even if nuclear power collapses you would still have nuclear proliferation because the materials would still exist everywhere. These cards are very old, they're from the early 1980's. In the 1980's, we had all this nuclear development. We had fuel supplies everywhere. There's no way you could ever shut this off. The only way you could ever stop proliferation is through political motives, that's the Avery evidence, at the bottom. He says, off the Simpson cards, not stop and only ban. Please group these. First of all, the only way to stop is the real technology threats. The only way to stop the capabilities in the countries that have massive motivation like Libya etc. is to have leverage. That's the sixth evidence in the 1AC. I implore you to read this evidence, it's excellent. It says it's the only way to get real, meaning even if their link is true on technology, the only way to get effective technologial denial is for leverage, and the United States, Simpson evidence, and there's no coherent answer in the 2NR. He says, extend the Kennedy evidence, says Third World will not follow the United States, if we give it up, that's in the 2AC. Also extend, quick shift, this takes out the Japan argument up above. He says grids increase risk, however, the Weinberg evidence, the third card in the 1AC answers this. The grids uniquely, because they can be coupled with the grids, and because we get the small kind of nuclear power, incorporates it into Article IV of the NPT and fulfills our commitment and means we uniquely solve that, solve at that level. He says the plan, leads to no light water reactors, and that light water reactors have never caused prolif. Right, the light water reactors have never caused proliferation. Remember that, there's never been any instance in which this technology caused proliferation. There's never any capability, in which the technology

itself, and he's dropping the Gray evidence which says you can not make a modular HTGR into proliferation and he's reading evidence that says empirically they've never made that decision, which means we're the only one that can solve the most likely scenario for war in 1996. He says escalation risk is low, where is this coming from? The Sheinman evidence in the 1AC, second card on the B Subpoint says it's the most likely scenario for war. He says all this stuff at the bottom. Please group it. First of all, quick change takes it out. That's the Kennedy evidence, remember we're qualifying that. I don't need to win anything on the disads. The world goes nuclear and it blows up in a heap of radiation in 1996 without the plan. The counterplan he says no coherent answer except for anti-topicality. However, David's permutation is to do nuclear power and do oil. All we need to do is to do more nuclear power than we do oil. They still get their revenues. We're just displacing other types of fossil fuels. There is no coherent answer to this; this is not anti-topical. He says off the top, is why, and anti-topical. Please group these. First of all, you could do it. He's dropping David's answer. Number two is we don't have to have a topical permutation. It's only a test of competition. He's making an artificial permutation. The second answer is we just offset other fossil fuels. We just don't offset oil. There's no answer to this. We put oil plants on line, we do more nuclear power than oil, there is no coherent answer to this. They say it's still anti-topical. There is nothing on this, and don't vote against us because David isn't clear. This is a brand new 2NC counterplan. It makes no sense whatsoever, and he could have asked us what the heck the permutation was, if he really had a problem. He says permutation equals anti-topical, however he's dropping the arguments that you don't need a permutation to be topical. That's number two, in the 1AR. Also number six, is that if the resolution is the focus it justifies counter warrants, there's no answer to that in the 2NR. He says, why, it's the opposite of the Affirmative. That's not true, it's not the opposite. We offset other types of fossil fuels, we just don't offset oil. We permute to put oil on line which gives the Soviets their future revenues, and solves the disad. Remember proliferation outweighs anyways. CO_2, there is no anwer to this. He says it just doesn't come on fast. But the reason why, extend number three, it takes too long to build the nuclear reactors. This means in five to fifteen years it comes on line. This means we don't offset electricity for five to fifteen years, we don't get the technology link to proliferation for five to fifteen years.

Additional evidence from Mintzer in '88:

> "Commercial nuclear power plants produce substantially less than 10 percent of the world's electricity. Because they require 5 to 15 years to build, their contribution can only be increased slowly under the best of circumstances."

The Gorbachev debate, off the top. He says electricity occurs quickly. First of all, the counterplan solves this. Second of all, we don't offset for a long period of time, that's five years, all the stuff above. He extends down below, the Soviets need the price because they sell it. However this is only talking about OPEC perceptions and doesn't make any rationale, also the perception evidence is taken out by observation one. He doesn't answer David's 1AR argument, which is number two off this. He says it's necessary for high prices. However, this is very longterm, in the future. You don't get it on line, remember, for five years to fifteen years which is up on CO_2, which he drops and I clearly crossapply at the bottom of the CO_2 disad. all the answers to the other disad and he has no answer to that before. That's the fourth answer on the CO_2 disad up above. I crossapply that. There's no justfication for the new arguments in the 2NR. He says at the bottom that the counterplan solves for conservation; however, the permutation solves this. Remember, he is fiating in the link to the disad. The only way he can fiat this in is by mandating oil plants on line. However, we permute it, we get out of that disad. and the only way to solve is through nuclear power. The top of the counterplan. He says increase accidents, but remember the administration solves for that. The Japan debate, please group at the top. First of all, empirically false. Remember, the agreement already exists. It has never collapsed the NPT. Nobody has proliferated, hence there's no link turns. The only possibility is for a turn. Extend the perception evidence; he has no answer to this. We're reading better perception evidence that says the perceptual link, that we would solve prolif. He extends that the agreement equals proliferation, diversion; however, it doesn't assume the big industrialized countries are allowed to do reprocessing under this, which is the Smith '88 evidence in the 1AR, please extend. He extends '87 evidence, however we're answering that below. He says they'll reprocess with the plan, however Japan is reprocessing now, which he has no answer to, which would take out the link. He says at the bottom is accidents, however extend the New Scientist, February '90 card, which says we don't send by air anymore. Now, grant our energy wars on no escalation. The debate on the depression stuff. Please extend the turns to the arms race. There's no answer to this. Marc does not answer the links on any of this stuff, all I need to do is win the link to energy wars up above. He's only claiming no escalation. Also extend the Futurist 1980 card, the third card in the 1AR, which says the collapse of living standards occurs. The only thing I need on accidents is the adminstration independently solves. The world explodes (time) in 1996 unless you vote for the affirmative. None of the rest of this debate becomes relevant. I don't need to win anything but a hope of solving (applause.) There's a lot of pressure at these tournaments and I think that it tends to get in the way of things. This is specifically applying to Marc and I, because of the pressure of some of these tournaments. I implore all of you, please in the future, keep present standards for revealing in debate. Don't get too competitive with other people in debate and remember what this activity is for. It's for friendship and development and fun. I'd also like to thank David. He's the best damn partner I've ever had. (Applause)

Judges Critiques

SCOTT DEATHERAGE, Northwestern University (Affirmative)

Of the eight final debates that I have heard, this was the best and closest. N.D.T. put its best foot forward in this debate. Argument focused around a limited number of well developed issues. Both sides presented coherent, well thought out, and strategically sound positions. All four debaters were technically outstanding. The debate was, in short, exemplary of the sort of good debating practices that everyone, regardless of their experience level, ought strive to achieve.

Central to the outcome of the debate is the question, what motivates states to acquire nuclear weapons? While I have discussed the resolution of the other issues with the debaters, I will devote the limited space allocated to me in this forum on the prolif issue. Harvard defends the position that the U.S. must maintain strong ties to states that have thus far foregone acquisition. Their claim is that leadership in the development of peaceful nuclear energy will provide us the needed political influence to slow the rate of weapons proliferation. Redlands, on the other hand, argues that by providing peaceful nuclear technologies, the plan effectively opens the door to prolif. Capability, in other words, motivates acquisition. Each position takes on link, brink, and uniqueness arguments that are inextricably intertwined.

At the margin, I am persuaded to the case for political influence. The starting point for this conclusion is the indigenous production debate at the top of the C Subpoint. Both sides agree that the N.P.T. is presently being adhered to. No new states have recently joined the nuclear club, and none appear to be on the absolute verge of acquisition. But the real question is, absent the civilian nuclear technology provided by the plan, could states acquire the bomb if they so choose? If capability is not uniquely created by the plan, then the motivations for acquisition that are driven by capability are, at best, only marginally increased. And if acquisiton is easy enough without additional nuclear technologies, then the availability of HTGRs may have no effect whatsoever on motivation.

Given this framework, the inevitability debate is probably mislabeled; it might better be understood as "capability exists" rather than "acquisition is inevitable." Since both teams are competing for the same impact, inevitability can only work to the strategic benefit of the affirmative. Given the lack of affirmative significance elsewhere in the debate, they must win at least some risk of future nuclear proliferation. But as an offensive argument against the capability-motivation link, the affirmative need win only that potential nuclear states have substantial capabilities now, not that they will inevitably use those capabilities to acquire the bomb.

In this regard, the *CSM* evidence in the 2AC is quite persuasive. It indicates that 35 states now have what it takes to construct a nuclear device. If capability motivates acquisition, then these states should have proliferated by now. Redlands answers this evidence in the 2NC with evidence indicating that no indigenous construction of weapons is occurring now. This constraint is largely attributable to superpower security guarantees. But the negative evidence considers only security as a motivating force for weapons acquisition; other influences, like the state of the non-proliferation regime, are not addressed. Security guarantees exist concurrently with the N.P.T.'s Article IV provisions for energy security. The dynamic of these security arrangements is altered only by our refusal to continue to fulfill our Article IV obligations under the 1N counterplan. Accordingly, only the 1N counterplan changes the factors which influence acquisition for the 35 states that have the capability but have not yet proliferated; only the 1N counterplan could motivate proliferation for these states.

Obviously, some states have no acquisition capability now; for these countries, only the plan could add to motivation. On this issue the cross examination of the 2NC is particularly devastating. The link evidence for cost and power grids, as the 2N concedes, is talking largely about developing countries. The only example suggested is Senegal. As I think the cross-exam illustrates, LDCs of this sort are hardly threshold states and are unlikely to proliferate simply because they have a decentralized nuclear power source. For severely underdeveloped countries, the plan may provide a necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for encouraging weapons proliferation.

If capabilities exist and future acquisition is likely, then the question becomes what can we do to slow or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? Political leverage is the alternative presented by the affirmative. Both teams agree that the N.P.T. will be renegotiated in 1995. Additionally, I.A.E.A. authority is tied to the success of the N.P.T. Accordingly, the two major impediments to proliferation will soon be in jeopardy. And the 1AC claim that we have to begin before 1995 to demonstrate a credible commitment to Article IV is not directly challenged by the negative.

As the Weinberg evidence in the 1AC indicates, N.P.T. participants will have no reason to resign if we haven't fulfilled our end of the bargain. Intentional snubbing of our Article IV obligation to provide peaceful nuclear energy will most certainly doom efforts to save the N.P.T. This col lapse would hurt anti-proliferation efforts in both threshold and non-threshold states. And given that both teams agree to the proposition that pro liferation decisions snowball, then only a few of the current signatories would need to pass on N.P.T. II and build bombs for the entire non-proliferation regime to come crashing down. In fact, it seems highly plausible that the N.P.T. would collapse even if just a few states refused to resign, regardless of their acquisition posture.

The negative evidence on the political influence question is far from conclusive. The most significant shortcoming of the three cards on political leverage that the negative reads is that none addresses the implications of our failure to fulfill our Article IV obligation. Each takes on political influence in a broad sense, but the particular case of adverse reaction to our abandonment of Article IV is not explicitly addressed.

The evidence in the fifth argument in the 1NC outlines the moral obligation position. But it is worth noting that the evidence is qualified: "Such a step, *it is argued*, would be a moral deterrent . . ." One is at best uncertain what the author's position is on the issue. In addition, the evidence concedes the prevalence of nuclear power and weapons technologies, leading into Harvard's argument that the mere existence of knowledge makes capability inevitable. The two extension cards in 2NC are better, but still fail to eliminate influence as a tool for controlling prolif. The Spence evidence says that nuclear power and nuclear weapons are inherently connected, a claim which essentially begs the question. Many states have the capability now. Merely giving them nuclear power technology doesn't substantially increase that capability. The argument that nuclear power should be abandoned because of the inseparable link between power plants and bombs does not address the issue of whether or not physical denial is possible. And the second card proves only that influence is difficult, a conclusion that the affirmative would probably concede. We have been hypoctitical for forty-five years, but few states have joined the nuclear club, and for more than twenty of those years we have relied on the N.P.T. as a tool to preserve that constraint.

By contrast, the affirmative evidence on physical denial better accounts for the realities of the uniqueness debate. The Simpson evidence in the 2AC indicates that physical denial requires U.S. leadership in the global nuclear industry. This, combined with the Avery evidence in the 1AC, means that since both the nuclear power and nuclear weapons genies are already out of the bottle, control of weapons acquisiton requires control of energy development. Obviously the 2N recognizes the import of these cards; he singles out Avery in both the 2NC and 2NR. But despite that effort, I don't understand how the claim that political influence is difficult to execute answers the argument that nuclear knowledge is here to stay. If physical denial inherently fails, then political persuasion, hypocritical and problematic as it may be, still seems to be our best chance.

In sum, I am convinced that exerting political influence over potential proliferant states will be difficult. In fact, political persuasion will, I suspect, eventually fail. But I think that it is our only reasonable option. Denial seems to have already failed to prevent the development of capabilities. And if we attempt denial and fail, then we are left no hope of stopping prolif. We will have foregone the last real opportunity to keep the N.P.T. regime intact and lost this chance to win influence with and good will among pariah states. If we continue to cooperate with those states on

the development of peaceful nuclear technologies, then we may add to their already significant capabilities, but in doing so preserve our only real opportunity to save the non-proliferation regime.

Japan. This is the one issue in the debate that is handled relatively poorly by both teams. All three rebuttalists who discuss the issue seem to be missing arguments, and little attention is devoted to explaining the fine distinctions in the competing evidence. As I understand it, the Japan debate is nothing more than a specific case of the large prolif debate. The plan, by the negative's argument, saves the nuclear industry and therefore permits us to fulfill the terms of an agreement which will provide Japan with reprocessing technology. At issue is whether this hampers or aids our efforts to discourage Japanese prolif.

The affirmative argues that by fulfilling the terms of the agreement, the plan fulfills our Article IV obligation to provide peaceful nuclear technology, thereby promoting adherence to the N.P.T. The Leventhal evidence in the 1NC proves that plutonium related transfers must be considered carefully and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Leventhal apparently believes that as structured, the Japan agreement fails to meet that N.P.T. requirement because it permits Japan to reprocess without American approval, although it is worth noting that the 2NC Leventhal evidence is qualified with the reservation "critics charge." The last card in the 2AC, on the other hand, indicates that the agreement strengthens our non-proliferation efforts precisely because it used the case-by-case review mechanism to honor our Article IV commitment. It also links the agreement to stronger American influence over Japanese nuclear development.

The link evidence in the 2NC doesn't really help to clarify the issue. None of it really addresses the N.P.T. link. It says only that reprocessing technology yields fissionable material from which bombs can be made. Technologically speaking, that claim is correct. But the evidence does not prove that Japan has the motive or the willpower to proliferate, nor does it prove that the requisite motives would be created simply by the presence of capability. In addition, the last card in the 1AR proves that Japan, a highly industrialized nation, could quickly develop reprocessing technology on its own if it desired to build a bomb. In the Third World reprocessing technology might represent a more substantial prolif threat; the existing motives may be more substantial there and reprocessing might simply complete the puzzle. But no claim is made that reprocessing technology would be acquired by Third World states, and the unique level of prolif threat created in Japan is virtually nil. In addition, the affirmative influence story makes even more sense in regards to Japan precisely because of their position in international affairs. They have more to lose by suffering the consequences of a decision to prolif; consequently, our pressure would more likely deter their acquisition. And if that influence weren't sufficient, then, given their level of technological advancement, denial of capability would certainly not stop them from indigenous construction.

One final note on source qualifications. Three years ago, a group of judges, myself included, started a campaign to encourage debaters to read and defend the qualifications of their sources. In every speech in this debate, Harvard makes generally the claim that their sources are proliferation experts, among the best in the field, and they challenge Redlands to qualify their evidence. That challenge went virtually unanswered. Harvard's defense of their sources was hardly eloquent or detailed, but they did at least make an effort to distinguish their sources from their opponents. I don't mean to suggest tht I ignored negative evidence because it wasn't qualified; I didn't. Nor do I mean to suggest that the negative necessarily lost the debate becaue of this issue. But as the preceding discussion indicates, the choice between competing worldviews on the prolif link story was made on a razor thin margin. And given that, I can't help but think that the fact that many of the negative's cards didn't even list qualifications on the blocks must have hurt their chances. I think that it is important that debaters begin to understand that sources are not equal and that judges can be persuaded that a particular claim lacks credibility because its author lacks credibility.

ERIK DOXTADER, Northwestern University (Affirmative)

It is a rare privilege to hear a debate, such as this year's final round, which features two very well matched teams, both of whom have in their possession an arsenal of carefully constructed positions and the strategic insight to use them to their greatest possible benefit. In light of such obvious talent and commitment both the teams and coaches from Redlands and Harvard are to be congratulated for an outstanding final round and a fine season.

Before proceeding it seems appropriate to start with a couple of general comments about the debate. First, I heartily applaud Harvard's decision to not introduce a new case. By running nuclear power, the debate centered on several of the more interesting substantive issues of the topic area while avoiding the chaos which so often seems to accompany the introduction of new affirmatives. Second, as the debate proceeded it became quite clear that both teams had a carefully planned strategy for the round; that is, each had a vision as to how the debate was to unfold and on what arguments the debate was to be decided. Thus, many of the strategic choices made in this debate were made based not on dropped answers or blatantly generic arguments, but rather, on the specific argumentative and evidentiary distinctions which undergirded each side's position. This aspect of the debate is important in beginning to discuss its outcome insofar as it is Harvard's ability to isolate several key distinctions in their position which, in what is otherwise an extremely close round, swings the balance in their favor.

Initially, Redlands argues that the move to nuclear power ensures a decrease in the amount of oil which the U.S. purchases to generate electricity thus engendering a disruption of Soviet economic reform by altering the world oil market. Most of the debate on this position occurs on the link level and in conjunction with the counterplans. Redlands maintains that the plan puts the Soviet economy at risk in two ways: structurally (a market link) and perceptually. Given the immediacy of the Soviet monetary crisis, the first link — that the Soviet economy depends on sales of oil to the U.S. — is contingent on the plan causing a near-term shift in consumption patterns. Yet the 2AC evidence from Mitzner on the carbon dioxide disadvantage indicates that the new power plants take anywhere from 10 to 15 years to come on line. This evidence is granted by the negative and thus, the structural effects of the plan on the oil market would be somewhat long term. This then leaves the negative with the argument that the plan will be perceived by prominent oil producers (primarily the Saudis) who will, in turn, readjust their orientation to the market and thus displace the Soviets. However, as Harvard points out, the Lennox and Bechman evidence on which this argument is based, does not indicate to what extent this shift in Saudi policy would impact the Soviets, whether the market disruption would come in the short term and if the downturn would cost the Soviets actual market shares or merely prevent them from increasing their present sales.

While the link to the Soviet's position is minimized significantly by Harvard, the introduction of the counterplans changes the debate on this issue insofar as the question becomes whether the remaining link is substantial enough to constitute a net benefit which would justify the adoption of the counterplans. Although I will discuss the ban nuclear power counterplan more as they relate to the Soviet's disadvantage since for the most part, the questions involved are similar: would their adoption serve to help Soviet economic reform by increasing or maintaining present levels of fossil fuel use?

The various interactions between the disadvantage and the counterplan(s) are not handled very thoroughly by either team. However, in order to win that the Soviets position is a net benefit to either of the counterplans it is necessary for the negative to prove not only that a shift to nuclear power reduces Soviet oil revenue but also that the Soviets are in need of a greater market share than they have now. Yet the internal link evidence is quite specific in saying that what is crucial for the Soviets is that they not lose any of the market which they currently have. Thus, what is needed, and ultimately not provided, is evidence which speaks to the importance of an expansion of the Soviet's market share. In sum, the effect of the plan and the counterplans on the Soviet's ability to sell oil are called into question by the delays involved in getting HTGR's on-line and the difficulty in proving that oil producers would react immediately to the plan in a way which would work to the Soviet's short term detriment.

The rest of the debate hinges on the effect of the plan on efforts to retard Third World proliferation, an event which both teams agree is

destabilizing and conducive to small Third World conflicts which carry with them an inherent risk of superpower miscalculation and subsequent escalation. Two closely interrelated issues are involved in resolving the relationship between U.S. nuclear power and the development of nuclear weapons: the possible benefits which can be derived by banning nuclear power altogether (the first negative counterplan) and the effect of a U.S. HTGR program on the Third World's perception of both the NPT and the desirability of nuclear power.

The first negative counterplan proposes a ban on all American nuclear power in order to stop U.S. exports of nuclear materials to Japan which may undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (and thus turn the case advantage). The first issue of concern is the actual status of the agreement between this country and Japan. Redlands' evidence from Levanthal indicates that an agreement which allows the U.S. to transfer nuclear material to Japan is being renegotiated. Yet Harvard's more recent evidence from the Washington Post (1987) and Smith indicates that the agreement has been in existence for several years, a fact which places the overall impact of the agreement on the NPT in some question. Nonetheless the issue still remains as to whether Japan, after receiving nuclear material from the U.S., might reprocess it for military purposes. The negative evidence from Rose and Aver indicate that access to U.S. nuclear material creates a situation wherein Japan is left with spent nuclear fuel which is easily converted into weapons grade plutonium. However, Harvard's evidence from Smith and The Washington Post (1988) maintains both that Japan is not reprocessing the fuel they have now nor are they likely to do so in the future given the leverage which the U.S. has over Japan's use of the material. Thus, given previous experience with transfers of these kinds of material and some level of U.S. control over the process, there seems to be only a minimal risk that the fuel will be directly converted to weapons grade plutonium.

The final issue with respect to the counterplan is whether the very act of giving the Japanese nuclear material might constitute an abrogation or weakening of the NPT. On the one hand, Redlands argues that the the transfer itself weakens non-proliferation agreements (Levanthal). Harvard counters with evidence from Inoue which indicates that the transfer solidifies the NPT given that the latter blocks the U.S. from denying other countries access to fuel and power sources. The difficulty in resolving this issue is that neither side's evidence specifically isolates the conditions of the treaty nor potentially negative reactions from those opposed to the transfer agreement. Nontheless, given that, that the agreement has existed for some time, and without deleterious consequence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the integrity of the NPT is not compromised by U.S.-Japanese actions.

The proliferation debate on the case is closely linked to several issues introduced with the counterplan. The basic position taken by the negative is that a shift from large light water reactors to HTGR's allows Third World countries to divert nuclear material into military weapons programs. As such, the relative effect of the plan on the potential for Third World proliferation is contingent on whether it is more important to deny the Third World access to nuclear materials than to preserve the NPT through U.S. nuclear leadership vis-a-vis a systematic development of HTGR based nuclear power.

Redlands argues that Third World countries are not currently proliferating owing to: a basic lack of technology, problems involved in utilizing currently available large power plants for military ends and the effectiveness of international safeguards. Initially, the Booth and Aver evidence read in the 1NC say that the increased availability of nuclear materials risks undermining proliferation controls as well as creating the opportunity for the diversion of nuclear material to the military. This is supplemented in the 2NC by the Technology Review and Epstein evidence which indicates that increased access to nuclear fuel creates an incentive for Third World countries to begin to use the power sources for military ends. Finally, Redlands reads several pieces of evidence which indicate that a shift from an emphasis on large reactors to the smaller HTGr would allow the Third World to overcome cost and power grid obstacles which currently prevent proliferation. (the Rose, Fisher and Aver evidence from the 2NC) Setting aside for the moment the question of whether or not these countries actually have a motivation to proliferate, there are several key assumptions of Harvard's position which go unanswered.

First, the Christian Science Monitor and Avery evidence indicate that those Third World countries considered to be potential proliferation risks either have the technology or can acquire it on the black market (the 1AC evidence from Gummett and McGrew). This means that the plan would not uniquely increase the availability of nuclear technology since if countries currently wish to develop nuclear weapons there are several avenues which they can pursue independent of a U.S. HTGR program. Arguably, the effect of the plan would be to reduce the cost for Third World countries to acquire such technology but the evidence read from Aver in the 2NC is specific to light water reactors and does not indicate that the difference in cost between U.S. supplied technology and that found on the black market is a deterrent to those wishing to acquire material for nuclear weapons. So, while the plan would most likely increase the availability of small scale nuclear technology, the possible negative implications of this are, to some degree, offset by the existence of others who can just as readily supply the material in question. In addition, the Gray evidence from the 1AC indicates that the type of nuclear plant which the plan mandates is of such a nature that it is difficult to reprocess the fuel for military purposes. And although neither team spends a great deal of time exploring this question, it does seem that this would futher mitigate the risk that the technology itself could be a motivating factor to proliferate. With this in mind, the question becomes whether a U.S. effort to develop nuclear power undermines either its leverage over Third World countries or the NPT.

It strikes me that with the emergence of the debate over the state of the NPT and the role of the U.S. in guiding the Third World, Harvard's strategic and evidentiary edge becomes decisive. Working with the premise that international safeguards currently prevent proliferation, Redlands' evidence from the 1NC indicates that any U.S. attempt to revitalize its nuclear power program sends a signal to the Third World which delegitimizes the NPT. However, Harvard's position is based on the fact that the effectiveness of the NPT depends on the ability of the U.S. to muster a domestic power program which can both provide the Third World with what the latter perceives to be necessary sources of power as well as serving as a basis for influence over other countries (the Wolfe evidence). The 2AC Kennedy evidence indicates that it is naive to assume that Third World countries will follow the U.S. in a policy of nuclear abstinence and thus, it is imperative that the U.S. develop its own program so as to be able to direct the efforts of those abroad. This entire position is buttressed by the Williams evidence which indicates that the change in U.S. policy must come before the 1995 renegotiation of the NPT. And while Redlands argues that the Third World will not follow U.S. direction in the development of nuclear power (Zaleski and Litzke evidence) this seems to answer only a portion of Harvard's argument which is both that the U.S. can lead and that U.S. action creates a basis for sustaining the NPT; the latter being an effective force over the Third World independent of the U.S. In addition, the 2AC Simpson evidence indicates that given the possibility that safeguards against proliferation do fail, the U.S. must be in a position where it can influence the Third World directly. This claim, when tied with the evidence from Wolfe, serves as a compelling argument as to why the U.S. should be in a position of nuclear leadership.

Returning to the question of whether the plan creates a motive for the Third World to proliferate, it seems that while it is nonetheless true that there is a risk that increased access to nuclear material may lead to its military diversion, this danger is offset by the fact that if the NPT is not renegotiated successfully, something which can only happen with U.S. involvement and leadership through an HTGR program, then Third World countries will most likely turn to other sources of technology and develop nuclear power on an independent and unconstrained level. In other words, while the plan may increase the attractiveness of nuclear power (and weapons) for Third World nations, this does not assume that the plan would strengthen the NPT, something which both teams admit is effective in preventing other countries from joining the nuclear club. Due in part to clandestine sources of nuclear technology, proliferation is likely to be a potential problem in the next few years. If this is the case then it seems reasonable to conclude that the best way of working to stem this trend is to strengthen the NPT in conjunction with Third World countries. Thus, given Harvard's position that renegotiation of the treaty can occur only with a U.S. HTGR program, it seems prudent to work to regulate this process by way of domestic action.

Overall, while there is a residual risk to the Soviets disadvantage, the affirmative position that the development of a U.S. HTGR program would work to stabilize a Third World which is moving to the point where it must confront the problems and perils of nuclear power is more compelling both in its immediacy and potential impact. And while there is certainly some risk that U.S. efforts will go awry, to my mind this risk is offset by Harvard's argument that U.S. actions are instrumental in both reaffirming the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in directing the ways in which the Third World moves to adopt nuclear power. Accordingly, it seems prudent to vote affirmative.

This was a closely contested debate and it is unfortunate that these comments cannot fully represent the precision and strategic concern that was evident throughout the round. Again, I should like to congratulate both the teams and coaches for their performance in what was an outstanding final round.

CATHERINE PALCZEWSKI, Northwestern University (Affirmative)

I really enjoyed judging this round. I am glad that Harvard chose to run the case that they had been running all year. The debate was excellent in that both teams executed well developed strategies. If anything, the level of argumentation may have been too sophisticated in that if someone had not heard this round before, s/he may not have initially understood the argument interrelations that the debaters seemed to take for granted.

Broadly speaking, this round came down to two things: 1) the argument resolution in the last two rebuttals and 2) the quality and *qualification* of evidence. The 2AR articulated a coherent description of argument interrelations, while the 2NR did not. The affirmative consistently qualified their sources, while the negative did so only when pressed and then in a haphazard manner.

Having given that preview, here are the issues.

Gorbachev. First, the affirmative argues (and wins) that the counterplan permutation will solve, their permutation being to maintain (or increase) oil consumption, but only to replace coal burning plants with nuclear plants. I give the affirmative a little leeway on account of the counterplan being new in 2N. The permutation is only a test and hence the counterplan permutation allows the affirmative to minimize the DA link. Second, the affirmative argues (and loses) that only OPEC perceives demand shifts. The negative Lennox evidence on the link is quite good talking about nukes' displacement of oil. Third, the affirmative answers (and wins) that the timeframe is long term. It will take fifteen years to get nuclear plants on line. This argument is made on the CO_2 DA, is cross-applied in 2AC, and the negative chooses to ignore it. At this point, perception is the only link the negative has a chance at, but insofar as the affirmative is winning the permutation, and hence is winning that nukes will not displace future demand increases, the chance at a perception link is minute.

Accidents. Undercoverage in the 2AR gives the negative this scenario. The negative wins that accidents will increase due to risks inherent in new technology, the lack of containment procedures. Hence, only the counterplan can solve accidents by banning nukes. The affirmative's only answer is that administration solves, and I'm not sure how this beats the negative line-by-line. The question then is, what is the impact? All the 2NR says is that "lots die." The resolution of the counterplan thus depends on the proliferation debate, the impact of prolif outweighing "lots die."

Counterplan on ban nukes. Most of the debate on this counterplan revolves around the Japan scenario. The Japan debate was probably the most blatant example of where the level at which the debaters argued was way over my level of comprehension; it is not that the debaters were unclear, but rather that they made assumptions about the argument that were not articulated but were necessary in order to fill in the internal links. As far as I can tell, the argument is that the spent fuel from nuclear power plants is sent to Japan for reprocessing and that if nukes are banned, spent fuel supplies dwindle. If Japan has the fuel, nuclear terrorism and a weakening of the NPT will result. After I figured out what (I think) was going on, I decided. . . The affirmative wins that banning nukes will weaken the NPT more than a renegotiated Japan reprocessing agreement (more about that on case side). The affirmative further minimizes the impact by arguing that reprocessing occurs now and there is not Japanese instigated prolif. The affirmative wins that reprocessing of fuel occurs now, hence there is no unique link; any link that might exist is some marginal increase at best. The affirmative also wins that critics of the Japan agreement have reversed their position, "their fears are calmed." The affirmative also wins that the fuel is not transported via air, hence no catastrophic accident will occur. The NPT debate is also resolved in relation to the proliferation debate on case side. This debate basically evolves into the question of what world best controls the spread of nukes, a nuclear or non-nuclear world?

The economy advantage. This was debated atrociously. The negative answers that the counterplan solves because it ensures sufficient energy; how this happens eludes me. The affirmative wins that a depression will equal an arms race and that it decreases third world living standards. The orginal impact of war isn't mentioned, and I'm not sure how to weigh this, except that maybe this impact and the accidents iimpact mitigate each other.

Now, *Prolif.* This is where the debate gets resolved. Not a big surprise to anyone I would guess. The first negative argument is that if countries are in the superpowers' spheres of interest, they won't prolif; the negative also reads the Weinberg evidence that indicates that since 1945, prolif has been inhibited directly and that there is no motive to obtain nuclear weapons. The key affirmative argument is that 35 countries already will prolif *now* despite technological barriers and the Williams evidence indicated that we must reorient nuclear policy. The Avery evidence indicates that the question is political, not technical.

The second set of negative arguments is that terrorists could use the small amounts of fuel and that the way to decrease prolif is by decreasing nuclear power. The affirmative argues that the negative sources are not qualified, which makes me give more weight to affirmative evidence. The affirmative also extends the Simpson evidence that indicates that in order to physically deny nuclear capability, one needs a safeguard regime, which would be lost if the center for nuclear power was shifted away from the U.S. The affirmative also extends the Alonsa evidence that the connection between nuclear power and weapons is merely hypothetical; prolif countries use military facilities, not civilian ones. The affirmative also extends the evidence indicating that countries can get nukes if they really want them regardless of nuclear power facilities. The 35 countries argument also plays a role here. According to the CSM evidence, 35 countries already have the financial, technolgical, and knowledge bases to get nukes. The only way to stop the acquisition of nukes by these countries is to employ political pressure according to the affirmative. Finally, the affirmative argues that U.S. nuclear forebearance will not induce the third world to follow.

As for the political pressure argument that goes along with the 35 countries' story, the affirmative extends the Wolfe evidence indicating that if the U.S. wants to control proliferation, it must have a strong domestic nuclear power program and technology base and that past NPT successes were based upon the U.S.'s technological leadership. Wolfe evidence also indicates that if the U.S. does not build, that it will give up its leadership role.

The third set of negative arguments involve the influence turn. The negative reads evidence from Kraushear in '88 that indicates that the United States should renounce nuclear power because it started in the U.S. and that this renunciation would function as a moral deterrent to developing nuclear reactors. The negative extends with evidence indicating that to get nuclear disarmament, the U.S. must abandon civilian power. The negative reads a pretty good card from Zaliski in '85 that says using civilian nuclear power as a means of pressure is not an efficient way to decrease civilian nuclear power development and that the U.S. cannot convince third world countries *not* to arm when we are. The affirmative again falls back on the 35 countries' argument. The "turn" doesn't apply to those countries that are already on the brink of prolifing (save for political pressure). The only chance of stopping the 35 countries is via political pressure.

The fourth negative argument is about some grid. I will be honest, this is another one of those issues where the sophistication of the argumentation was beyond my ken. But, I'll take a shot. . . The negative argument seemed to be that small reactors increased proliferation and that because

smaller is cheaper the risk increased even more. The key affirmation answer was, again, that technology was irrelevant to proliferation. Additionally, they argued that HTGR's can't be used for proliferation.

The final negative argument was that countries can't prolif unless the United States provides power capabilities. The technology arguments that again answered this position. The affirmative also extended the arguments that sharp turns in U.S. nuclear policy would make countries question us as a reliable nuclear partner in peaceful endeavors and they also extended the Kennedy evidence indicating that shifts create friction with partners and undermines non-proliferation objectives.

So, the key arguments comes down to the fact that thirty-five countries have the technological knowledge and financial capabilities to proliferate. The only way for the U.S. to stop that proliferation is to employ political pressure and the only way to use political pressure, according to qualified sources, is to have a strong domestic nuclear power industry. Additionally, the motives behind proliferation are not technical, therefore, developing nuclear power does not increase the risk of "non-35 countries" proliferating. The point at which the affirmative won the prolif argument, they won the round. The accidents scenario was mitigated some by the economy arguments and finally outweighed by the impact of proliferation.

J. DANIEL PLANTS, Baylor University/University of Michigan Law School (Negative)

Before offering my critical appraisal of this year's national championship round, I wish to formally express my extreme unction at the quality of this debate. Certainly, both teams are to be congratulated for advancing to the final round of the N.D.T., itself an accomplishment of the highest magnitude in this, the most prestigious debate tournament in the universe. But my enthusiastic commendations are intended as much more than just perfunctory or *pro forma* plaudits. This year's final round showcased two of the season's finest teams in a vigorously contested donnybrook; it was a much closer debate than those of recent memory. Neither side ran away with this debate, as evidenced by the fact that the five-person panel took longer to adjudicate the debate than the debate itself took to transpire. The coaches and debaters from both schools merit praise and respect for providing us all with a superlative debate worthy of the title it carries.

The short version of what decides this debate for me is my determination that there is very little risk of proliferation in voting negative, that voting affirmative may just as likely exacerbate that risk as quell it, and that an affirmative vote guarantees nuclear accidents resulting in the certain deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.

Gorbachev Disadvantage. I think the negative's position is fatally weakened by its tardy refutation of the affirmative's argument that the plan would not reduce fossil fuel consumption any time soon. The evidence read on the CO_2 disadvantage is quite good (in fact, so good that it re-confirmed my doubts about the topicality of this case). The negative brink evidence is just too good—the time is **NOW** for Gorbachev, but the impact on the Soviet oil market from the plan will not come in any frame of time that could affect Gorbachev. The affirmative plainly cross-applies this argument to the Gorbachev disadvantage, yet curiously the negative waits until 2NR to acknowledge these arguments. All of the 2NR is badly new on this. The negative relies on the "perception" evidence (Lennox '89), but the affirmative's cursory dismissal of it is appropos, since it is clearly not talking about *anticipated* reductions in oil use but rather *actual* reductions. I don't see how it is perception evidence. I don't reach the theoretical questions surrounding the attempted seizure of the 2NC counterplan by the affirmative to take out the disadvantage link, since I view the carded link take-outs as decisive. The negative still squeezes some mileage out of this counterplan though, due to an oversight by the last affirmative rebuttal. 2NR cross-applies this counterplan, which maintains all fossil fuel consumption, to take out the economy disadvantage to the 1NC counterplan. Since this disad to the counterplan stemmed off of the economic effects of energy shortage, the 2NC counterplan replaces the energy lost by banning nuclear power with an offsetting increase in fossil fuels.

Proliferation (Advantage II). To me, this is really the locus of the entire debate. I take it that the same reasoning was guiding the second affirmative's devotion of such a mammoth chunk of his rebuttal to this part of the case, even to the exclusion of other areas of contention (see, for example, the dropped accidents advantage). Despite this huge dedication of precious rebuttal time, I don't think the affirmative retains nearly the significance originally claimed on this part of the case, and probably the negative ekes out a net turn by the end of the debate.

The affirmative position depends crucially on the proliferation of nuclear weapons being inevitable. The need to exert "leadership" of "leverage" on nascent proliferants is obviously relevant only to the extent that there is a risk of such prolif in the status quo. Indeed, the 2AR emphasizes repeatedly that a vote against Harvard is a sure vote for inevitable proliferation. The affirmative relies on the CSM '87 evidence from 2AC (35 countries willing and able to prolif) and the 1AC evidence from Williams, April '90 (1995 NPT Conference; US must re-orient policy or watch NPT unravel). Setting these aside for a moment, there are a plethora of negative take-outs that the affirmative *never* addresses throughout the debate, and particularly not in the 2AR. Frankly I think the affirmative spent so much time re-iterating the central thesis of the case ("Leverage!") that they lost sight of the fact that the negative was savagely marauding the premise of the affirmative's justification for leverage and leadership. The negative contends firstly that no motivation exists for prolif. Countries don't find it in their security interests to proliferate (Weinberg '85 from 2NC); superpower spheres of interests provide a protective umbrella obviating the incentive to prolif (Aver '85 from 2NC). Note that the Aver evidence also indicates that all of the potential proliferants are covered by this protection: These arguments alone I think are extremely powerful in negating the affirmative claims. Even if the affirmative is right that countries have the knowledge to prolif now, this evidence explains the lack of willingness in *security* terms, something that none of the affirmative evidence addresses. The card talking about the 1995 Conference merely says that if the US doesn't change its policies (which ones those are, how they might be changed, or what the affirmative has to do with any or all of them is never clear—in fact, it is equally arguable that the shift in policy required is more along the lines of the counterplan, rather than the affirmative, see below) then the NPT will be weakened. I think the negative's motivational evidence would hold true even *absent* the NPT. Furthermore, the affirmative ignores completely the 2NR's extension that the high costs of proliferation prevent it now (Rose '85, in 2NC, extended off of #7 from the 1NC).

I think the affirmative, in debating the turnarounds on whether or not nuclear power causes proliferation ignored the implications that the death of nuclear power has for proliferation in the present system. In other words, these were take-outs and not just turns. The Weinberg evidence, #2 in 2 NC extended off of #2 in 1NC says that the current flaccid state of nuclear power worldwide is solving the risk of proliferation. It also indicates that slower growth of nuclear power allows adaptation to prolif, since it slows the rate, if nothing else. I think the negative could have gotten more mileage out of this as turn evidence, answering every affirmative chime of "Leverage!" and "Leadership!" with the equally nebulous retort of "Adaptation!" Buttressing the Weinberg evidence on this point were the Lovins '89 evidence, read off of #10, and the Eibenschutz '85 evidence, both saying essentially the same thing. The negative correctly claims that these cards all make the turns unique, but independent of that, I think that the initial alarmism about the risk of status quo prolif is greatly mitigated.

I am also persuaded that voting negative absolutely eliminates the risk of prolif via the first negative counterplan. The 2AR's last-line argumentation on this is thoroughly wanting. First, the materials and know-how would persist. But this assumes that there is a risk in the status quo of prolif. As I indicated, I don't find much danger in allowing such *capability per se* to persist. Second, it is arguable that the affirmative exacerbates the technological side of the prolif equation (see below). Besides, all of this ignores the fact that the negative is supporting the counterplan with excellent evidence saying that banning nuclear power would solve proliferation, something that none of the gestaltic affirmative responses address. Even if capability would persist, the counterplan solves the end-stage of the problem, the actual *development* of nuclear weapons. I don't know really how to elaborate much further on this; examine the uncontested solvency evidence for the counterplan

from Spence '84 and Bhatia '88.

The affirmative's other counterplan answers are "Third World Not Follow", the Kennedy evidence form the 2AC which is *excellent* indeed (and never extended by the 1AR, thus new in 2 AR) and "Turn, Quick Change Bad". This argument hold more promise (it was properly advanced by both rebuttalists) but a close reading demonstrates that it assumes that nuclear power is good. The argument of the affirmative's Kennedy evidence is that a ban on nuclear power would make our nuclear trading partners doubt our reliability. Obviously this turn kicks in only if the affirmative wins that nuclear promises are beneficial; there is no independent credibility argument made. I think the negative is winnning clearly that nuclear power's elimination, rather than preservation, solves proliferation. Thus, "quick change bad" is fruitless, at least from my perspective. Given the totality of all of the negative's arguments on prolif, I am convinced that voting negative engenders no risk of proliferation. This determination eviscerates any meaningful chance that the affirmative could win my ballot, since they must win a prolif risk to win something on this advantage.

Assuming that prolif is well-nigh upon us, can the affirmative do anything about it? Again, I think the affirmative, in restating the positions outlined in the First Affirmative Constructive ignores too much of the negative's position. The Zaleski '85 evidence from the 2NC is totally forgotten, even though it says that the political motive and leverage that the affirmative seeks cannot be obtained. The argument is that the developed countries lack credibility with the LDCs, since we ourselves have made the decision to have nuclear weapons. The evidence concludes that it is futile to try to ward off military development of nuclear materials in the LDCs while we continue to support nuclear power. This devastates the affirmative solvency, and further helps demonstrate why the counterplan is such an attractive option. The negative also has the better of the debate over the empirical effects of US support. The negative claims that past proliferation risks have all been created by US support of LDC nuclear power (Bhatia '88, Steinberg '84). The negative's evidence is very strong, because it demonstrates almost perfect causality between US support and attempts to develop nuclear weapons. All will be explained below, the fortuitous fact that none of these countries actually ever proliferated can be explained by the size of the reactors they currently have, something that the affirmative changes, thus incurring a unique risk.

I am persuaded by the affirmative position that most countries already know how to proliferate and could if they wanted. The turnarounds I give the negative all relate to the effect of the plan on those nations' determination of when they can implement that capability. The black market turn in the 1NC, #9 (Lovins '89) and the Weinberg evidence extended off of it indicate that the existence of nuclear power makes the policical risks of trying to proliferate too high. The Weinberg evidence, the 4th 2NC extension of the 9th 1NC argument, explains that the more difficult acquisition of materials that would accompany a nuclear power ban would stop proliferation by changing the cost-benefit calculations of prospective proliferants. I think this argument answers the affirmative's demand that the negative debate not capability but motivation. In my mind, these turns are "motivation" turns, since they explain why the plan affects the motivation of countries in making the proliferation decision. This evidence is extremely important, since it concedes that countries have the ability to proliferate now, but says that actually doing so entails certain risks that are much more easily run when concealed in the context of a world-wide nuclear power edifice. This evidence therefore makes two arguments, both of which the affirmative ignores: first, countries will not prolif in the present system, since the current withering of the nuclear power regime will change proliferant's CBA of such a decision; second, the affirmative uniquely will upset this, since it will make materials availability easier. It is also important to note the way that this fits with the negative turns; this argument is not that the plan provides the essential missing elements, knowledge, or magic fairy dust to prolif. The argument is that nuclear trade provides the *cover* to carry out such operations. Every time the affirmative answers with the claim that prolif is not unique because countries already know how, they ignore the negative claim that even if they do know how, the present system properly makes such activity too politically costly. Of course, a vote for the counterplan could only further solidify this desirable incentive structure.

The affirmative's main answer is that past nuclear power never led to proliferation, to which the negative says that current light water reactors are too big to disguise a nuclear program. That is the Fisher '85 evidence, to which the affirmative makes exclusively "capability" answers. Also, the negative reads quite a bit of evidence empirically linking proliferation initiatives with US support. Even though full-blown prolif hasn't occurred, efforts in that direction have been almost perfectly correlated with US support of peaceful nuclear power (Bhatia, Steinberg and Spence). Finally, the affirmative re-iterates that it is "prolif-proof", (Gray '89) since there is not much nuclear material involved. Again, I think the affirmative is guilty of violating its own standards regarding "capability/motivation" — the countries already can prolif, they just need a way to disguise it.

The Japan advantage to the counterplan, impacted in destruction of the NPT, is a link turn to the case. I think that the negative cleanly wins this argument, and it seals my decision that the negative prevails in the prolif contest. The affirmative extends here that the argument is empirically denied, since the NPT has not been destroyed by past Japanese reprocessing. But the affirmative ignores the distinction that the new agreement is different in that it allows Japan to reprocess without getting American clearance first. The important link of the disadvantage is not that *Japan* will prolif but that other countries will take it as a signal that they can when they see Japan flaunting this reprocessing *carte blanche*. This new agreement/old agreement distinction, explained by the long string of 2NC evidence, is not addressed by the affirmative. To the extent that the plan permits reprocessing and diversion of plutonium it weakens the NPT. This is obviously a turnaround to the case.

Accidents (Advantage I). As I have indicated, I think the affirmative position is severely crippled by the fact that it maintains only a threadbare swath of significance on Advantage II, and arguably gets the entire Advantage flipped by the turns. Any hesitation I might exhibit in casting my decision solely on this basis is wholly countenanced by the affirmative's questionable strategic decision (or negligent technical oversight) to answer the negative's turns on Advantage I. The affirmative answers to the negative's turnarounds went from weak (2AC) to weaker (1AR) to non-existent (2AR). I am aware that an examination of the transcript will reveal that the first affirmative did not claim nearly the number of lives on this advantage as the negative asserted when the turns were extended. But the 2NR clearly claimed that there were hundreds of thousands of lives at stake with the accident turns, and it was the affirmative's job to minimize the significance of the turns they were losing. Simply, this is a risk one runs when dropping arguments outright as the 2AR does. I give the negative a 100% risk of hundreds of thousands of deaths due to accidents. In a debate of this complexity, held together by as many subtle relationships and interrelationships between positions, this advantage could not be so cavalierly discarded without penalty. I can't say with honesty that the rest of the debate was a tie, because I think the negative won the balance of the arguments; but I must confess, if it had been a tie on everything else, this advantage would have been the straw, or rather brick, that would have broken the camel's back.

Hopefully my critical comments will not be interpreted as displeasure with the Final Round, because as I said at the outset, this was a debate-lovers dream come true. Rarely is a debate of this complexity and speed, featuring so much evidence and so many interrelated arguments, executed with such amazing clarity and substantive coherence. To those who decry the current state of our activity, I would commend this debate. Again, I want to congratulate the coaches and debaters from the University of Redlands and Harvard College for their outstanding finishing act of the 1989-90 debate season.

ERIK WALKER, Houston Baptist University (Negative)

This year's debate is, without a doubt, the best NDT final round in over a decade. The round exemplifies the style, strategies, and practices which define high-quality debate. All of the arguments presented by each team are part of a clearly-defined, coherent position. The depth with which each issue is extended by both sides is impressive. Extra praise must be heaped upon the first affirmative rebuttalist (1AR) and the second negative rebuttalist (2NR) for exceptional word economy and time allocation. The coaches on both sides have been integral to their team's achievements throughout the year. Bill Southworth continues to stand as one of debate's outstanding coaches to date. To coach a team to the final round of the NDT three times in sixteen years, losing by one ballot only in each is an achievement few will match. I am thrilled for two good friends - Sherry and Dallas. Sherry Hall has worked so hard with the Harvard debaters; she truly earned this award. Dallas Perkins clearly possesses one of the greatest minds in debate. His readings on and research of the topic are as extensive as anyone's. He coaches and judges for Harvard every weekend for essentially no monetary compensation. His hard work is motivated by commitment and dedication to his debaters, a commitment which has been the primary force keeping the Harvard program alive through much adversity over the years. And the program, once again, is at the top.

I voted negative because I conclude based on this round that America's best energy option is continued reliance on fossil fuels, coupled with no use of nuclear power. The affirmative position is that the U.S. should commit to high temperature gas coolant nuclear reactors (HTGR's) in place of light water nuclear reactors (LWR's) to reduce fossil fuel consumption. The negative position is that any commitment to nuclear power is undesirable — our energy needs should be met by fossil fuel combustion. To justify this position, the negative initially defends two counterplans, one which bans nuclear power and one which increases fossil fuel use. Hereafter, this position will be referred to as a singular counterplan since the negative defends them as interdependent components of the same policy. Based on the arguments of this debate, the counterplan clearly is superior to the plan. Unlike the plan, the counterplan avoids any risk of nuclear accidents and eliminates a major avenue to nuclear weapons proliferation. The shift from nuclear power to greater fossil fuel use poses no significant risks, due largely to the abundance of oil.

Initially, the counterplan eliminates the risk of nuclear accidents. 1AR runs out of time before covering the negative attacks to this advantage (Advantage 1). 2AR drops the issue completely meaning the negative wins the advantage by default. Furthermore, the negative turns the advantage into a disadvantage to the plan by showing that HTGR's pose accident risks as great or greater than LWR's. A ban on nukes would avoid the risks of either reactor. And the benefits of preventing nuclear accidents are substantial. We will save the lives of tens of thousands of people for each accident prevented.

The next issue concerns whether a strong U.S. nuclear power industry would reduce or increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the third world. The affirmative initally argues that the plan proliferation for two distinct reasons. First, development of a strong nuclear industry will enhance U.S. leadership in anti-proliferation efforts. Second, HTGR design is such that the diversion of fuel and materials to produce bombs would be extremely difficult. The negative contends that the availability of U.S. nuclear fuel and technology makes proliferation easy and cheap. The technology and materials of the Black Market or of other nations can do little more than produce inefficiently a primitive weapons capacity. Furthermore, the negative argues that the U.S./Japan reprocessing agreements sets a dangerous precedent which ensures proliferation. Under this agreement, Japan has the right and capacity to reprocess nuclear fuel with U.S. assistance, as long as the disposal of spent fuel follows international safeguards. The negative argues that continued adherence to this pact with Japan will force the U.S. politically to negotiate reprocessing agreements with other nuclear and potentially nuclear nations. These often unstable LDC's are less likely than Japan to adhere to the anti-proliferation regime. This concern gains greater significance since diversion of fuel during reprocessing offers the easiest, cheapest, and most likely route to proliferation.

By the 2AR, the affirmative essentially collapses to the argument that U.S leadership in anti-proliferation policy demands a strong domestic nuclear industry. Such leadership, the affirmative contends, can reduce the motive for prolif. And we should focus on *motives* rather than *means* because cheap, effective means to proliferation (e.g. covert nuclear sales, European transfers, and black market sales) are widely available irrespective of the status of the U.S. nuclear industry.

Determining which policy will prevent further prolif is quite difficult. The solvency evidence on both sides is conclusionary. The reasoning behind the negative claims is easily ascertained - U.S. nukes reduce the barriers to proliferation. The affirmative position is more difficult to apprehend. Why is the "leadership" provided by a strong U.S. nuclear industry helpful to anti-prolif efforts? Why would our choice of a civilian energy source have any effect at all on a small nation's decision to acquire weapons? One sensible explanation is that these countries civilian nuclear power more than nuclear weapons. Their power programs are dependent upon U.S. technology and expertise. To avoid restrictions on U.S. assistance, they forego the prolif option. While plausable, this explanation is specifically repudiated in the 2AR distinction between "leverage" and "leadership." 2AR argues that it is not leverage but leadership that is important. What does this mean? What possible leadership role, distinct from leverage, would a civilian nuclear industry provide that would dissuade third world nations from developing the bomb? A determination of the motives for proliferation is critical to evaluating the solvency of the affirmative policy. Neither affirmative debater, nor the evidence they read, discusses these motives. I can only imagine that the desire for a nuclear weapons capability falls somewhere on a continuum like the following: At one end of the spectrum are those nations with a strong desire for nuclear weapons. These nations are driven by concerns for their security. They may fear the aggressive tendencies of their neighbors or the nuclear capabilities of enemies. At the other end of the spectrum are those nations without a great need for nuclear weapons. Their motive is one of prestige rather than security. The first group of nations will develop nuclear weapons regardless of our civilian nuclear policy. The affirmative proves that the means for proliferation are widely available irrespective of our nuclear policy. At most, the negative shows that such means are not as simple and cost effective as the use of nuclear technology. Nonetheless, fear for their security will motivate these nations to choose alternative routes. The latter group of nations is more likely deterred by the counterplan. Since their desire for nuclear weapons is not strong, they are unlikely to go to great lengths to get them. The counterplan's ban on the U.S. nuclear industry makes proliferation a more complex and costly undertaking. Nations at the margin may be deterred. In sum, my own consideration of possible motives fails to reveal the secret of this nebulous "leadership" concept. Clearly, 2AR's strategy to collapse the plethora of arguments on this advantage to one issue quite obviously requires an explanation of the concept. My own suspicion is that the affirmative solvency sources do not completely disassociate leverage and leadership and that the affirmative attempt to do so contribute to my uncertainty.

These enlightened guesses of "motive" and "solution" are consistent with the historical evidence in the debate. Past policies and events support a rejection of U.S. nuclear power. Both affirmative rebuttalists punt the empirical arguments presented at the end of the 1NC. The collapse of the nuclear industry worldwide correlates to the handling of proliferation worldwide. Moreover, several of today's significant nuclear powers are the product of America's civilian nuclear industry. Ironically, the potential surge in prolif facing the world next year corresponds to a resurgence of the U.S. nuclear industry. (Or so the affirmative inherency indicates.) There may be other permutations of the historical arguments, but the "tying together" of these arguments is omitted from the rebuttals of both sides.

The reprocessing argument favors the negative as well. The affirmative misses the boat more than once here. As both 2NC and 2NR emphasize, the real issue is not the safety of the Japanese undertaking. The real danger is that this agreement with Japan sets a precedent for

reprocessing agreements with other, less stable, nations. Politically, the U.S. would have difficulty justifying denial of reprocessing requests. This is of special concern because it is reprocessing which provides the greatest ease of proliferation. The affirmative effectively defends the legality and desirability of the particular U.S./Japanese program. But the affirmative fails to consider the dangers posed by reprocessing in other parts of the world.

The affirmative fails to win a disadvantage to the negative policy (ban nukes; increase fossil fuels). The abundant worldwide supply of oil prevents energy wars. (disadvantage "I" to the counterplan). Replacement of nuclear power with fossil fuel combustion ensures that energy needs are met, hence the economy will not collapse (disadvantage "II" to the counterplan). 2AR claims that the link to the second disadvantage (the reason for economic collapse) is distinct from energy supply. Unfortunately, he goes no further - he does not indicate what is that unique link. 1AR asserts a unique "multiplier effect" that nuclear power has on the economy. Here again, there is no explanation as to why this benefit is unique to nuclear power in light of the abundance of fossil fuels. Surprisingly, the affirmative did not argue an "investor confidence" or "market shock" position. The affirmative could argue that the supply of oil is irrelevant to such a disadvantage. The economy still loses the billions of dollars poured into nuclear power development. In the end, the affirmative fails to isolate economic benefits unique to nuclear power. The affirmative evidence for this disadvantage is extremely short and non-explanatory.

The most rational energy policy is to forego the nuclear option altogether, relying instead on greater use of fossil fuels. The "competitiveness" of a ban on nuclear power (1NC counterplan) is conceded by the affirmative throughout the debate. The permutation to increasing fossil fuel use (2NC counterplan) is irrelevant because the "Gorbachev disadvantage" to reducing fossil fuels is inconsequential to the decision. 2AR merely refutes the link, hence the argument cannot benefit the affirmative. In sum, the negative policy avoids nuclear accidents which promise to be a regular occurrence under the affirmative plan. Each accident prevented translates into tens of thousands of lives saved. The counterplan reduces the incentives for proliferation by making difficult the task of developing nuclear weapons. (While the overall effect on proliferation is tenuous, at the very least the issue does not benefit the affirmative.) Since adequate supplies of oil exist and their use is not shown to be harmful, a ban on nuclear power is the superior policy option.

I am concerned that the majority vote for the affirmative is based, at least subconsciously, on a popular, yet unsound, decision rule: a scenario for world destruction, no matter how remote, outweighs a lesser harm. The insidious growth of this intellectually shallow and politically bankrupt standard has been apparent in a number of debate rounds this year. Consider those rounds in which the negative completely ignores affirmative advantages based on the tens or hundreds of thousands of cancer deaths caused by air pollution. Instead, the negative focuses exclusively on advantages isolating global disaster, such as climate change and Middle Eastern war. Though the climate debate may be extremely close, the prevailing view seems to be that any risk of the greenhouse effect outweighs a manageable loss of life. This is not only irrational but would produce policy paralysis. Every government action has an infinitesimal effect on conditions affecting the world. A rational comparison of the risks of different policies is based on a simple mathematical formula — "Risk = probability × impact." The lower the probability of an Earth-shattering event, the lesser the significance it should be afforded. I cannot imagine that anyone on the panel concludes that the affirmative promises a substantial reduction in proliferation, if for no other reason than the tremendous divergence of opinion among experts of similar credibility. The hour-and-a-half of evidence examination of which all members of the panel engaged attests to the closeness of the issue. The effect of the plan on proliferation is highly questionable. Yet the significance of the accidents advantage is clear. Since the issue is dropped in affirmative rebuttals, a critique of the evidence constitutes unwarranted judge intervention. As early speeches indicate, each accident will kill at least tens of thousands. And accidents will be a regular occurrence in the future. Respected decision makers pushed for a ban on nuclear power after Three Mile Island, though no one was killed. Several hundred radiation deaths created a global consensus that the Chernobyl accident was a global tragedy of utmost consequence. It is difficult to imagine any policy maker accepting the regular occurrence of tens of thousands of lives absent certain and significant anti-proliferation benefits. Of course debate should not bow to the prevailing sentiment. But neither should debate become completely esoteric, divorced from rational policy evaluation.

On behalf of the NDT Board of Trustees and the NDT Committee I would like to thank the entire NDT community for their assistance in the production of THE REPORT ON THE 44th NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT. We would further extend our appreciation to those alumni who have contributed to the Alumni Association, and especially to Mr. Donald Herrick whose annual gift has enabled the NDT to revive the publication of this book. Any ideas for future books, or for the January ALUMNI NEWSLETTER should be directed to Bill Southworth, Director of Alumni Relations. Similarly, any contributions to the NDT Alumni Fund can be forwarded to me as I am also the Treasurer for the Board of Trustees. We look forward to hearing from you and hopefully seeing you in San Antonio in 1991, for the 45th NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT!

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