


*REPORT ON THE*  
*43rd*  
**NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT**



**American  
Forensic  
Association**



September 19, 1989

Participants and Guests at the National Debate Tournament:

Last spring, when you participated in the Forty-third National Debate Tournament which was held at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, you did more than continue the academic debating year for another weekend. Instead, you entered into a tradition that began nearly 2,500 years ago in ancient Greece and that has continued to this day. This tradition involves the exercise of debate, of an engaged dialectic over the issues of public affairs. When exercised at its highest levels, such debate displays intellectual inquiry and integrity, honesty in advocacy, respect for the ideas and personhood of your opposition. Your existence in this activity and, indeed, your successes ultimately depend upon the existence and quality of your opponent.

As such, the material and temporary successes that are achieved--wins, trophies, and the joy that those bring--will ultimately pale when compared to the broader benefits that debate can generate: recognition of the inevitability and necessity of opposition to bring us to the complexities of issues and, hence, to a deeper and richer understanding. But that understanding goes beyond specific policies and their implications; for in our investigations and deliberations, we come to gain insight into our selves and our culture. Such insights are granted not only to the debaters, but to coaches, judges, and observers of this activity as well. Truly, a forensic education contributes to the well being of both our public and personal lives.

It is for these reasons that the American Forensic Association has continued its sponsorship of the National Debate Tournament for the last two decades. This booklet stands, in many ways, as a physical manifestation of the special relationships that you have developed with ideas and with one another over the course of this year. But even this booklet, as it records the record, works to preserve and to energize the commitment to intellectual inquiry, to free expression, and to personal and public excellence that is valued so highly by the AFA. Accordingly, on behalf of all the members of this Association, I commend you for your successes and hope that each of you will continue to appreciate and support the tradition into which you have entered.

Cordially,

Bill Balthrop, President  
American Forensic Association



MIAMI UNIVERSITY

Office of the President  
Roudebush Hall  
Oxford, Ohio 45056

March 30, 1989

To All Participants in the 1989 National Debate Tournament:

On behalf of the entire Miami University community, I extend a warm welcome to all tournament participants--debaters, coaches, and judges alike--to our University and to the Oxford area. We are very proud of our campus, and we hope you have the opportunity to enjoy it while you are here.

We are proud, too, of our liberal arts tradition. Certainly participation in forensics contributes to the development of skills important to liberal education, e.g., the ability to think critically and to communicate effectively.

Dr. Jack Rhodes, Director of Forensics here at Miami, Dr. Gerald Sanders, Chair of our Department of Communication, and their colleagues have worked diligently to assure the success of this year's tournament. I commend them for their efforts.

Again, welcome to Miami University. I am very pleased that we are hosting the 1989 National Debate Tournament, and I offer my best wishes to you all.

Sincerely,

Paul G. Pearson  
President

js



Leo J. Brennan, Jr.  
Executive Director

Ford Motor Company Fund  
The American Road  
P.O. Box 1699  
Dearborn, Michigan 48121-1699

March 16, 1989

Ecellence is Our Tradition

Mr. Jack Rhodes, Chairman  
National Debate Tournament  
Board of Trustees  
c/o Department of Communication  
Miami University  
160 Bachelor Hall  
Oxford, Ohio 45056

Dear Mr. Rhodes:

Ford Motor Company Fund is most pleased to be counted among the supporters of the National Debate Tournament, and we wish to congratulate all of the outstanding participants in the 1989 tournament.

Your involvement in such an event clearly indicates your leadership and intellectual qualities which assure our nation of dedicated and informed leaders in the years ahead. Congratulations to you all!

Sincerely,

LJB/bt

# The National Debate Tournament

The National Debate Tournament began at the United States Military Academy in 1947. It was organized and conducted by the academy at West Point for its first twenty years. Initial tournament rules were determined by the West Point Administration in consultation with such debate coaches as A. Craig Baird of the University of Iowa, G.M. Musgrave of Des Moines, Alan Nichols of USC, E.R. Nichols of the University of Redlands, and Joseph O'Brien of Pennsylvania State University.

At the first tournament in 1947, twenty-nine colleges participated in five "seeding" rounds and four elimination rounds over a three day period. Some of the features of the tournament were that no school would meet a school within five hundred miles of itself during the seeding rounds and that no coach would judge a school from his or her own district. Many traditions were started at West Point that year, some of which still remain today: the "big board", oral announcement of round pairings, cadet escorts for each team, teams for each debate meeting under the banner of the affirmative team, and team signs in the rooms.

In 1967, the National Debate Tournament entered a new era as the American Forensic Association, the national professional organization of forensics educators, assumed responsibility for the tournament. The NDT was moved from West Point and has been hosted by a different school every year since. Control of the tournament became the responsibility of a national committee elected by those schools supporting the tournament. As debate has developed in recent years other refinements have been added to the tournament: the ten-minute preparation time rule, elaborate procedures for assigning judges, judge qualifications and published critiques of the final debate.

Over the years, the tournament has expanded in size, with various procedures used for selecting the participants. In the early days, teams were chosen by district nominating committees. This method was replaced by some form of qualifying tournaments in most districts. For the first twenty years of NDT competition the tournament host and previous year's winner received automatic invitations. Post-district at-large bids were initiated in 1968 and pre-district bids in 1971. Since 1970, it has been possible for a school to qualify as many as two teams for the NDT. This year seventy-four teams participated in the NDT.

The Forty-Third National Debate Tournament was sponsored by the American Forensic Association with support from the Ford Motor Company Fund. The NDT is also indebted to Mr. Sigurd S. Larmon (1891-1987) for donating the rotating Larmon Trophy, emblematic of the national debate championship; to Mr. and Mrs. George Walker for donating the rotating second-place Walker Memorial; to Robert Feldhale, top speaker in the 1976 NDT and now an attorney in Los Angeles for donating the Wayne Broackriede Top Speaker Watch; and to a most generous individual, who wishes to remain anonymous, for a \$5,000 contribution for a new rotating First Speaker Award. Under the guidance of the Board of Trustees and with the invaluable assistance of Roth Jewelers of Waterloo, Iowa, a magnificent Tiffany Bowl was designed and engraved with all the previous Top Speakers in time for the 1989 tournament. This small and elegant trophy replaces the former Rotating Trophy which had been donated by District Nine in 1980. The NDT is also indebted to many other alumni who have contributed over the past few years since the formulation of the NDT Alumni Associa-

tion. One person in particular, Mr. Donald Herrick (top speaker at the 1960 NDT from William-Jewel College) was responsible for the revival of this publication. Originally begun by the Military Academy the publication ended when the NDT left West Point, Mr. Herrick felt such a book was a significant memento for participants and a most meaningful legacy for a tournament and activity he personally cherished. We are extremely grateful to his yearly contribution which makes this book possible.

District and national committees expended considerable time and effort to insure that the tournament reflects the highest quality debating throughout the nation. Sixteen teams were selected at-large by the National Debate Tournament Committee on the basis of outstanding records prior to the District Tournaments. Forty-seven teams representing the nine Districts were invited on the basis of their superior debating in District tournaments. Eleven additional teams were selected by the National Committee on an at-large basis after the District Tournaments.

All teams with minimum preliminary round 5-3 records, and 13 or more ballots, participated in the elimination rounds. Seeding was determined by win-loss records, total ballots, and adjusted team points after dropping high and low. The first elimination round featured a partial bracket so that sixteen teams remained after its conclusion, a format that the National Committee enacted for the 1987 NDT. Four subsequent elimination rounds culminated in the selection of one team as the national champion. Awards are given to the outstanding individual speakers after the eight rounds of preliminary competition.

The 1989 final round was a rematch of the 1988 semi-final round, and produced the exact same results. It was no surprise to find these two teams competing for the National Championship, because along with Northwestern, they had dominated the season. From the very first tournament of the year, Northern Iowa, when the two teams met in the final round to begin the year, until the NDT they were constantly vying for top honors. By the time the First Round At-Large Bids were announced, it was clearly a three-team race, Baylor finished a unanimous number one bid, Northwestern second and Michigan third, between them the three teams accounted for virtually every one of the top three ranks. The preliminary rounds at the National Tournament weren't much different, Michigan was 8-0 defeating both Baylor and Northwestern, Baylor was 7-1 second seed and Northwestern managed to lose two debates and finish fifth seed. It was Northwestern's upset loss to Emory in the quarter-finals which prevented this NDT from being totally predictable. For the second year in a row the NDT topic was foreign policy, RESOLVED: THAT UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ONE OR MORE AFRICAN NATIONS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED. While a broad topic, the final round did, however, find the most popular and successful affirmative being run: expansion of Family Planning Aid for Africa. This interpretation facilitated numerous advantages, from saving the environment to reducing the pressures for military confrontation. Michigan had run virtually the same affirmative all year and enjoyed amazing success, whereas many other teams, Baylor and Northwestern included, ran several different affirmatives throughout the year. So at least this Final Round was more of a reflection of the calibre of argumentation which was run during the year.



# N.D.T. National Ranking System

The National Tournament culminates the NDT Ranking System which was initiated in 1986. Throughout the year each NDT tournament reports its results, points are calculated on the basis of preliminary round wins, elimination round ballots and wins for each NDT team competing. Five times during the year a Newsletter reports the national and regional rankings, for the past three years we have been quite fortunate to have Neil Phillips of Northern Iowa University, directing the computerized tabulation of these results. Neil's departure from this task, as well as forensics, is a great loss to the community and we wish him well in his endeavors. His replacement will be Bob Chandler of Illinois State University, and we wish him luck with this massive task. The final tabulations revealed that 109 schools competed at 80 tournaments representing a total of 2,266 teams. Once again the University of Michigan emerged as the National Point Total winner as they did in 1987-88, the TOP 25 finishers for 1988-89 were:

RANK	SCHOOL	TOTAL POINTS
1	University of Michigan	388
2	George Mason University	354
3	Northwestern University	346
4	University of Kansas	344
5	United States Naval Academy	338
6 TIE	Emory University	332
	James Madison University	332
	Baylor University	332
9	Liberty University	311
10	George Washington University	298
11	University of Redlands	290
12	Dartmouth College	282
13	Harvard University	281
14	Weber State College	267
15	Northern Iowa University	262
16	University of Texas in Austin	258
17	Wake Forest University	255
18	USC	254
19	Wayne State University	248
20	University of Pittsburgh	240
21	University of Iowa	233
22	Georgetown University	223
23	University of Pennsylvania	221
24	Central State University of Oklahoma	219
25 TIE	Concordia College	217
	Augustana College of Illinois	217


To further encourage greater participation, ACHIEVEMENT AWARDS are presented to those programs who show the greatest improvement from one year to the next. The TOP TEN for 1989 were as follows:

RANK	SCHOOL	1988	1989	% IMPROVEMENT
1	Fairmont State College	8	58	725%
2	Illinois State University	88	173	196%
3 TIE	Grand Rapids College	45	87	193%
	Bates College	36	69	193%
5	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	115	206	179%
6	University of Pennsylvania	133	221	166%
7	University of Nebraska, Lincoln	93	153	164%
8	Liberty University	193	311	162%
9	Boston College	94	145	154%
10	Augustana College, South Dakota	124	180	145%




Gerald Sanders, the first NDT champion, speaks at the awards banquet. Among the onlookers is next year's NDT Committee Chairperson Cori Dauber — somehow I don't think she is remembering the good old days?


# Tournament Administration



Al Johnson, Bill Henderson, Lucy Keele, Mike Hazen and Jack Rhodes comprise the NDT Board of Trustees. Many consider the Board the NDT equivalent to the U.S. Supreme Court, naturally the NDT Committee which is both larger and elected by the Districts is more analogous to the U.S. Congress, and just as naturally I was unable to get them altogether for a group photo! In a way we were fortunate to get this photo taken, a few days later this was the location for an elimination round of the NDT!



The 1989 NDT Tab Room has Al Johnson (next year's Director) taking the photograph of Glen Clatterbuck, Steve Depoe, Lance Rosenzweig, Tim Hynes, Jean DeHart, Kathryn Olson, Paul Slappety (undoubtedly making his most helpful contribution to the efficiency of the Tab Room!) David Zarefsky and Michelle Howard. This is clearly the equivalent of our EXECUTIVE BRANCH, and to all of them we owe a great deal of gratitude, unlike our U.S. counterpart we are willing to rely on a "BRAIN" even if it is a computer lurking in the background.



I really cannot think of an analogous political body for this Trio, perhaps they just embody all politics? Chester Gibson will host the 1990 NDT, Bill Balthrop is AFA President and the Host of this "sleepy time" reception, Jack Rhodes and Gerald Sanders were the Miami University Hosts!



During the Sunday evening Awards Banquet, David Zarefsky, retiring Tournament Director receives a plaque from Tournament Host and NDT Board of Trustee member Jack Rhodes. Looking on is next year's Director, Al Johnson and his wife, perhaps asking themselves — "What have we gotten ourselves into?"

# 43rd Annual National Debate Tournament Results

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## FIRST ROUND AT-LARGE RANKINGS

1. Baylor University	(Loeber & Plants)	(12)
2. Northwestern University	(Mitchell & Reiter)	(25)
3. University of Michigan	(Schrank & Thompson)	(35)
4. Harvard University	(Coale & Lennon)	(54)
5. University of Michigan	(Brownell & Loshbough)	(67)
6. Emory University	(Lowrey & Puryear)	(73)
7. Weber State College	(Bixby & Summers)	(83)
8. University of Kansas	(Krauss & Pickens)	(91)
9. University of Pittsburgh	(Craver & Crocker)	(111)
10. University of Redlands	(Herrick & Rubinstein)	(134)
11. Wake Forest University	(Coverstone & Kimball)	(139)
12. Dartmouth College	(Grossman & Katyal)	(154)
13. University of Kentucky	(McKinney & Rockefeller)	(159)
14. Northern Iowa University	(Hawbaker & Schuler)	(164 /135)
15. George Mason University	(Stewart & Tuell)	(164 /139)
16. University of Kansas	(Canninstra & Whalen)	(183)


## TOP SPEAKERS

1. Gordon Mitchell	Northwestern University	627
2. Danny Plants	Baylor University	622 /566
3. Martin Loeber	Baylor University	622 /565
4. Frank Lowrey	Emory University	621
5. Joe Thompson	University of Michigan	619
6. Barry Pickens	University of Kansas	618 /562/507
7. Andrew Schrank	University of Michigan	618 /562/506
8. David Herrick	University of Redlands	618 /561
9. Jim Summers	Weber State College	617
10. Ted Bixby	Weber State College	615 /560

## QUALIFYING TEAMS

1. University of Michigan A	(Schrank & Thompson)	8-0	22	1237
2. Baylor University A	(Loeber & Plants)	7-1	18	1243
3. Dartmouth College A	(Grossman & Katyal)	6-2	20	1194
4. Emory University A	(Lowrey & Puryear)	6-2	19	1229
5. Northwestern University A	(Mitchell & Reiter)	6-2	18	1235
6. University of Kentucky A	(McKinney & Rockefeller)	6-2	18	1206
7. University of Kansas A	(Krauss & Pickens)	6-2	17	1215
8. University of Kansas B	(Canninstra & Whalen)	6-2	17	1214
9. Dartmouth College B	(Agran & Pulis)	6-2	17	1181
10. University of Michigan B	(Brownell & Loshbough)	6-2	16	1222
11. Harvard University B	(Cooper & Schnall)	6-2	16	1194
12. University of Redlands A	(Herrick & Rubinstein)	6-2	15	1218
13. University of North Carolina A	(Burgess & Wells)	6-2	14	1186
14. Northern Iowa University A	(Hawbaker & Schuler)	5-3	17	1211
15. University of North Carolina B	(Goldstein & Rouse)	5-3	17	1165
16. University of Pittsburgh A	(Craver & Crocker)	5-3	16	1215
17. Concordia College A	(Groven & Schmidt)	5-3	16	1200
18. Georgetown University B	(Kuswa & Tomz)	5-3	15	1200
19. Arizona State University	(DuBois & Sannes)	5-3	15	1184
20. University of Iowa B	(Coco & Smith)	5-3	15	1181
21. Harvard University A	(Coale & Lennon)	5-3	14	1213
22. University of Redlands B	(Cole & Lilly)	5-3	14	1202
23. Emory University B	(Bellon & Dowell)	5-3	14	1199
24. University of Iowa A	(Shearer & Wells)	5-3	14	1194
25. University of Southern California A	(Becker & McDade)	5-3	14	1179
26. Concordia College B	(Sylvester & Ward)	5-3	14	1172

# 1989 Elimination Round Results




# First Place Team



**David Giardina, Vincent Griffin, and Lyn Robbins (1987 Champs)  
Martin Loeber, the Larmon Trophy & Daniel Plants**

In 1988 after finishing Second to Dartmouth at the NDT, both Martin and Danny were very optimistic about their senior years. Their optimism was justified as they compiled an outstanding record, winning Northern Iowa to start the year, Georgetown and Dartmouth during; taking second at Kentucky, Wake Forest and Kansas before capturing the 43rd NDT. Their record accorded them a unanimous FIRST, First Round-at-Large Bid, only the second one in history. In addition to such impressive team awards they were clearly the most balanced team on the circuit. Aside from tying for Second Speaker at the NDT, they were constantly rotating among the top three speakers at every tournament, just marvel at the list; Loeber first, Plants third at Northern Iowa; exact tie for first at Kentucky; Plants first, Loeber third at Harvard; Loeber second, Plants third at Wake Forest; Plants first, Loeber second at Georgetown; Loeber was second at both Miami and Northwestern and Plants was third at Dartmouth and Kansas. It is not surprising that such success breeds lasting recognition, as the BEST OF THE DECADE survey would indicate, Loeber and Plants were the only other team to receive over twenty total points, their twenty-four total had them finishing SIXTH in the decade.


Both managed to maintain equally impressive GPA's while working tirelessly on debate. Martin's closing comments from his 2NR suggested some relief that his debate career was at an end, a relief which is shared by those returning debaters who definitely did not enjoy researching the six different affirmatives which Baylor ran during the year. Both will, however, be "around" the circuit during the year, in between law studies. Martin will be attending Baylor Law on full scholarship, while Danny will be at the University of Michigan Law.



**The celebration which followed their 4-1 victory was jubilant to say the least; undoubtedly due to the fact that they knew this was the LAST TIME they would have to clean up their impeccable files!**



# Second Place Team



**Joe Thompson, Steve Mancuso, The Walker Trophy and Andrew Schrank**

It was in the semi-finals that Andrew Schrank and Mike Green lost to the same Baylor team in 1988; this time Schrank was a junior debating with a sophomore when the same 4-1 decision resulted in their Second Place finish. To say Thompson and Schrank had an outstanding year and tournament would be an understatement. They were in the semi-finals or better at seven of the nine tournaments that was possible. At their last two tournaments, Kansas and the NDT they were 16-0 in prelims, at the NDT they defeated both Baylor and Northwestern on 3-0 decisions dropping only two ballots in the prelims, and winning 5-0 in both octos and quarters and 4-1 in semis, for a truly dominating performance. Perhaps the greatest indication of the balance shared by Baylor and Michigan was the fact that at the completion of the NDT their records were virtually identical: Baylor had a 104-18 win-loss record while Michigan's was 104-16 and their record against each other ended up 5 wins and 5 losses each. One final comparison of the two teams solidifies their similarity. In a rather dubious distinction the two teams set the final round record for "fastest" debate ever, by averaging exactly the same speed of 311 words per minute. The decade ended in a flash not a bang!


Joe Thompson will be a twenty year old junior who plans on completing his Political Science major in three years before advancing to Law School. His impressive collegiate career was clearly predictable based on his high school dominance while competing for Kinkaid High in Houston.

Andrew Schrank found the final round a rather "weird" experience having such an "emotional beginning and end" to it as he constantly "thought about last year's debate with Baylor." Whether there will be yet another attempt at the national title in 1990 neither Joe nor Andrew have decided, but both are clearly eligible. Andrew is 21 and hails from Albany and is a double major at Michigan in History and Political Science and is planning on becoming a professor.



**This audience was viewing Michigan compete, but not against Baylor, but against Seton Hall for the NCAA Basketball Championship. At the exact time the final round decision was announced, Michigan won in overtime — I am sure Schrank & Thompson wish Seton Hall had been their opponents!**

# Top Speaker




Gordon Mitchell of Northwestern University

Gordon was born in Stockton, California; educated at Sewickley Academy in Pennsylvania and went to college in Illinois, so it should be no surprise that he is spending his summer in Japan and will do graduate work at Wake Forest — he is a traveling man! During the second half of the debate season he traveled through most debate tournament prelims with great ease. First Speaker at the last four tournaments he attended: Miami of Ohio, Dartmouth and Kansas and finally the NDT. Suffice to say his victory was not a surprise, he was fourth speaker in 1988 and together with Danny Reiter comprised the Second, First At-Large Bid Team in 1989.

You could not have predicted Gordon's NDT future based on his High School career which was predominately Lincoln-Douglas Debate, his junior year he reached the semi-finals of the NFL L-D Nationals. But he learned to "adapt" and do so with great artistry as he also persuaded the National Committee he was suited to represent debate abroad and thus spent June debating in Japan. It was, as he said, "an experience he was looking forward to even during the NDT excitement."

His reaction to debate differed somewhat from Martin Loeber's when he said, "the intellectual impact of four years in debate is as significant as having a lobotomy with a lot of negative factors, *but more positive features*, in retrospect I wouldn't trade it for ANYTHING!" His enthusiasm transcends the normal professional goals, he will pursue his advanced degrees in Speech Communication at Wake Forest University and assist with debate there.



The new "Tiffany Bow" rotating First Speaker Award is surrounded by the watches which also go to First and Second Place Speakers and Teams!



Gordon and Danny received a loud ovation after their quarter-final loss to Emory. Gordon could not break that quarters jinx at the NDT!

# 1989 N.D.T. Participants Team Photographs

## DISTRICT I

California State University at Fullerton  
University of LaVerne  
University of Redlands  
University of Southern California

## DISTRICT III

Baylor University  
Central State University  
Houston Baptist University  
University of Kansas  
North Texas State University  
University of Texas  
Washburn University

## DISTRICT IV

Augustana College of South Dakota  
Concordia College  
University of Iowa  
University of Northern Iowa

## DISTRICT V

Augustana College of Illinois  
Eastern Illinois University  
Illinois State University  
Marietta College  
Miami University of Ohio  
University of Michigan  
Northwestern University  
Wayne State University

## DISTRICT VI

Emory University  
University of Kentucky  
University of Louisville  
University of North Carolina  
Samford University  
Wake Forest University  
West Georgia College

## DISTRICT VII

George Mason University  
George Washington University  
Georgetown University  
James Madison University  
Liberty University  
University of Pennsylvania  
University of Pittsburgh

## DISTRICT VIII

Bates College  
Boston College  
Dartmouth College  
Harvard University

## DISTRICT IX

Arizona State University  
Northern Arizona University  
University of Utah  
Weber State College  
University of Wyoming



## 1989 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

Miami University Oxford, Ohio

ROUND 1	ROUND 2	ROUND 3	ROUND 4	ROUND 5	ROUND 6	ROUND 7	ROUND 8
[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]	[Illegible]


The NON-TRADITIONAL "Little" BOARD!




# DISTRICT I




CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AT FULLERTON  
Jon Brusckhe, Judge; Brent Brossman, Coach; Chris Daley  
Bob Gass, Director; Tammy Shedroff



UNIVERSITY OF LA VERNE  
Bob Rivera, Director; Christy Parker,  
Brook Haynie



UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS TEAM A  
David Herrick, Marc Rubinstein  
Bill Southworth, Director



UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS TEAM B  
 Rodger Cole, Bill Southworth,  
 Brett Lilly



UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TEAM A  
 Tom Hollihan, Director; Greg Miller, Judge,  
 Mark DeLoach, Judge; Robert McDade, Evelyn Beeker,  
 Barb Pickering, Judge; Randy Lake, Coach



UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TEAM B  
 Hollihan, Miller, James Gaynor, DeLoach, Norman Cutler,  
 Pickering, Lake


# DISTRICT III



**BAYLOR UNIVERSITY TEAM A**  
Cary Voss, Director; Lynn Robbins, Coach;  
David Giardina, Coach; Griffin Vincent, Coach;  
Martin Loeber, J. Daniel Plants




**BAYLOR UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
Voss, Robbins, Giardina, Vincent  
John Lombard, Eric Mueller




**CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY**  
Layne Paquin, Coach; Josh Hoe



**HOUSTON BAPTIST UNIVERSITY**  
David Breshears, Marty Sadler, Director; Clinton Brown



**UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS TEAM A**  
Ben Biermann, Judge; Takeshi Suzuki, Judge; Charles Krauss,  
Barry Pickens, Robert Rowland, Director



**UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS TEAM B**  
Pat Whalen, John Fritch, Judge; Karla Leeper, Judge  
Peter Canninstra



**NORTH TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY**  
John Gossett, Director; Matthew Caligur, Judge;  
Keith Woods, Judge; Chris Agree, Mark Champion




**UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, TEAM A**  
Ryan Goodman, Brian McBride, Scott Segal, Director;  
John Bosma, Judge; Traci Jones, Joel Rollins, Coach



**UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, TEAM B**  
Bosma, Mikheel Dhekne, Segal, David Wyrick, Rollins






WASHBURN UNIVERSITY  
Jon Leahey, Nick Backus, Director; Marie Mater

## DISTRICT IV

AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (SD) TEAM A  
Michael LeMay, John Bart, Director; Christopher Moorhead,  
Greg Abbott, Coach



AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (SD) TEAM B  
Heather Aldridge, Bart, Heidi Hamilton, Abbott






CONCORDIA COLLEGE TEAM A  
John Burtis, Coach; Joe Schmitt, Robert Groven,  
Fred Sternhagen, Director




CONCORDIA COLLEGE TEAM B  
Sternhagen, Courtney Ward, Cort Sylvester, Burtis




UNIVERSITY OF IOWA TEAM A  
Shawn Shearer, David Hingstman, Director; Steve Wells



UNIVERSITY OF IOWA TEAM B  
Charles Smith, David Hingstman, Director; Nathan Coco



UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA TEAM A  
Bill Henderson, Director; Aaron Hawbaker, Ken Schuler,  
Neil Phillips, Coach



UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA TEAM B  
Henderson, David Bushek, Don Janssen, Phillips




# DISTRICT V



AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (Ill.) TEAM A  
Rosti Kimbarovsky, Stephen Anderson, Coach;  
Craig Trepanier, David Snowball, Director




AUGUSTANA COLLEGE (Ill.) Team B  
Phil Wilson, Anderson, Terri Thomas, Snowball



EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
James Conley, Terry West, Director; Jay Zuzevich



**EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
Jerry Sheehan, West, Michelle Spelbring



**ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY**  
Robert Chandler, Director; Andrew Reisman,  
Michael Berry, Judge; Paul Cash, Steve Pazmino, Judge



**MARIETTA COLLEGE**  
Dennis Murphy, Director; Liz Hamilton, Mark Wayda,  
Coach; Jon Hamilton, Scott Spicer, Judge



MIAMI UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
Kathy Friedel, Judge; Garn LeBaron, Judge; Noell Tin,  
Frank LaSalle, Lyn Coyne, Judge; Jack Rhodes, Director



MIAMI UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
Fridel, LeBaron, Jim Hanas, Michael Moore, Rhodes



UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN TEAM A  
Steve Mancuso, Director; Joe Thompson, Andrew Schrank,  
Jeff Mondak, Judge



UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN TEAM B  
 Mancuso, David Brownell, Denise Loshbough,  
 Jim Speta, Judge




NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
 Cathie Palczewski, Judge; Erik Duxtader, Judge;  
 Scott Deatherage, Coach; Arnie Madsen, Judge;  
 Dani Reither, Gordon Mitchell, Charles Kauffman, Director




NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
 Palczewski, Duxtader, Deatherage, Madsen, Kauffman,  
 Terence Check, Joel Christie





WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
George Ziegelmueller, Director; Scott Thomson,  
Michael Warren, Kim White, Judge




WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
Bob Bryant, Patrice Agent, Ziegelmueller, White




EMORY UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
Gus Puryear, Melissa Wade, Director; Frank Lowrey

## DISTRICT VI



**EMORY UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
Drew Dowell, Bill Newnam, Coach, Joseph Bellon



**UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY TEAM A**  
Calvin Rockefeller, T.A. McKinney, J.W. Patterson, Director



**UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY TEAM B**  
David Walsh, William Massie, Roger Solt, Coach




UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE  
 Russ Rogers, Coach; Kevin Duddleston, John Delicath,  
 Scott Harris, Director




UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA TEAM A  
 Bill Balthrop, Director, Geoff Burgess, Kevin Sargent, Judge;  
 Yuzuru Yamashita, Judge; Bryan Wells




UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA TEAM B  
 Balthrop, Tom Goldstein, Sargent, Channing Rouse,  
 Yamashita



SAMFORD UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
Rex Copeland, Bill Slagle, Director; George McNinch



SAMFORD UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
Stephen Scott, Daniel Wood, Slagle




WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
Ross Smith, Coach; Todd Woodbury, Judge;  
Alan Coverstone, Gloria Cabada-Leman, Judge; Judd Kimball





WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
Dan Lingel, Judge; Allan Louden, Director; Mark Bailey,  
Lyle Scruggs, Shane Stafford, Judge



WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE  
Aurang Nassery, Bruce Daniel, Coach, Chester Gibson,  
Director, Thomas Cramer




GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
Leonard Bennett, Judge; Warren Decker, Director;  
Alan Stewart, Jeff Parcher, Judge; Star Muir, Coach;  
Laura Tuell


## DISTRICT VII




GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY TEAM B  
Leonard Bennett, Judge; Warren Decker, Director;  
Doug Frye, Joe Jones, Jeff Parcher, Judge;  
Star Muir, Coach



GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY  
Marc DelSignore, Steven Keller, Coach; Glenn Greenwald



GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY TEAM A  
David Cheshier, Director; Jon Garcia, Casey Anderson



**GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
Kevin Kuswa, Cheshier, Michael Tomz




**JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY TEAM A**  
Suzanne Pester, Cecilia Graves, Coach; David Foley



**JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
Jean-Paul Lacy, Graves, Heather Emmert



LIBERTY UNIVERSITY  
Lisa Lundquist, Brett O'Donnell, Director; Janet Pierpoint



UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA  
Steve Bank, Jenny Steinen, Director; Jeff Pearson





UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH TEAM A  
Cori Dauber, Director; Jarle Crocker, Carl Craver,  
Greg Spicer, Judge; Peter Bsumek, Judge; Ron Wastyn, Coach



UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH TEAM B  
Frank Bender, Dauber, Holly Johnston, Spicer, Bsumek,  
Wastyn

## DISTRICT VIII

BATES COLLEGE  
Chris Janek, Steve Concannon, Paul Rosenthal, Coach




BOSTON COLLEGE TEAM A  
John Katsulas, Coach; Dale Herbeck, Director;  
Darren Schwiebert, Lisa Marie Ameden






BOSTON COLLEGE TEAM B  
Katsulas, Herbeck, Ron Weed, Richard Smith



DARTMOUTH COLLEGE TEAM A  
Neal Katyal, Rob Wick, Judge; Scott Grossman,  
John Culver, Judge



DARTMOUTH TEAM B  
Ken Strange, Director; Shaun Martin, Judge;  
Ken Agran, Ralf Pulis




**HARVARD UNIVERSITY TEAM A**  
 Dallas Perkins, Coach; Sherry Hall, Director,  
 Chris Decker, Judge; David Coale, Alex Lennon



**HARVARD UNIVERSITY TEAM B**  
 Hall, Sam Cooper, Decker, Matt Schnall, Perkins


## DISTRICT IX




**ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY**  
 Clark Olson, Director; Scott DuBois, Joel Sannes,  
 Vince Meldrum, Coach



NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY  
Jerry Burns, Coach; Sharon Porter, Director; Tim Casey,  
Susan Chubrich, Paula Phillips, Judge; David Riek, Coach




UNIVERSITY OF UTAH  
Rebecca Bjork, Director, Lisa Hobbs, Corey Folster



WEBER STATE COLLEGE TEAM A  
Jim Summers, Ted Bixby, Michael Bryant, Director





WEBER STATE COLLEGE TEAM B  
Korry Harvey, Lisa Johnson, Michael Bryant, Director



UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING  
Wayne Callaway, Director; Wendy Irving, Shawn Miller,  
Sue Balter, Judge

# Tournament Facts, 1947 - 1989

From 1947 to 1966 the NDT was held at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.

<b>1967</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Chicago <b>Host:</b> Richard L. LaVarnway & Thomas B. McClain <b>Director:</b> Stanley G. Rives	<b>1978</b> <b>Site:</b> Metropolitan State College, Denver <b>Host:</b> Gary Holbrook <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen
<b>1968</b> <b>Site:</b> Brooklyn College <b>Host:</b> Charles E. Parkhurst <b>Director:</b> Richard D. Rieke	<b>1979</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Kentucky <b>Host:</b> J.W. Patterson <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen
<b>1969</b> <b>Site:</b> Northern Illinois University <b>Host:</b> M. Jack Parker <b>Director:</b> Roger Hufford	<b>1980</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Arizona <b>Host:</b> Tim A. Browning <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen
<b>1970</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Houston <b>Host:</b> William B. English <b>Director:</b> David Matheny	<b>1981</b> <b>Site:</b> California Polytechnic State University, Pomona <b>Host:</b> Robert Charles <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen
<b>1971</b> <b>Site:</b> Macalester College <b>Host:</b> W. Scott Nobles <b>Director:</b> John C. Lehman	<b>1982</b> <b>Site:</b> Florida State University <b>Host:</b> Marilyn J. Young <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen.
<b>1972</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Utah <b>Host:</b> Jack Rhodes <b>Director:</b> John C. Lehman	<b>1983</b> <b>Site:</b> Colorado College <b>Host:</b> James A. Johnson <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen
<b>1973</b> <b>Site:</b> U.S. Naval Academy <b>Host:</b> Philip Warken <b>Director:</b> Merwyn A. Hayes	<b>1984</b> <b>Site:</b> University of Tennessee <b>Host:</b> Russell Taylor Church <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky
<b>1974</b> <b>Site:</b> U.S. Air Force Academy <b>Host:</b> David Whitlock <b>Director:</b> Merwyn A. Hayes	<b>1985</b> <b>Site:</b> Gonzaga University <b>Host:</b> Darrell Scott and Joan Archer-Cronin <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky
<b>1975</b> <b>Site:</b> University of the Pacific <b>Host:</b> Paul Winters <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen	<b>1986</b> <b>Site:</b> Dartmouth College <b>Host:</b> Herbert L. James <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky
<b>1976</b> <b>Site:</b> Boston College <b>Host:</b> Daniel M. Rohrer <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen	<b>1987</b> <b>Site:</b> Illinois State University <b>Host:</b> Arnie Madsen <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky
<b>1977</b> <b>Site:</b> Southwestern Missouri State University <b>Host:</b> Rita Rice Flaningam <b>Director:</b> Michael David Hazen	<b>1988</b> <b>Site:</b> Weber State College <b>Host:</b> Randy Scott <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky
<b>1989</b> <b>Site:</b> Miami University of Ohio <b>Host:</b> Jack Rhodes <b>Director:</b> David Zarefsky	

# Top Speakers, 1957 - 1989

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- 1957**  
1st: **Patricia Stallings**, University of Houston  
2nd: **Phillip Hubbard**, Augustana College (Ill.)
- 1958**  
1st: **Michael Miller**, University of Southern California  
2nd: **Phillip Hubbard**, Augustana College (Ill.)
- 1959**  
1st: **James Ray**, United States Military Academy  
2nd: **Ray Nichols**, University of Kansas
- 1960**  
1st: **Don Herrick**, William Jewell College  
2nd: **George Schell**, Baylor University
- 1961**  
1st: **George Schell**, Baylor University  
2nd: **Laurence Tribe**, Harvard University
- 1962**  
Tie: **Lee Huebner**, Northwestern University  
Tie: **Harold Lawson**, Kansas State Teachers College
- 1963**  
1st: **Daniel Kolb**, College of the Holy Cross  
2nd: **Robert Roberts**, University of Alabama
- 1964**  
1st: **Robert Roberts**, University of Alabama  
2nd: **John Hempelmann**, Georgetown University
- 1965**  
1st: **Robert Shrum**, Georgetown University  
2nd: **Douglas Pipes**, University of the Pacific
- 1966**  
1st: **William Snyder**, Northwestern University  
2nd: **John Holcomb**, Augustana College (Ill.)
- 1967**  
1st: **Rick Flam**, University of Southern California  
2nd: **Thomas Brewer**, Dartmouth College
- 1968**  
1st: **David Zarefsky**, Northwestern University  
2nd: **Richard Brautigam**, Michigan State University
- 1969**  
1st: **David Seikel**, University of Houston  
2nd: **Joel Perwin**, Harvard University
- 1970**  
1st: **Mike Miller**, University of Houston  
2nd: **Jim Caforio**, Loyola University (Los Angeles) and **David Goss**, Canisius College
- 1971**  
1st: **Joe Loveland**, University of North Carolina  
2nd: **Joseph Angland**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 1972**  
1st: **Terry McNight**, Canisius College  
2nd: **Ron Palmieri**, University of Southern California
- 1973**  
1st: **Elliot Minchberg**, Northwestern University  
2nd: **Frank Kimball**, University of California at Los Angeles
- 1974**  
1st: **Michael Higelin**, University of Southern California  
2nd: **Marvin Isgur**, University of Houston
- 1975**  
1st: **Thomas Rollins**, Georgetown University  
2nd: **Robert Feldhake**, Augustana College (Ill.)
- 1976**  
1st: **Robert Feldhake**, Augustana College (Ill.)  
2nd: **Thomas Rollins**, Georgetown University
- 1977**  
1st: **Gilbert Skillman**, University of Kentucky  
2nd: **John Walker**, Georgetown University
- 1978**  
1st: **Thomas Rollins**, Georgetown University  
2nd: **Stuart Singer**, Northwestern University
- 1979**  
1st: **Mark Fabiani**, University of Redlands  
2nd: **Michael B. King**, Harvard University
- 1980**  
1st: **Steven Meagher**, Dartmouth College  
2nd: **Don Dripps**, Northwestern University
- 1981**  
1st: **Jeff Jones**, University of Kentucky  
2nd: **Paul Weathington**, West Georgia College and **Scott Harris**, Wayne State University
- 1982**  
1st: **Steve Mancuso**, University of Kentucky  
2nd: **John Barrett**, Georgetown University
- 1983**  
1st: **John Barrett**, Georgetown University  
2nd: **Leonard Gail**, Dartmouth College
- 1984**  
1st: **Leonard Gail**, Dartmouth College  
2nd: **Bill Brewster**, Emory University
- 1985**  
1st: **Danny Povinelli**, University of Massachusetts  
2nd: **Doug Sigel**, Northwestern University
- 1986**  
1st: **Lyn Robbins**, Baylor University  
2nd: **Scott Segal**, Emory University
- 1987**  
1st: **Lyn Robbins**, Baylor University  
2nd: **John Culver**, University of Kansas
- 1988**  
1st: **Gloria Cabada**, Wake Forest University  
2nd: **Barry Pickens**, University of Kansas
- 1989**  
1st: **Gordon Mitchell**, Northwestern University  
2nd: **Daniel Plants**, Baylor University

# Tournament Results

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>CHAMPIONS</b>	<b>RUNNERS-UP</b>
1947	<b>Southeastern State College</b> W. Scott Nobles and Gerald Sanders Coach: T.A. Houston	<b>University of Southern California</b> Potter Kerfott and George Grover Coach: Alan Nichols
1948	<b>North Texas State College</b> Keith Parks and David Cotton Coach: S.B. McAlister	<b>University of Florida</b> Alan Weston and Gerald Gordon Coach: Wayne Eubank
1949	<b>University of Alabama</b> Oscar Newton and Mitchell Latoff Coach: Annabel D. Hagood	<b>Baylor University</b> Thomas Webb and Joseph Allbritton Coach: Glenn Capp
1950	<b>University of Vermont</b> Richard O'Connell and Thomas Hayes Coach: Robert B. Huber	<b>Augustana College</b> Dorothy Koch and Charles Lindberg Coach: Martin Holcomb
1951	<b>University of Redlands</b> James Wilson and Holt Spicer Coach: E. R. Nichols	<b>Kansas State Teachers College</b> Robert Howard and Robert Kaiser Coach: Charles Master
1952	<b>University of Redlands</b> James Wilson and Holt Spicer Coach: E.R. Nichols	<b>Baylor University</b> John Claypool and Calvin Cannon Coach: Glenn Capp
1953	<b>University of Miami</b> Gerald Kogan and Lawrence Perlmutter Coach: Donald Sprague	<b>College of the Holy Cross</b> Michael McNulty and John O'Connor Coach: Henry J. Murphy, S.J.
1954	<b>University of Kansas</b> William Arnold and Hubert Bell Coach: Kim Giffin	<b>University of Florida</b> Robert Shevin and Larry Sands Coach: Douglas Ehninger
1955	<b>University of Alabama</b> Dennis Holt and Elis Storey Coach: Anabel D. Hagood	<b>Wilkes College</b> Harold Flannery and James Neveras Coach: Arthur Kruger
1956	<b>United States Military Academy</b> George Walker and James Murphy Coach: Abbott Greenleaf	<b>Saint Joseph's College</b> John Gough and J. Foley Coach: Joseph Erhart, S.J.
1957	<b>Augustana College</b> Norman Lefstein and Phillip Hubbard Coach: Martin Holcomb	<b>United States Military Academy</b> James Murphy and George Walker Coach: Abbott Greenleaf
1958	<b>Northwestern University</b> William Welsh and Richard Kirshberg Coach: Russell R. Windes	<b>Harvard University</b> David Bynum and James Kincaid Coach: Robert O'Neill
1959	<b>Northwestern University</b> William Welsh and Richard Kirshberg Coach: Russell R. Windes	<b>Wisconsin State University of Eau Claire</b> James Shafer and Charles Bush Coach: Grace Walsh
1960	<b>Dartmouth College</b> Anthony Roisman and Saul Baernstein Coach: Herbert L. James	<b>San Diego State College</b> John Raser and Robert Arnhyrn Coach: John Ackley
1961	<b>Harvard University</b> Laurence Tribe and Gene Clements Coach: James Kincaid	<b>King's College</b> Frank Harrison and Peter Smith Coach: Robert Connelley
1962	<b>Ohio State University</b> Dale Williams and Sarah Benson Coach: Richard Rieke	<b>Baylor University</b> Calvin Kent and Michael Henke Coach: Glenn Capp

<b>YEAR</b>	<b>CHAMPIONS</b>	<b>RUNNERS-UP</b>
1963	<b>Dartmouth College</b> Frank Wohl and Stephen Kessler Coach: Herbert L. James	<b>University of Minnesota</b> Andre Zdrzil and David Krause Coaches: Robert L. Scott and Donn W. Parson
1964	<b>University of the Pacific</b> Raoul Kennedy and Douglas Pipes Coach: Paul Winters	<b>Boston College</b> Jamers J. Unger and Joseph McLaughlin Coaches: John Lawton and Lee Huebner
1965	<b>Carson-Newman College</b> John Wittig and Barnett Pearce Coach: Forrest Conklin	<b>Northeastern State College</b> David Johnson and Glen Strickland Coach: Valgene Littlefield
1966	<b>Northwestern University</b> Bill Snyder and Mike Denger Coach: Thomas B. McClain	<b>Wayne State University</b> Douglas Frost and Kathleen McDonald Coach: George Ziegelmueller
1967	<b>Dartmouth College</b> Tom Brewer and John Isaacson Coach: Herbert L. James	<b>Wayne State University</b> Don Ritzenheim and Kathleen McDonald Coach: George Ziegelmueller
1968	<b>Wichita State University</b> Robert Shields and Lee Thompson Coach: Quincalee Striegel	<b>Butler University</b> Donald Kiefer and Carl Flanigam Coach: Nicholas Cripe
1969	<b>Harvard University</b> Richard Lewis and Joel Perwin Coach: Laurence Tribe	<b>University of Houston</b> David Seikel and Michael Miller Coach: William B. English
1970	<b>University of Kansas</b> Robert McCulloh and David Jeans Coaches: Donn W. Parson and Jackson Harrell	<b>Canisius College</b> David Goss and David Wagner Coach: Bert Goss
1971	<b>University of California, Los Angeles</b> Don Hornstein and Barrett McInerney Coach: Patricia B. Long	<b>Oberlin College</b> Scott Lassar and Joe Misner Coach: Larry E. Larmer
1972	<b>University of California, Santa Barbara</b> Mike Clough and Mike Fernandez Coach: Kathy Corey	<b>University of Southern California</b> Ron Palmieri and Dennis Winston Coach: John C. DeBross
1973	<b>Northwestern University</b> Elliot Mincberg and Ron Marmer Coach: David Zarefsky	<b>Georgetown University</b> Bradley Ziff and Stewart Jay Coach: James J. Unger
1974	<b>Harvard University</b> Greg. A. Rosenbaum and Charles E. Garvin Coach: Mark Arnold	<b>Augustana College</b> Bob Feldhake and Rick Godfrey Coach: Dan Bozik
1975	<b>Baylor University</b> Jay Hurst and David Kent Coach: Lee Polk	<b>University of Redlands</b> Greg Ballard and Bill Smelko Coach: William Southworth
1976	<b>University of Kansas</b> Robin Rowland and Frank Cross Coaches: Donn W. Parson and Bill Bathrop	<b>Georgetown University</b> Charles Chafer and David Ottoson Coach: James J. Unger
1977	<b>Georgetown University</b> John Walker and David Ottoson Coach: James J. Unger	<b>University of Southern California</b> Leslie Sherman and Steven Combs Coaches: John C. DeBross and Lee Garrison
1978	<b>Northwestern University</b> Mark Cotham and Stuart Singer Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight	<b>University of Southern California</b> Steven Combs and Jon Cassanelli Coaches: John C. DeBross and Lee Garrison




**YEAR CHAMPIONS**

1979	<b>Harvard University</b> Michael B. King and John M. Bredehoft Coaches: Charles E. Garvin and Greg A. Rosenbaum
1980	<b>Northwestern University</b> Don Dripps and Tom Fulkerson Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight
1981	<b>University of Pittsburgh</b> Michael Alberty and Stephen Marzen Coach: Thomas Kane
1982	<b>University of Louisville</b> Dave Sutherland and Dan Sutherland Coach: Tim Hynes
1983	<b>University of Kansas</b> Mark Gidley and Roger Payne Coach: Donn W. Parson
1984	<b>Dartmouth College</b> Leonard Gail and Mark Koulogeorge Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, & Tom Lyon
1985	<b>Harvard University</b> Jonathan Massey and Ed Swaine Coaches: Dallas Perkins and Jonathan Wiener
1986	<b>University of Kentucky</b> David Brownell and Ouita Papka Coaches: J.W. Patterson and Roger Solt
1987	<b>Baylor University</b> Lyn Robbins and Griffin Vincent Coaches: Robert Rowland, David B. Hingstman, Cary Voss, Bob Gilmore and Mark Dyer
1988	<b>Dartmouth College</b> Shaun Martin and Rob Wick Coaches: Ken Strange, John Culver, Jeff Leon, Eric Jaffe and Lenny Gail
1989	<b>Baylor University</b> Daniel Plants and Martin Loeber Coaches: Cary Voss, Lyn Robbins, David Guardina, and Griffin Vincent

**RUNNERS - UP**

<b>Northwestern University</b> Don Dripps and Mark Cotham Coach: G. Thomas Goodnight
<b>Harvard University</b> John M. Bredehoft and William C. Foutz Coaches: Dallas Perkins and L. Jeffrey Pash
<b>Dartmouth College</b> Cy Smith and Mark Weinhardt Coaches: Herb James and Ken Strange
<b>University of Redlands</b> Bill Isaacson and Jeff Wagner Coach: William Southworth
<b>Dartmouth College</b> Robin Jacobsohn and Tom Lyon Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, and Steve Mancuso
<b>University of Louisville</b> Cindy Leiferman and Mark Whitehead Coach: Tim Hynes
<b>University of Iowa</b> Robert Garman and Karla Leeper Coaches: Robert Kemp, Dale Berbeck, Greg Phelps, and John Katsulas
<b>Georgetown University</b> Michael Mazarr and Stuart Rabin Coach: Greg Mastel
<b>Dartmouth College</b> Craig Budner and Chrissy Mahoney Coaches: Herbert L. James, Ken Strange, David Rhaesa, and Erik Jaffe
<b>Baylor University</b> Daniel Plants and Martin Loeber Coaches: Cary Voss and Erik Walker
<b>University of Michigan</b> Andrew Schrank and Joe Thompson Coach: Steve Mancuso



That's right Baylor, Michigan didn't run a new case (like some other teams were known to do); they went down with what brung them — family planning!



Frank Lowrey and Gus Puryear break a forty year jinx for Emory University when they accept the Third Place Trophy. Despite countless outstanding teams, Emory had never managed to go beyond the quarters. They did it this year by defeating one of the pre-tournament favorites Northwestern in the quarters.

# NDT Participants, 1947 - 1989

- Abilene Christian College: 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 65, 69, 70  
University of Alabama: 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 71, 73, 75-79  
Albion College: 67, 69  
American University: 61  
University of Arizona: 49, 50, 69, 76-85  
Arizona State University: 47, 67, 87, 88, 89  
University of Arkansas: 50  
Auburn University: 85, 86  
Augustana College (Illinois): 47-60  
64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73-81, 87, 88, 89  
Augustana College (South Dakota): 76-85, 87, 89  
Bates College: 48, 76-79  
Baylor University: 48-53, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, 71, 74-78, 79, 81-89  
Boston College: 62, 63, 64, 65, 67-72, 74, 75, 79, 87, 88, 89  
Boston University: 60, 73, 74, 75  
Bowling Green State University: 50, 51, 70, 75, 76, 78  
Bradley University: 51, 69, 79  
Brandeis University: 65, 67  
Brigham Young University: 55, 56, 60, 62, 63, 66, 78  
Brooklyn College: 61  
Brown University: 69, 70, 72  
Butler University: 59, 61, 67, 68, 80, 81, 83, 88  
University of California at Berkeley: 68, 77, 81  
University of California at Los Angeles: 48, 54, 66 68-76, 78  
University of California at Santa Barbara: 64, 71, 72, 73, 75  
California State University, Fullerton: 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 85-89  
California State University, Los Angeles: 55, 56, 61, 66, 73, 76  
California State University, Northridge: 65, 67, 68, 72, 74  
California State University, Sacramento: 74-79, 81, 82  
California State University, San Diego: 49, 52-63, 72  
Canisius College: 69-74, 77, 78, 79  
Capital University: 48, 73, 74  
Carson-Newman College: 64, 65, 66  
Case Institute of Technology: 73  
Catholic University: 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78  
University of Central Florida (Florida Tech): 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83  
Central Michigan University: 74, 76, 83, 85, 86, 88  
Central Oklahoma State University: 52, 53, 54, 56, 61, 63, 72, 73, 85, 86, 87, 89  
Champlain College: 49  
University of Chicago: 48, 49  
Claremont McKenna (Men's) College: 78-85, 87  
Coe College: 48  
Colgate University: 51  
Colorado College: 75, 77, 79  
University of Colorado: 47, 48  
Concordia College: 67, 68, 73, 87, 88, 89  
Cornell University: 76  
Dartmouth College: 48, 51, 54-61, 63-73, 75-89  
David Lipscomb College: 55  
University of Denver: 54, 67, 68, 69, 70, 85  
DePaul University: 48, 49, 51, 57  
University of Detroit: 67  
Drury College: 72, 80  
Duke University: 56, 57, 58, 61  
Eastern Illinois University: 71, 74-86, 88, 89  
Eastern Nazarene College: 58, 60, 61  
Emory University: 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 77, 78, 81-89  
Emporia State University: 51, 53, 58-63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82  
Fairmont State College: 76, 78  
University of Florida: 48, 50-57, 59, 62, 68, 69, 70  
Florida State University: 75  
Fordham University: 57, 59, 66  
Fordham University School of Education: 58, 59, 61  
Fort Hays State College: 61  
George Mason University: 74, 75, 80, 84-89  
George Pepperdine College: 49, 50, 51, 52, 53  
George Washington University: 49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62-66, 68-73, 76, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89  
Georgetown College: 49  
Georgetown University: 49, 52, 56, 61-67, 70-89  
University of Georgia: 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77  
Georgia State University: 84, 85, 86, 88  
Gonzaga University: 47, 48, 59, 60, 62, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87  
Greenville College: 56  
Harvard University: 50, 54-89  
Hiram College: 52  
College of the Holy Cross: 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62, 63  
University of Houston: 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 67-83  
Houston Baptist University: 87, 89  
Howard University: 52, 54  
University of Idaho: 53, 57, 61  
Idaho State University: 53, 57, 61  
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle: 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 64, 65  
Illinois College: 54  
Illinois State University: 52, 54, 55, 62, 63, 72, 73, 81, 86, 89  
Indiana State University: 47, 73  
University of Iowa: 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81 83-89  
Iowa State University: 52, 71, 74, 82, 83, 84  
James Madison University: 79-84, 86, 87, 88, 89  
John Carroll University: 78, 80, 81  
John Hopkins University: 77, 78, 79  
University of Kansas: 48-60, 63, 64, 66, 68-89  
Kansas State College of Pittsburgh: 61, 63, 67  
Kansas State University: 55, 64, 75, 76, 77, 83  
University of Kentucky: 60, 64, 67, 68, 73-82, 84-89  
Kent State University: 51  
King's College: 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 77, 83  
University of La Verne: 88, 89  
Lewis and Clark College: 64, 66, 67, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80  
Liberty University: 89  
Louisiana College: 47, 48, 49, 53, 54  
University of Louisville: 79-89  
Loyola-Marymount University: 62, 63, 64, 65, 67-74, 76, 77, 78, 80-88  
Loyola University (Chicago): 60, 70, 72  
Luther College: 50  
Macalaster College: 56, 61, 71, 73-87  
Marietta College: 59, 89  
Marquette University: 58, 59  
University of Maryland: 67  
University of Massachusetts: 73-88  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 48, 49, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79  
Mercer University: 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87  
University of Miami (Florida): 52, 53, 54, 55, 57-63, 66, 68, 69, 74  
Miami University (Ohio): 76, 80, 81, 87, 88, 89  
University of Michigan: 71, 72, 76, 77, 87, 88, 89  
Michigan State University: 53, 66, 68, 69  
Middlebury College: 55  
Middle Tennessee State University: 70, 72, 77  
Midland College: 53  
Midwestern College: 69  
University of Minnesota: 62-67, 73, 82, 83  
University of Mississippi: 47, 51, 52  
University of Missouri, Columbia: 68, 71, 72  
University of Missouri, Kansas City: 61, 62, 66, 68  
University of Montana: 49, 50, 51  
Montana State University: 51, 60  
Morehead State University: 77, 78, 79, 80  
Mount Mercy College: 53  
Nebraska State College at Kearney: 65, 66  
Nebraska Wesleyan University: 51, 52, 54, 55  
University of Nebraska, Lincoln: 80, 83, 86, 87  
University of Nebraska, Omaha: 77  
University of Nevada: 48  
University of New Hampshire: 71  
University of New Mexico: 51, 52, 54, 85  
State University of New York, College at Geneseo: 53  
Northeastern Oklahoma State University: 62-70, 72, 73, 81, 82, 84, 85  
Northern Arizona University: 87, 88, 89  
Northern Illinois University: 65

University of Northern Michigan: 75  
 University of North Texas: 48, 49, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 79, 83-89  
 Northwest Missouri State University: 79, 80, 82  
 Northwestern College (Minnesota): 63  
 Northwestern University: 47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 62, 65-80, 82-89  
 University of North Carolina: 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80-86, 88, 89  
 University of North Dakota: 79  
 University of Northern Colorado: 71, 74, 75  
 University of Northern Iowa: 74, 75, 81-89  
 University of Notre Dame: 47-53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 65, 78  
 Oberlin College: 68, 69, 70, 71, 72  
 Occidental College: 53  
 Odessa College: 81, 82, 86, 87  
 Ohio University: 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 82  
 Ohio State University: 47, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 86, 87  
 University of Oklahoma: 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64  
 Oklahoma Baptist University: 77  
 Oklahoma City University: 65  
 Oklahoma State University: 68, 69, 70  
 University of Oregon: 60-69  
 Oregon State University: 47, 48, 54, 63, 64  
 Ottawa University: 49  
 Pace University: 75, 81, 83, 84, 87  
 University of the Pacific: 58, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 76  
 Pacific Lutheran University: 52, 56, 62, 72, 82, 83, 84  
 Pacific University: 49, 55, 56, 57, 65, 73  
 University of Pennsylvania: 49, 50, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 66, 87, 89  
 Pennsylvania State University: 47, 50, 52, 55  
 Phillips University: 49  
 University of Pittsburgh: 53, 56, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 70-76, 79-83, 85-89  
 Princeton University: 51, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61  
 University of Puget Sound: 56, 57  
 Purdue University: 47, 48, 50, 60, 61, 62  
 University of Redlands: 50, 51, 52, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 69, 72-89  
 University of Rhode Island: 73  
 Rice University: 57  
 University of Richmond: 56, 62, 65, 76  
 Roanoke College: 50  
 Rockhurst College: 62, 64  
 Rutgers University: 47, 68, 71, 73, 74  
 Saint Anselm's College: 56, 59, 64, 68, 69, 71, 72  
 Saint John's University: 53, 54, 62, 63, 64  
 Saint Joseph's College: 55, 56, 57, 59, 67  
 Saint Martin's College: 51, 53, 59  
 Saint Mary's College: 49  
 Saint Olaf College: 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 62, 63  
 Saint Peter's College: 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 62  
 College of Saint Thomas: 47  
 Samford University: 73, 74, 75, 78-89  
 University of San Francisco: 58  
 San Jacinto College: 86  
 San Joaquin Delta College: 80, 81  
 University of Scranton: 61  
 Seton Hall University: 60, 72, 73, 79, 83, 85  
 Smith College: 52  
 University of South Carolina: 50, 51, 54, 56-64, 66, 67, 68  
 University of South Dakota: 67, 68, 75  
 South Dakota State College: 54  
 Southeast Oklahoma State University: 47, 48, 49, 50, 59, 73, 74, 76  
 University of Southern California: 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67-89  
 Southern Illinois University: 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 70, 88  
 Southern Methodist University: 50, 52, 87, 88  
 University of Southern Mississippi: 65, 66  
 Southern Oregon College: 67  
 Southern Utah State College: 82, 83, 84, 85  
 Southwest Missouri State University: 52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 69-75, 77, 78  
 Southwest Texas State University: 88  
 Southwestern College: 56, 57, 78, 79, 80, 81  
 University of Southwestern Louisiana: 76, 77, 78, 79  
 Stanford University: 49  
 Stevens Institute of Technology: 49  
 Stonehill College: 67, 68  
 Suffolk University: 81, 82, 83, 84  
 Swarthmore College: 48  
 Temple University: 49  
 University of Tennessee: 50, 51, 79  
 Tennessee Polytechnic Institute: 62  
 University of Texas, Arlington: 77, 78, 80, 82  
 University of Texas, Austin: 47, 60, 71, 72, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89  
 Texas A & M University: 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88  
 Texas Christian University: 47, 48, 51, 60, 62, 66, 67, 75, 76  
 Texas Technological College: 68, 70, 73  
 University of the South: 49  
 University of Toledo: 71, 72  
 Union College and University: 55  
 United States Air Force Academy: 59, 60, 76, 77, 78, 79  
 United States Merchant Marine Academy: 52, 53, 59  
 United States Military Academy: 47-64, 66, 77, 80  
 United States Naval Academy: 47-50, 58, 64, 65, 70, 72, 78, 80, 85, 87, 88  
 University of Utah: 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 72, 73, 75-89  
 Utica College: 50, 51  
 Vanderbilt University: 76, 77, 78, 80  
 University of Vermont: 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54-62, 64, 65, 66, 84, 85, 86, 88  
 University of Virginia: 47, 63, 67, 68, 81  
 Wabash College: 55  
 Wake Forest University: 47, 48, 50-56, 59, 63, 64, 70, 71, 73-78, 80-89  
 Washburn University: 56, 58, 64, 65, 66, 72, 86, 87, 88, 89  
 Washington and Lee University: 63, 68, 69  
 University of Washington: 55, 68  
 Washington State University: 47, 50, 54, 58, 66, 69, 70, 76  
 Wayne State University: 58, 61, 63-73, 77-89  
 Weber State College: 81, 86, 87, 88, 89  
 Wesleyan University: 50, 52  
 West Georgia College: 73-89  
 West Georgia University: 55, 64, 74, 79, 81, 85, 86  
 West Virginia University: 55, 64, 74, 79, 81, 85, 86  
 West Virginia Wesleyan College: 75, 77  
 Western Illinois University: 71, 73, 80, 82, 85  
 Western Michigan University: 63, 64  
 Western Reserve University: 66  
 Western Washington University: 74, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86  
 Wheaton College: 47, 59, 63  
 Whitman College: 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59  
 Whittier College: 71  
 Wichita State University: 48, 64, 67, 68, 77, 79  
 William Jewell College: 60, 61  
 College of William and Mary: 56, 68, 69, 73, 74, 84  
 University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire: 50, 51, 53-59, 73, 76, 78, 79  
 Wilkes College: 54, 55, 57, 58  
 Williamette University: 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 58, 69, 71  
 College of Wooster: 73, 79, 81, 83  
 University of Wyoming: 67, 68, 70-78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89  
 Xavier University: 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59  
 Yale University: 47, 49

# Best of the Decade

In 1979 I conducted a survey of college coaches to assist in determining THE BEST OF THE 1970's'. When I decided to repeat the process it seemed only appropriate that this newly revived publication should contain the results of a survey to determine THE BEST OF THE 1980's.

While each decade produces its own unique occurrences, the 1980's seemed especially significant. The decade began with the first unanimous final round decision when Northwestern gained some revenge on Harvard for their 1979 final round loss. However, before the decade would end there would be three more such unanimous final round decisions.<sup>2</sup> Going into the 1980s there had only been three undefeated preliminary round teams,<sup>3</sup> but by 1989 there were four more including an amazing 8-0 with 24 ballots and ultimate 12-0 record.<sup>4</sup>

Streaks were continued as Harvard qualified for the NDT each year of the decade stretching its string to thirty-six consecutive years, but Northwestern failed to qualify in 1981 after winning in 1980 breaking its twenty-two year stretch. But no one managed to establish streaks in the 1980's like Dartmouth. It was possible to qualify twenty teams during the decade, Dartmouth did that; they managed to get fourteen of those twenty teams by First Round At-Large Bids and they sent sixteen of those twenty into the elimination rounds of the NDT. Perhaps more amazing, Dartmouth had at least one team in the quarter-finals of *every* NDT during the decade, they had at least one team in eight of the semi-finals during the decade, and in half of the final rounds Dartmouth was competing for the national championship — an honor they won twice. Dartmouth's total win-loss record for the 1980's at the NDT was an unbelievable 150-52, and that was handicapped by the fact that twice Dartmouth was forced to forfeit rounds because of elimination pairings of two Dartmouth teams.

Such accomplishments were generously rewarded by my survey respondents, but before looking at those subjective evaluations a closer look at the objective evidence might be in order. There are probably three important criteria to consider when attempting to measure the overall BEST for a particular year, the First Round At-Large Rankings, the NDT Preliminary Round Seeding, and the NDT Final Results. The following, year by year breakdown, provides that very information for your examination and comparison.

YEAR	NO. 1 AT-LARGE	NDT TOP SEED	NDT WINNER
1980	GEORGETOWN (Kirkland & Thompson) 23rd Seed — Did Not Break!	HARVARD (7-1) (Bredehoft & Foutz) 3rd At-Large/2nd Place	NORTHWESTERN (Dripps & Fulkerson) 5th At-Large/3rd Seed
1981	DARTMOUTH (Smith & Weinhardt) 3rd Seed/2nd Place	KENTUCKY (8-0/23) (Jones & Mancuso) 2nd At-Large/3rd Place	PITTSBURGH Alberty & Marzen) 4th At-Large/5th Seed
1982	KANSAS (Gidley & Grant) 12th Seed/Octos	DARTMOUTH (7-1) (Jacobsohn & Weinhardt) 6th At-Large/3rd Place*	LOUISVILLE Sutherland & Sutherland) 5th At-Large/4th Seed
1983	SAMFORD (Gardner & Walker) 2nd Seed/3rd Place	DARTMOUTH (8-0/20) Gail & Koulogeorge) 6th At-Large/3rd Place	KANSAS (Gidley & Payne) 5th At-Large/6th Seed
1984	DARTMOUTH (Gail & Koulogeorge) 1st Seed/Quarters	DARTMOUTH (8-0/24) (Gail & Koulogeorge) 1st At-Large/1st Place	DARTMOUTH (Gail & Koulogeorge) 1st At-Large/1st Seed
1985	CLAREMONT McKENNA (Bloom & Mastel)	BAYLOR (7-1) (Dyer & Robbins)	HARVARD Massey & Swaine)
1986	MASSACHUSETTS (Povinelli & Friedman) 9th Seed/Octos	DARTMOUTH (7-1) (Jaffe & Mahoney) 2nd At-Large/Quarters	KENTUCKY (Brownell & Papka) 11th At-Large/3rd Seed
1987	BAYLOR (Robbins & Vincent) 2nd Seed/1st Place	KANSAS (8-0/22) (Culver & Lopez) 2nd At-Large/Octos	BAYLOR (Robbins & Vincent) 1st At-Large/2nd Seed
1988	NORTHWESTERN (Attias & Mitchell) 2nd Seed/Quarters	DARTMOUTH (7-1) (Martin & Wick) 2nd At-Large/1st Place	DARTMOUTH (Martin & Wick) 2nd At-Large/1st Seed
1989	BAYLOR (Loeber & Plants) 2nd Seed/1st Place	MICHIGAN (8-0/22) (Schrank & Thompson) 3rd At-Large/2nd Place	BAYLOR (Loeber & Plants) 1st At-Large/2nd Seed

This review of the decade finds Dartmouth listed nine times, with only Baylor even close with five listings. Clearly it was Dartmouth's decade, a dominance which has *never* been equalled and one which was clearly recognized by the forensic community in my 1989 survey. Thirty-one of the forty individuals who had been active in forensics throughout the decade responded.<sup>5</sup> Each coach was asked to rank their Top Five in every category, points were then allocated (5 for first, 4 for second, etc.), to the right of the listings you find their total points and their total number of first rankings as well as the total number of ballots they were ranked on out of the thirty-one possible. As in The Best of the 1970's there seemed to be consensus on most categories.

### THE BEST DEBATERS OF THE 1980s

1)	Lenny Gail, Dartmouth **/**	104	(16 Firsts/24)
2)	Lyn Robbins, Baylor ***/**/*	91	( 6 Firsts/25)
3)	Steve Mancuso, Kentucky *	31	( 2 Firsts/10)
4)	Danny Povinelli, Mass. ***/**/*	27	(/11)
5)	Jeff Jones, Kentucky *	26	( 1 First/11)

This was justifiably one of the closest categories with Lenny Gail edging Lyn Robbins. Unfortunately their peak years did not overlap, unlike the 1970's where Tom Rollins and Robert Feldhake were taking turns being first and second speakers for a four year period. Of course, Lenny did not compete his senior year so his opportunities were more limited. He did however, maximize his limited NDT appearances as the next category would suggest.

### THE BEST TEAMS OF THE 1980s

1)	Gail & Koulogeorge, Dartmouth ***/**	104	(16 Firsts/24)
2)	Robbins & Vincent, Baylor *	55	( 4 Firsts/15)
3)	Jones & Mancuso, Kentucky ***/**	54	( 3 Firsts/16)
4)	Bredehoft & Foutz, Harvard **	34	( 3 Firsts/16)
5)	Gidley & Payne, Kansas *	29	(/11)

This category was not particularly close, in 1984 Gail and Koulogeorge were 8-0 with 24 ballots and went on to win the NDT in undefeated fashion. What is perhaps more amazing is, that they perhaps should have done it they year before as sophomores. They were again 8-0, not quite with 24 ballots however, and were paired against their other team in the semis. If Ken Strange made a mistake in the 1980s it might have been in sending the seniors on, after Gail and Koulogeorge had defeated the same Kansas team in the prelims on the same side Dartmouth would lose in the finals. It is perhaps that knowledge and the fact that Gail and Koulogeorge retired after their junior years which prompted the voters to overwhelmingly place them first. Robbins and Vincent were only a team their senior year. During the interceding years Lyn Robbins debated with Mark Dyer and undoubtedly split the votes as they were ranked on six ballots for a total of 18 points. But it would be difficult to argue with Gail and Koulogeorge, destiny may have played a part as they debated each other in the finals of NFL Nationals their senior year in high school with Koulogeorge from Glenbrook South defeating Gail from Maine East. They then closed out the Novice Nationals Tournament as freshmen before finally being paired as sophomores for their historic streak!



(The 1984 NDT Awards Ceremony has David Zarefsky presenting the Larmon Trophy to Lenny Gail and Mark Koulogeorge with Tom Lyon and Ken Strange looking on.)



The 1980s found some other categories making changes, namely in the BEST TOURNAMENT OF THE DECADE. Here respondents simply listed their top five hosts of NDT tournaments during the decade, from the 1970's Heart of America was replaced as number one and the NDT itself moved up to number two:

1)	WAKE FOREST "Dixie Classic"	104	(12 Firsts/27)
2)	THE N.D.T.	76	( 8 Firsts/21)
3)	NORTHWESTERN "Owen Coon"	65	( 1 First/21)
4)	KANSAS "Heart of America"	62	( 5 Firsts/20)
5)	DARTMOUTH "The Great Freezeout"	41	( 1 First/14)

Dartmouth did regain its number one standing in the results of the TOP NDT HOSTS.

1)	DARTMOUTH, 1986	136	(17 Firsts/31)
2)	GONZAGA, 1985	63	( 4 Firsts/15)
3)	UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, 1980	58	( 6 Firsts/17)
4)	UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, 1984	45	( /19)
5)	CSU POMONA, 1981	43	( 1 First/16)

There was no real consensus on THE BEST TOPIC OF THE DECADE, but clearly the forensic community prefers international topics:

1)	SPACE, 1984-85	85	(8 Firsts)
2)	NATO, 1987-88	81	(2 Firsts)
3)	INTERVENTION IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 1982-83	69	(8 Firsts)
4)	FIRST AMENDMENT, 1986-87	52	(3 Firsts)
5)	INCREASE FOREIGN MILITARY COMMITMENTS, 1980-81	45	(3 Firsts)

It should come as no surprise that Ken Strange was the overwhelming selection as BEST COACH, the preceding statistics and categories provide rather compelling evidence to his accomplishments. Even before assuming the coaching duties at Dartmouth in 1981 Ken had established himself at Augustana College in Illinois, first as an assistant with an equally impressive record accumulated by Robert Feldhake and Rick Godfrey and later with his own teams from Augustana, qualifying both teams at the 1980 NDT. During the decade of the 1980's Ken has never failed to qualify the maximum number of teams for the NDT and has, as the introduction to this article suggested, dominated the National Tournament in truly remarkable fashion. Nor is it surprising to find Donn Parson in the number two slot, Kansas has been among the top five NDT programs for the twenty odd years Donn has been coach there. He is the *only* repeater from the 1970s Best and only his retirement from coaching in 1988 will prevent him from being found in the Best of the 1990s. Taking that charge will be his successor 'Robin' Rowland who was at Baylor the first half of the decade leading them to their national title in 1987 before taking over at Kansas where he promptly got two teams to the quarters of the 1989 NDT.

#### THE BEST COACH OF THE 1980s

1)	KEN STRANGE, Dartmouth	126	(21 Firsts/27)
2)	DONN PARSON, Kansas	61	( 5Firsts/19)
3)	DALLAS PERKINS, Harvard	51	(/19)
4)	ROBERT ROWLAND, Baylor/Kansas	37	( 2 Firsts/15)
5)	ROGER SOLT, Kentucky	33	(/11)



**DONN PARSON**

After 24 years of distinguished service as Director of Forensics at the University of Kansas DONN PARSON recently announced his retirement from that position. Donn was truly both a teacher and a coach. Having received an M.A. from the University of Wisconsin and a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota he constantly emphasized the fact that debate was an exercise in "substantive communication." A lesson well learned by his many students in their more than 20,000 rounds of competitive debate during his tenure. This combination of teacher and coach was also reflected in the well deserved recognition which Donn continued to receive throughout the years. Three times his teams captured the NDT National Championship while on four other occasions they reached the semifinal round. In 1971 he was honored as the Georgetown University "Coach of the Year". At the University of Kansas itself he was recognized with the 1983 Chancellor Club Award as that school's Outstanding Teacher. His national stature in the activity was further testified to by his charter membership since 1976 on all four of the Associated Press Presidential Debate Evaluation Panels. In the Best of the 1970s Donn finished as the Fourth Best Coach and moved up to Second in the 1980s. Clearly his colleagues view his departure as a significant loss. Fortunately for the University of Kansas Donn will continue to serve as an active member of the Department of Speech.

In the most subjective and closest category Roger Solt prevented a clean Dartmouth sweep by winning as Best Judge of the Decade. It is hard to determine what criteria voters used, but one thing is for certain if these five ever comprised a panel we might never find out the result. Ken Strange is the only repeat from The Best of the 1970s in this category, a distinction which was obviously achieved while at Augustana.

#### THE BEST JUDGE OF THE 1980s

1)	ROGER SOLT, Kentucky	70	(8 Firsts/17)
2)	KEN STRANGE, Dartmouth	69	(8 Firsts/20)
3)	DALLAS PERKINS, Harvard	46	(3 Firsts/14)
4)	DAVE HINGSTMAN, Iowa	27	(1 First/ 9)
5)	ROSS SMITH, Wake Forest	21	(2 Firsts/7)

If one characteristic has come through with this survey compared to the Best of the 1970s it is the growing importance of The National Debate Tournament, or perhaps increased recognition of its changing and improving structure. In the Best of the 1970s the best team never won the NDT or even reached the semi-finals, the NDT itself finished a poor third among Best Tournaments; but the Best of the 1980s reflects a consistent acceptance of the NDT results as being a meaningful indicator for the year. As I ended my first survey by saying, if the debaters, teams, tournaments, coaches and judges named here were not, in fact, the "best" according to some more scientifically objective measure, they were the "best" in the memories of thirty-one individuals who were in a position to venture their opinions. I hope you find the results as interesting as I found them enjoyable to compile.

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#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> William Southworth, "The Decade's BEST in Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1981

<sup>2</sup> 1981 Pittsburgh 5-0 over Dartmouth, 1985 Harvard 5-0 over Iowa; and 1986 Kentucky 5-0 over Georgetown.

<sup>3</sup> 1971 University of Georgia; 1977 and 1979 Northwestern University.

<sup>4</sup> 1981 Kentucky; 1983 and 1984 Dartmouth; and 1989 Michigan.

<sup>5</sup> The thirty-one who responded were: Bill Balthrop, University of North Carolina, John Bart, Augustana College South Dakota, Jay Busse, Loyola-Marymount University, Becky Bjork, University of Utah, Ralph Carbone of Butler (?), David Cheshier of Georgetown University, Scott Deatherage of Northwestern, Rich Edwards now of Baylor, Bob Gass of CSU Fullerton, Chester Gibson of West Georgia, John Gossett of University of North Texas, Sherry Hall of Harvard, Scott Harris of Louisville, Bill Henderson of Northern Iowa, Dave Hingstman of Iowa, Tom Holihan of USC, Al Johnson of Colorado College, John Katsulas of Boston College, Randy Lake of USC, Allan Loudon of Wake Forest, Steve Mancuso of Michigan, Bill Newnam of Emory, Ed Panetta of University of Georgia, Dallas Perkins of Harvard, Neil Phillips of Northern Iowa, Robert Rowland of University of Kansas, Ross Smith of Wake Forest, Bill Southworth of the University of Redlands, Ken Strange of Dartmouth, Walter Ulrich now of Northern Iowa, and Melissa Wade of Emory.

\*Top Speaker/NDT Champion; \*\* Second Speaker/Second Place NDT; \*\*\*Third Speaker/Third Place NDT

# The 1989 Final Round Transcript

When West Point began publishing THE REPORT ON THE NDT its primary purpose was to publish the Final Round Transcript. We are pleased to include the transcript from this year's final round in *The Report on the 43rd National Debate Tournament*. Since the NDT left West Point the final round transcript has at various points been transcribed for publication in *The Journal of the American Forensic Association* and for the past four years published in *Championship Debates & Speeches*, a yearly publication put out jointly by SCA and AFA. The enclosed transcript was done jointly by Larry G. Schnoor, Prof. of Communications, Chair and Director of Forensics at Mankato State University. Larry is also Vice-President for Tournament Administration of the National Forensic Association and Chair of the AFA-NIET Board of Trustees and is the new co-editor for the publication. The individual who transcribed the NDT Final Round was Dr. Christina L. Reynolds, Asst. Professor of Communication and Theatre Arts at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, and is also Executive Secretary of the National Forensic Association. We are indebted to their efforts and cooperation in the reproduction of this transcript. The *1989 Championship Debates & Speeches* will be available in January from AFA or SCA for a nominal price. The publication includes all the speeches at the National Individual Events Tournament as well as the final round transcripts in CEDA and NDT, a publication well worth adding to your library. At the completion of the transcript the five judges of the final round have submitted a brief summary of their reasons for decision.

## **AFFIRMATIVE**

### **UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN**

First Affirmative Speaker, Andrew Schrank  
Second Affirmative Speaker, Joe Thompson

## **NEGATIVE**


### **BAYLOR UNIVERSITY**

First Negative Speaker, Daniel Plants  
Second Negative Speaker, Martin Loeber

## **FINAL ROUND PANEL**

John Bart, Augustana College South Dakota  
Erik Doxtader, Northwestern University  
Gloria Cabada-Leman, Wake Forest University  
Ross Smith, Wake Forest University  
Roger Solt, University of Kentucky

**THE DECISION WAS 4-1 FOR THE NEGATIVE BAYLOR UNIVERSITY**



In the "flop" debate film of 1988 "LISTEN TO ME" the duel between NDT Harvard and tiny CEDA team occurred before the Supreme Court. In real life the NDT panel didn't quite measure up — we only had five! Ross Smith, Roger Solt, Gloria Cabada-Leman, Erik Doxtader and John Bart formed the quintet — all they needed were black robes!

## FIRST AFFIRMATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE — MICHIGAN (Andrew Schrank)

Contention one: African population is uncontrolled. African population growth rates are uniquely high. Ungar of American University wrote in 1989:

“Africa’s population has grown geometrically and is continuing to grow by 3.2 percent a year, faster than any place else . . . population will double by the year 2005”

Recent cutbacks in U.S. government support for family planning programs undermine the most successful efforts to control African population. Egelberger of CFR proves inherency and solvency in 1986:

“The US has cut support to the two organizations that have the best outreach in Africa and are in the best position to tailor programs to particular economic, cultural and social needs. These cuts must be reversed. New programs should be started. Otherwise an effective approach to one of Africa’s most serious problems will be thwarted.”

We offer the following *plan* to be adopted through normal means. The U.S. will resume funding of agencies that allow abortions, specifically the IPPF and UNFPA in a manner consistent with previous guidelines. U.S. will increase support for African family planning and education programs in order to provide reasonable access to birth control. Programs will educate men and women in basic family planning and related health practices. Programs will utilize community based outreach system. The U.S. will monitor and oversee programs and support for population control will be banned. Any necessary funding to be reallocated from existing development aid to Africa outside the Egypt project from within existing agency budgets. Enforcement through normal means. Relevant actors abroad including the French, African Muslims and Soviets shall be first consulted with an open mind toward their non-coercive suggestions or contributions. Speech shall serve as intent.

Two: African population exceeds carrying capacity. Harrison of Earthwatch explains how population breaches carrying capacity in Africa, in 1987:

“When population densities pass a certain threshold forest are cleared. Fallow periods are cut back so trees do not have time to grow. Livestock population expand and overgraze the land. Soil fertility is not retained and crop yields fall. Everything conspires to reduce the vegetation and amount of organic matter in the soil which binds it together so it resists erosion.”

Pat Hold of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff added in '86:

“Drought was clearly the proximate cause of the recent famine but the principal cause is that Africa has the world’s highest population growth rate. This has led to more intensive agriculture, overfarming and overgrazing land that is marginal at best so all across the continent there is the making of an ecological disaster.”

Reduced population pressures will buy time for policy makers to solve carrying capacity problems. This will also prove that speciation doesn’t occur. Simmons in '86:

“Under conditions of rapid population growth resources must be shared by increasing numbers possibly outstripping regenerative capacities. Degradation of water, soil and cover in LDCs undermines development by constraining improvements in health, agricultural production and infrastructure. Rapid population, or rapid exploitation of resources attributable to increasing population can also lead to irreversible changes such as species loss. Countries with very high rates may be least able to intervene to protect environments. Slower population growth may give them greater opportunity to acquire the economic or political capacity to do so before the resource is exhausted.”

Africa is very densely populated considering its lack of usable land and resources. Muscat, World Bank, '85:

“Africa it seems vast and empty. On closer inspection it appears very crowded indeed. Population density is just one side of the equation. About 80 percent of the continent cannot be considered cultivatable.”

The economic and environmental problems of Africa are so severe that normal adjustment mechanisms fail. Development alone will not slow population growth. Lester Brown explained in '87:

“Where growth is beginning to overwhelm local life support systems, leading to ecological deterioration and declining living standards, once this begins rapid population growth and ecological deterioration feed on each other pushing countries into a demographic trap.”

He continued,

“Rapid population growth and the associated ecological and economic deterioration may prevent them from reaching the final stage. Such a regression is already evident in Africa.”

Market solutions fail in Africa due to economic and political underdevelopment. Merrick of Georgetown, '86:

“The optimism of those who criticize limits to growth thinking is based on the assumption markets have full play, but this is questionable in light of economic and political realities. Getting the right set of prices needed to generate responses that will conserve resources and preserve the environment as population grows depends on the distribution of economic and political power within and between countries. Arriving at the right prices on a worldwide basis won’t be easy. Interest groups in more developed markets like the US manipulate markets for purposes far removed from safeguarding of resources. LDCs, poor and debt burdened LDCs may not be able or willing to pay the prices that are right in market terms in order to balance resources and environmental preservation with population.”

For a number of specific reasons African markets are uniquely ineffective. The NAS, '86:

“Africa appears to be particularly vulnerable to problems induced by population growth. Independence and modernization came to Africa later than to other areas. Markets are generally least well developed in Africa. Factionalism is greatest and human resource potential is least developed. Adaptive responses are not automatic; they are constrained by natural conditions such as the limited responsiveness of soils to intensification. Furthermore, the institutional change and other adaptive responses will have to be unusually rapid in developing countries simply because population growth rates are more rapid. Adaptation may be particularly difficult in the case of forests and fisheries because collective action is necessary to remove the common property aspects of the problem. Fixing institutions or establishing new ones may be difficult especially where there are long standing political inadequacies as may be the case in Africa.”

High population growth rates overwhelm technological gains. Mecken of Princeton, '86:

“One argument advanced in favor of population growth is that increases would stimulate technologies. The

NAS conclusion was that there were economies of scale so that cities were more productive only up to a moderate level of size. Since much of the developing world depends on imported technology, density would have little effect on innovation. Technical progress is likely to be outweighed by reductions in productivity, particularly in densely populated areas. There is little evidence that slower growth would hamper innovation."

Theoretical arguments defending the ability to adapt to population growth are completely refuted by Africa's realistic abysmal economic performance. Ungar, '89:

"Where Africa's GNP grew at 5 percent a year during the '60s by '82 growth had stopped. Out of twelve countries that have actually seen their per capita income fall nine are in Africa. With population increasing rapidly African income is in effect racing backward."

Three: Overpopulation is disastrous. A is Ecodice. Overpopulation is deforesting Africa at a rate exceeding natural adjustment mechanisms, jeopardizing the ecosystem. Faruquee, World Bank, '83:

"Population pressure has also manifested itself in the growing scarcity of fuelwood. Forests have been reduced and fuelwood has become limited. Africa has only 6 percent of its land in closed forest against 15 in Asia and 33 in Latin America. Population growth is outstripping new tree growth. There is a trend towards deforestation threatening the ecosystem."

Species extinction occurs at a rate threatening human survival. The entire habitat is gone so it can't be replaced by natural mechanisms. Jablonski, Chicago, '86:

"Our species is on the brink of causing the worst mass extinction in 65 million years. The very species that provide medicines, raw materials and climate regulation are being driven into extinction forever beyond our reach. It is up to us to reverse this trend. There is still hope for this reversal before many of the species we hold dear including our own also go the way of the dinosaur."

Global warming results. Postel of World watch in December:

"Deforestation is adding to the atmospheric pool of carbon dioxide, hastening the onset of induced climate change, arguably the most threatening environmental problem of modern times."

CO<sub>2</sub> induced warming will risk world conflict. Wirth of the NRDC, Spring '88:

"Warming will potentially fuel turbulent regional conflicts that could upset the global balance of power. Loss of territory could create refugee problems. Competition over territory could create or exacerbate strife. Famine created by greenhouse drive crop failures could generate clashes that might encourage the major powers to take sides. Such acceleration in showdowns among the superpowers would destabilize the world balance in highly unpredictable ways tempting those countries that already have a tendency toward global adventurism and placing U.S. security at risk. The greenhouse effect if unchecked is likely to cause unpredictable disruptions in the balance of power worldwide, exacerbating the risk of war."

While rapid temperatures may provide some benefits, these can't be captured with rapid climate change. Lester Brown in '89:

"It is still argued by some that climate change will have positive effects and that societies can readily cope. But he ignores the extraordinary rate of change and the impossibility of adjusting quickly enough. Scientists believe that the pace will soon overwhelm natural variability. Indeed it can be compared with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt natural systems."

B is war. Overpopulation aggravates the conditions which cause it. Dr. Choucri of MIT:

"Population variables tend to produce a multiplier effect in that they exacerbate prevailing strains and stresses in society. The evidence is persuasive concerning such effects upon internal conflict and there is indication that the same type of impact prevails with respect to international violence."

Five specific scenarios are isolated. The first is internal instability caused by overpopulation. Choucri gives the link:

"In nineteen of the forty-five cases the pressures of population appeared to have had an important effect upon the ensuing conflict. In ten of these cases population pressures were major central or sole determinants of violent conflict. Such pressures contributed to internal political instabilities and hostile behavior appeared to emerge from internal pressures."

Second, wars of aggression are caused by environmental strain. Professor Leroy, '78:

"Rapid population growth appears to produce strain which in turn is related to aggressiveness. Any society regardless of its density lives in symbiosis with its environment. Any society is capable of applying technology to its environment in such a way that the ecological balance will be disturbed resulting in strain that may contribute to a climate in which war would be an attractive prospect."

Third, migration induced by overpopulation can and has caused wars in Africa. John Forje, Research Group on African Development in '85:

"The Congo crisis, the Nigeria civil war, famine in Ethiopia, the repressive attitude of the South Africa government toward frontline states all indicate a correlation between resources, environment, poverty and threat to national and international security. Resource exploitation and the destruction of the environment in Africa if allowed to continue unchecked would eventually become an issue of social conflict with wide and devastating military implications. The population of Africa is growing rapidly and the environment is fast deteriorating. The number of the people on the run throughout Africa explains the situation facing Africa. More than political refugees in Africa are the environmental refugees. The destruction of their ecological base that can no longer support its growing population. The misuse of resources in Africa paved the way for environmental refugees and the number is steadily increasing. Environmental revolutions and eventually environmental wars will soon become a common feature in Africa. The issue is vividly expressed by Tatcher, UN Environment program: The ultimate choice is between conservation and conflict. Trees now or tanks later."

Four, overpopulation generates large young populations making nations more explosive. Wallerstein, professor at SUNY in '87:

"The state department coordinator of population argued that rapid population increases led to a demographic distribution skewed toward younger cohorts. This younger age group, frequently unemployed and crowded, is particularly susceptible to terrorism and violence. These add up to an increasing potential for social unrest, economic and political instability, mass migration and possible international conflicts."

Five, the African wars . . . Finally allowing death checks to solve population pressures will create hostility toward the



north and a war between north and south. Lean, '78:

"There is an ominous side to the slowing of population growth. While most of it is due to falling birth rates part of it comes from rising deaths. This points up our choice. It is certain that population growth will return to near zero before many more have been born. Will this happen the easy way through declining births or will it come through a catastrophic rise in deaths? On the one hand there is the prospect of sharing internationally. This would not only reduce population growth but also look after the people already here. The more population grows, the more this will be needed. The alternative is neglect; and that is likely to lead not only to famine and disease but social breakdown and maybe war of unprecedented destruction. After all, people do not blame themselves for being born."

He continues,

"If by some tragedy the rich nations of the world were to act upon the lifeboat theory, big holes could be blown in them by the nuclear bombs likely to be in the hands of third world countries and terrorist groups."

Wars induced by overpopulation can escalate. Dr. Johnson, World Bank, '87:

"The possibility of escalation cannot be ruled out in any of these conflicts. Thus a little local difficulty, fundamentally caused by the imbalance between population and resources in one particular country or region may grow and spread like a forest fire until the flames of that fire may one day truly engulf the world."

African conflicts are uniquely escalatory because there are no rules for engagement. Brown of Howard in '86:

"We have also noted a seemingly self energizing dynamic of crisis escalation resulting in the incremental engulfment of the superpowers in crisis because neither superpower has high stakes in Africa and both are therefore paradoxically disinclined to clarify their interests. This common determination to maintain fluidity and uncertainty, however, can only operate to heighten misperception and miscommunication and consequently to further the disposition of each to intervene in a crisis that seems to be evolving in a direction perceived to be to its strategic disadvantage."

Four, we solve. Fertility reductions are the most important mechanisms for slowing population growth. Goliber of Futures Group, '85:

"Changes in fertility are much more important than changes in mortality in determining the future size of Africa's populations. Now death rates have dropped to the point where fertility becomes the key component in population growth."

Fertility rates can be reduced without economic growth. Brown writes:

"As some recent experiences show, countries with well-designed family planning programs that encourage small families can often bring fertility down even without the widespread economic gains that characterized the demographic transition in the industrial societies."

African attitudes are changing, making fertility reduction possible. Robert Press of the CSM in '87:

"Interest in family planning has changed dramatically according to Dr. Peter Lamptey. Interest has grown because of the greater availability of information, a worsening economy and increased educational levels. African women are paying more attention to family planning. People are realizing they cannot afford big families."

We can work effectively within their culture. World Bank Report Africa '86:

"Within traditional norms there is considerable untapped scope for regulating fertility programs to support family planning can build on African tradition of spacing births to give mother and baby a good start."

Education can change their attitudes. The World Bank in '86:

"Education about family planning can help influence attitudes toward favoring smaller families. Information can come about as a part of family planning programs."

Community based distribution or CBD solves. Birdsall and Sai, World Bank, '88:

"Community based distribution is effective for community workers have strong community ties that help them build a closer rapport with clients than unfamiliar health professionals may be able to achieve."

Paul Harrison adds empirical solvency and predictive harms in '87:

"The striking success of family planning programs in Zimbabwe and around Nven in Kenya suggest that rapid breakthroughs may be possible despite Africa's sustained high fertility. Health workers and midwives can be taught to promote prolonged breastfeeding and wider child spacing by traditional methods both of which reduce infant mortality and fertility together. On past trends a future of famines, ecological disasters and wars over future resources lies ahead for Africa with a combination of conservation based agricultural development and measures aimed directly and indirectly at reducing fertility as much better perspective up."

More empirical examples from Birdsall and Sai:

"In the few places in Africa where family planning services are widely available, use of contraception is high. In Chogoris, Kenya, a pilot program provides easily accessible health and family planning services and follow up. About 27 percent of the couples use modern contraception, compared with roughly 8 percent for the country as a whole. In a rule project in Zaire the contraceptive prevalence rate is roughly 25 percent against a country-wise average of 3 percent. In Zimbabwe and Botswana, 27 percent and 19 percent respectively of married couples use modern methods compared with the sub-Saharan average of 3-4 percent."

We free up resources for other goals thus solving quickly. Hendry '88, he's from the FAO:

"Reduction of fertility can provide time and relieve pressure on societies to direct resources toward satisfying the minimum needs of a rapidly growing and economically dependent population."

"We can extrapolate the empirical examples. World Bank, '86:

"On the basis of experience in Zimbabwe and in parts of Kenya it is possible that making services widely and regularly available could raise contraceptive prevalence rates in Africa to 25 percent in the next decade, compared with 3-4 percent today."

Finally Paul Harrison in '87:

"A reduction of only 20 percent in the birth rate would cut the effort required in food production or purchase by more than 50 percent."

**CROSS EXAMINATION: (Loeber questioning Schrank)**

**Q:** Why do markets fail?

**A:** That's a good question. A number of reasons including the fact that they don't have the economic power, ah, to get the prices to pay off the, to pay more than the rich countries do for certain resources. Also, there are gaps in the economic levels within the countries in Africa.

**Q:** Natural resources from a poor country and that provides imports revenue, right?

**A:** Import revenue usually goes to an MSC which is extracting it in the poor country, Marty.

**Q:** So your whole argument is based on this MSC thing, right?

**A:** Ah no, that's one minor one.

**Q:** Ok, what's another one?

**A:** Also the fact that they modernize (unintelligible) population growth that runs the ability of the markets to solve. Uh, there are factional problems in that the people compete for the resources and there might be ethnic difficulties according to the NAS study. There is also the fact that . . .

**Q:** Well those are all good reasons, but I mean how can you possibly overcome those?

**A:** We overcome them because the market won't have to work when there's a better balance between resources and the environment.

**Q:** But those are all reasons why any money that goes into these countries gets sucked away. The debt's too big, all of these things are problems that have nothing to do with population, they're intrinsic problems.

**A:** No. They aren't intrinsic problems. Two cards in the IAC say we solve them by freeing up resources for population,

**Q:** free up

**A:** More resources go go around, they used them on things like reforestation when there are more resources, according to Simmons, ah, which you know, ah is Africa specific evidence.

**Q:** Now, are you . . . In order to solve do you have to get a complete uh

**A:** No.

**Q:** Halting or just a slowing?

**A:** Slowing the rate of population.

**Q:** Alright. Now why does slowing down the rate solve.

**A:** Two reasons.

**Q:** When population causes the problem?

**A:** Two reasons. You don't need ZPG. That's not our argument. Our argument is that right now population growth outruns the rate of economic

**Q:** Ok, ok, what, what is the optimum

**A:** progress.

**Q:** Ok, what is the optimum rate of population growth?

**A:** We don't cite any in the IAC.

**Q:** What is it now?

**A:** 3.2+ percent.

**Q:** What does it have to go down to meet the threshold where other countries can start developing?

**A:** Oh, you know, the lower the better? Yeah, I mean there's a linear relationship.

**Q:** Yeah, so at some point there's a point at where the development is no longer hampered to the point where they can't grow anymore?

**A:** Well, that's ah, according to Harrison, once you get the prevalence rates which we're claiming off the Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana and Zaire examples. It's all on the solvency evidence.

**Q:** Well, well, how, what's this threshold? What growth rate has to be achieved in order . . .

**A:** Uh, I guess about a 25 percent prevalence rate.

**Q:** What is . . . That's not a percent growth rate. I want . . .

**A:** (unintelligible) a percent rate use of condoms, or whatever the heck they're going to use. Is that growth of economic growth or population growth?

**Q:** I've asked this question now for 2½ minutes.

**A:** Ok, if population growth and economic growth met up at some level and it was sustainable,

**Q:** Alright, what is, that's not my question. What's the threshold for population? Where do those two meet?

**A:** It depends on the economic growth and the type of development strategies that different countries are pursuing, it's not a model.

Q: So the development strategies

A: It doesn't fit the graph that your economics class takes, Marty. It's it depends, it varies from situation to situation,

Q: Alright.

A: country to country.

Q: All I'm asking you for is a number.

A: Well, then I don't know it.

Q: Ok.

#### FIRST NEGATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE — BAYLOR (Daniel Plants)

Marty and I are obviously very pleased to represent Baylor and District III in the final Round. We'd like to express our thanks to David Zarefsky and his staff, the NDT committee, and our hosts here at Miami University, Jack Rhodes and Gerald Sanders, for a well-run tournament. Additionally, we'd like to thank your coaching staff, Cary, Lynn, Griff and Dave, and especially Rich Edwards for helping us out this weekend. Also we'd like to thank the entire Baylor squad for all the help they gave us. And they should have run Canadian Subs.

The First observation: Topicality, The A subpoint: They don't change foreign policy. The A subpoint the foreign policy, the foreign policy of controlling population growth doesn't change. The B subpoint is a violation. It means that implementation change doesn't count. You have to have, you have to change the government, Melquiades Gambea, 1973:

"Once a foreign policy is decided by the proper authority it is left to the diplomatists concerned to execute or implement it. This process of execution or implementation is called negotiation. It is therefore wrong to equate diplomacy with policy. Diplomacy has nothing to do with policy; it is concerned only with negotiation. Diplomats do as they are told by the Foreign office."

C subpoint: This is a matter of interpretation. One, it preserves limits. Interpretation allows that individual laws would already allow some more planes, or would allow you to change like just water projects to Egypt or something. The second, does not equal regression. The goal here is not to hurt peace or good things like that. D subpoint topicality is a voting issue especially in the final round of NDT.

The first Disad, Bush. The A subpoint: Tower incident puts Bush agenda on the brink. CSM, March 13th:

"The battle has damaged the President's resources to push ahead this agenda says Thurber. If you use up the resources with people in the Senate, as he has, you cannot come back quickly and ask for more help on other votes."

The B subpoint: They further his agenda. First, quick victory is needed to recoup losses from Tower defeat. Fly and Harbrecht, March 20:

"What Bush needs more than anything is a quick victory. That would take some of the sting out of the expected loss of the Tower nomination and help refute charges that his administration is floundering."

Second, plan is popular. Family planning is very popular. Morain says in 1988:

"While recent polls indicate some 76 percent of the American people believe we should support birth control in developing countries."

Also, the UN, the UN is independently popular. Luck in '89:

"Accordingly to the latest Gallup poll, the American people think more highly of the work of the UN than at any point in the past two decades."

Success of course is on the agenda in '88:

"Public support serves as an integral component of power because it provides a president with leverage over other decision makers. The most recent opinion poll provides an indication of whether it is wise or foolish to resist Presidential persuasion."

The Impact: ASATS. ASATS are on the brink. *Aviation Technology*, March 6th:

"Theatre military commanders have thrown their support behind the Pentagon's new antisatellite program which could influence Congress to reconsider its longstanding opposition."

That could cause war. Gottfried in '85:

"These ASATs would bring about a highly unstable and dangerous situation because both the superpowers would be extremely dependent upon vulnerable satellite systems."

Next Disad: Gorbachev. A. They increase US influence. 1984:

"Over and over again it's been shown that population assistance such as the one Washington wants and handing out development aid or giving weapons is an instrument of foreign policy. Population aid . . . has been the best improvement the U.S. has ever made."

The B subpoint is that the U.S. gains destroy Gorbachev. Ullman, '88:

"Worse still for Gorbachev, foreign affairs are a potential source of his undoing. If those who oppose his domestic reforms can show that Gorbachev's policies have eroded the geopolitical position of the Soviet state and also its adversaries to make inroads that might threaten Soviet security, his days in office will be numbered."

"The Impact is A: it causes war. Walker in '88:

"Glasnost and reform may indeed be too good to last and it could end in tears. When they get Gorbachev it means war. They will need the army, KGB, the Stalinists the old Brezhnev backs. And the first thing they will do is purge everybody who supported Gorbachev. It will be like Stalin's time again. So we will have a whole new tension with the Americans just as Eastern Europe erupts in protest. And then we send the tanks in to crush the Poles or the Czechs or Hungarians. It will mean war."

The next Disad. Structural Adjustment. The economic reforms. The A subpoint: family planning stops market oriented reforms. African nations liberalizing their economies focus on the birth rate decreases reform incentives by providing an excuse not to deal with reforms. Eberstadt, '86:

"In most of the countries where they have been tried, population policies soft or hard have amounted to little more than attempts to solve through demographic tinkering economic policies that can in fact be traced to misguided governmental policies. To make a reduction of the birthrate the focus of so many high hopes is to divert attention

and political energy from the real sources of poverty and lagging economic growth in many countries of the third world.”

The B subpoint: Uniqueness. Economic adjustments are underway now. Francis, CSM, March 13th:

“One change in more than half of the 45 African nations studied in the report was a turn toward economic pragmatism and free enterprise.”

C subpoint is the impact. Structural Adjustment solves the case. It increases carrying capacity. Sklar in '88:

“Development planners of diverse ideological persuasions now believe that individual initiatives in the private sector are required to arrest and reverse Africa's current economic decline. In their view the key to the solution of the current African malaise is a release of the energies of the many million African producers. Hence they advocate movement toward freer markets and more realistic prices for products, capital, labor and foreign exchange.”

D subpoint: pre-emptive adjustment is inevitable. Delay only makes it more difficult. On number one, Camdessus in '88:

“The poor suffer during adjustment, but that they suffer even more in the absence of adjustment. When you have official prices for agricultural products that are kept artificially low in a desire to shield urban populations when you have more or less runaway inflation, when price controls are introduced and immediately give rise to black markets of all kinds, under such circumstances non adjustment means more distress no matter what anyone says.”

Now, on the Case. Now he says, at the top that population is increasing. Not according here, its population rate is slowing. Uh, Press, on February 10th, staff, CSM:

“Africa has the potential to produce enough food for its people, says Curtis Farrar, a World Bank expert on agriculture. He says while he acknowledges that a continuing high population rate it could offset production increases in so far that the growth rate is almost certain to slow. It will slow as incomes and education rise along with urbanization, and couples will have fewer children.”

Now, the next card here is that AIDS decreases. AIDS decreases, Leland in '88:

There are 5 to 10 million people carrying AIDS with the virus.”

And that solves for population growth. Way in '88:

“If the national seroprevalence rate ever were to reach the extremely high level of 10 percent future annual African population growth rates are estimated to decline from the current 3 percent to about 2 percent.”

That's what the case solvency evidence all assumes even though AIDS wasn't admitted in cross-ex.

Now. On the second contention. The harms. He says carrying capacity. The first one here is turn: population empirically increases. Bloom and Freeman, 1988:

“Despite population increasing rapidly, more rapidly than the labor force until the 1980s developing countries managed, on the whole, to improve their economic relations uh, substantially.”

The next argument here, in turn: increases capital. Eberstadt '86:

“Economists have since recognized the limitations of these models. Coale, Hoover, and his colleagues make a number of questionable assumptions. Among them that economic growth results solely from the accumulation of capital; that the rate of return on capital is fixed and that education, health care and all other forms of human consumption bear no productive returns.”

The next argument here, no decrease in development. Empirically true. Leroy '86:

“Empirical investigation of the relationship between population growth and increase in per capita income fails to confirm the generally negative association that theoretical analyses have predicted for developing countries. Thus either no significant association or a slightly positive link between population growth and income increases has been reported in several empirical studies of developing countries.”

Next, Affirmative studies are bad. Kelly in '88:

“At its most fundamental level, economics is about making choices in the face of scarcity. In the literature relating population growth, saving, and investment, the modeling of choices has been amazingly narrow, indeed, almost a-economic.”

Next, turn: increase, World Marxist Review '86:

“The Neo-Malthusian pattern is refuted by empirical data on the developing nations. There are studies showing that in India, for example, the most severe famine was observed at times of small population growth. On the contrary, there was considerable population growth in periods when there were fewer extreme manifestations of famine.”

The next argument here is that population doesn't cost. And in Watts, '86:

“The first is broadly Malthusian in the sense that the rapid growth of animal and human populations is seen to have exceeded the carrying capacity of extant resource systems. This argument is of somewhat limited utility for human populations insofar as population densities for most of the Sudano-Sahel remain quite low.”

The next is turn: increase in resources. Population causes innovation. Holden '86:

“Concern about the impact of rapid population growth on resource exhaustion has often been exaggerated. The effect has been and will probably continue to be quite weak. Increased scarcity is likely to stimulate technological advance and the search for other economics, economizing strategies although improved market functioning will be necessary.”

Also, we're proving that happens on the disad.

Next: No shortages. Kasun '88:

“Now that lead and zinc have not given out and indeed with other metals are less scarce than ever and the United States farm problem is one of the surpluses with food output burgeoning throughout the world, a new generation of economists faces a more sober public.”

Next, Tech prevents. Srinivasan, '88:

“What inference can one draw from such studies? It would appear that there is technological capability and land resources to sustain a population of as high as 33 billion.”

The next argument here is no shortages. Goeller in 1984:

“The world contains plenty of retrievable resources that can supply mankind with the necessary materials for the very long term and that these resources can probably be extracted and converted to useful forms indefinitely

with acceptable environmental consequences.”

Drop down to his argument C: It (unintelligible) the market. Cross apply over here. Disad proves this. We prove the market is internalizing the cost now. We prove that the free market will solve for these things. The evidence on the disad will, will answer all their arguments.

Now. On the B subpoint. He says its bad. The A subpoint he says is Ecocide. First. Turn: population internalizes costs solving any market imperfections and solving impact. Kasan, '88:

“The theory also applies to common property resources. It invites overexploitation but if a larger population increases the exploitation the point comes where the negative impact is felt and controls are brought to bear.”

Next turn: population equals adaptation. Repetto '87:

“Furthermore the implicit analogy to nonhuman species which don't approach man's capacity for modifying both his environment and his way of using it is faulty. From the beginning, humans have adapted to population pressures.”

Next, it doesn't hurt, it helps the environment. Hendry '88:

“Population density for example is not an infallible indicator of the pressure upon resources.”

Next, the impact is over plan. Kasan '88:

“Of course the more rational opponents of population growth admit that the recent environmental problems are not obscured (unintelligible).”

The next is their sources are flawed. Turner in '86:

“(unintelligible) these increases were obvious in 1986 when the prices (unintelligible).”

The next argument here is drop the evidence where he talks about deforestation. First, ah, the evidence overclaims. Simon in '86:

“It might well be reasonable to adjudge as quite unproven the case that large numbers of species are in danger of being lost as a result of deforestation in the next two decades.”

The next is that the earth is cooling now. Stevens, January 3rd:

“Dr. O'Brien is predicting that the present cold phase will bring about a sharp drop in the average global temperatures, reducing them to 1950s levels.”

Next, you have to have CO<sub>2</sub> to offset that. Lemonick in '87:

“The relationship between CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and global warming is more than theoretical. Two weeks ago a Soviet-French research team announced impressive evidence that CO<sub>2</sub> levels and world wide average temperatures are intimately related.”

The next argument here, the next argument here is the impact: cooling is bad. Ponte in '76:

“Relatively few people would freeze to death if the cooling trend began in 1950 continues until 2050 but perhaps two billion humans will starve to death or will die of the symptoms of chronic malnutrition.”

Next, it increases agricultural. Lagerfeld '88:

“The rising level of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere could have one important positive result. Bigger doses of CO<sub>2</sub> speed up plant photosynthesis and reduce water consumption.”

Next is that there won't be any melting. Lagerfeld in (unintelligible) Antarctica was largely unaffected by rapid global warming in the distant past.”

The last argument here is that species will survive. This is from Allmon '86:

“Extinction associated with habitat fragmentation and perhaps environmental stress may be an important factor in species multiplication. Extinction undoubtedly opens niche space that can later be filled by new lineages and may shift the overall course of evolution into new directions.”

Next is the impact. Its empirically undenied. Species adapt.

The B subpoint: war. The first argument here is that best studies conclude no war. With Ziegler 1987:

“Careful studies of the relationship between population densities and interstate aggressiveness have found no significant correlation between the two. For example, a study that was part of the Correlates of War Project, covering the period from 1815 to 1965 found no significant relationship between population density and external wars.”

Next, empirically true. Ng in '86:

“Aggressor countries are seldom heavily populated, poor countries. The world's heavily populated countries have seldom invaded other countries and do not seem to pose a threat to advanced countries.”

The next argument here is turn population, no, no, no. Uh. Next crowding doesn't equal. Ziegler '87:

“An obvious consequence for domestic politics in the United States is massive immigration of unemployed Mexicans. But the possibility of war between Mexico and the United States seems remote. This absence of international tension between the two countries seems to contradict the position of some writers who suggest that crowding by itself is a source of tension.”

Next is that refugees are empirically denied by the Ethiopia famine itself.

The next argument here is that crowding is good. Naw, no, we don't want that. The next argument here is turn: focus on rich equals rich/poor war. Family planning gives credence to the fairness claims made by the south. Hardin '86:

“Adopting the Martian principle that parochial demands should match parochial supplies would eliminate one important excuse for aggressive international actions. Implicitly thinking in one world terms easily leads to the concept of poor or have not nations. An excessive passion for justice can then easily lead to the assertion that being poor justifies corrective military action. In our thermonuclear world is there any injustice that would justify embarking on an uncontrollable war?”

Next, it can't solve. Leroy in '86:

“The significant reduction of populations resulting from disasters does not seem to bring about a reduction in frequency of war.”

Now (unintelligible) with the arguments. He says that (unintelligible) are bad. This doesn't assume AIDS. Second, it assumes poverty and deaths, etc. Which we're turning. It also doesn't assume a sexual disease.

Now on the escalation arguments, that won't happen. Soviets avoid. Huntington '87:

“All in all, however, the operational maxim of the Soviets seems to have been no Soviet interest in the Third World is worth military conflict with the United States.”

Also, this is empirically not true, we've had wars there before and they've never escalated.



Now. The solvency contention, lumped together. The first argument here is that growth turns: all this adds up that (unintelligible) is better. The second is that Africans want large families. Bethel '86:

"The absence of family planning is not the problem, problem is family planning. In short, people in developing countries have large families because they want to, not because no one ever gave them condoms or intrauterine devices."

Next, religion. Caldwell and Caldwell in '87:

"Traditional African religious values have sustained high fertility in two ways. First they have acted directly to equate fertility with the virtue and spiritual approval and to associate reproductive failure or cessation with sin. Second they have placed both positive and negative sanctions on filial piety and material homage to the older generation so that high fertility is rarely disadvantageous."

Next, male attitudes. Whitaker in '88:

"As in other societies, contraception enhances women's independence on the most basic level. African men fear of wandering wives is often expressed in the common refrain that women who use birth control will become prostitutes."

Next argument here is substitution. People that use them would use them anyway. Schultz in '88:

"First, a family planning program may assist parents in switching from one to another means to another of birth control, leaving birth rates potentially unchanged."

Next argument here is that culture prevents. Njoku, '86:

"In traditional culture family planning has not been so popular. And all over Africa, there are special rituals of gratification accorded to those who have ten or more children by one woman."

Next, best studies prove. Lappe in '86:

"Hernandez has reviewed all available research to determine the contribution of family planning programs to fertility decline. Examining the research on demographic change in 83 countries he concluded that the best studies have found little net effect from family planning programs."

Next argument here: ethnic competition equals desire for kids. Harf and Trout, '86:

"Substantial ethnic diversity in sub-Saharan Africa also contributes in many cases to high fertility. As ethnic groups within a country vie for political control, they view the size of the tribe as an important power dimension."

Next argument is momentum, they can't overcome it. The population is so large it will happen anyway. Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, 1985:

"Africa must expect that even if it takes major steps now to push family planning and that its population growth will outstrip the capacity of its economies to create jobs or of its governments to care for the extra population well into the next century."

The next argument here is that kids are economic assets. Commission on international Humanitarian Issues '85:

"Children still represent extra hands for the fields, security for old age, a symbol of potency and in some societies, a link for the spirit of parents."

Next is the availability doesn't equal use. Lappe in '86:

"What is truly pie in the sky is the notion that population growth rates can be brought down to replacement levels STOP through a narrow focus on the delivery of contraceptive technology."

#### CROSS EXAMINATION (Schrank questioning Plants)

**Q:** Ok, Danny. First of all, we caused the north-south war. How do we increase influence in the Third World?

**A:** What?

**Q:** We cause a rich-poor war, how do we increase influence, U.S. influence?

**A:** Well, you've got rich-poor, north-south confused (unintelligible).

**Q:** Oh, so this is internal gap?

**A:** Right.

**Q:** Ok, so we increase the economic gap inside Third World countries?

**A:** Right.

**Q:** Can I see that evidence? Um, and, while you're getting the evidence, how does the market value decline of the world?

**A:** Well, it, uh, values it pretty highly. Like notice [some of the dams] and

**Q:** Ok, so, so will the market

**A:** The market response to perceived environmental degradation off of fluorocarbons.

**Q:** So the economic market responds to environmental degradation in order to warm the earth?

**A:** What?

**Q:** If the market, your system is the market. You're defending the market as the solution to resource constraints. Will you defend that the market will increase warming?

**A:** Well, not if cooling is the appropriate response.

**Q:** If cooling is the appropriate response? How do you know, right? It's one or the other, isn't it?

**A:** Our argument is that the market can take, can take like relative prices and demand for things and production outputs and they can equilibrate them so that in the end socially optimal —

**Q:** Right, right.

**A:** Like environmental levels are achieved.

Q: Right, right, right.

A: So, if we would learn that we should pump the environment full of CO<sub>2</sub> that

Q: But how do you learn?

A: that, that

Q: Right? I mean the fact that we've got different people in the IAC and the INC contesting what's going on now, what causes it and what the impact is there too, doesn't that prove that the market cannot internalize the cost and can't figure out what the heck's going on?

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: Because for one thing, we're not anywhere near the brink of warming.

Q: Really? Well, what does our evidence say?

A: I don't know.

Q: If we're not near the brink

A: My evidence says, my evidence says that if anything, there's an underlying cooling trend.

Q: Ok, so then ok. So how long till we cool?

A: I don't know.

Q: You don't know?

A: The evidence says

Q: So how the market know?

A: The evidence says that there is a long term cooling.

Q: So how does the market know?

A: I don't really think this is an indictment of the market. The fact

Q: Why not? You can't, why not?

A: You don't understand what our argument is. Our argument is that when you have a complete economy that's full of people then

Q: Now is the market complete? Where's the evidence saying the market's complete?

A: For one thing, the evidence on the disad proves that the imperfections in the, in the Third World economies are being solved by market reforms. You're assuming

Q: Where's the card that says

A: That's because they don't have complete markets.

Q: Danny, Danny, Danny. Another question. I'm a peasant farmer in Africa. Right? I have a small plot of land, a subsistence farm just feeding my family. There's a rich agribusiness next door, they have a ton of money.

A: Uh hmmm.

Q: The market internalizes the cost. What does that mean? Jack up the price, take my land, right?

A: I'll give you examples of what

Q: Is that true? Would they take the land? Probably?

A: Ah,

Q: The price would go up.

A: Would who take the land?

Q: The rich agribusiness. Isn't that what happens when the market, when the market internalizes the cost? If land is there, land becomes more expensive.

A: If there was, is this a question?

Q: Yes. What happens to the poor?

A: If there was a high demand for the products of that industry, then the people, the peasant farmer would be able to charge a high price for some of his land since this company would have to pay a lot of

Q: Ok.

A: a lot of money since they're going to make a lot of money off their products. The guy would get paid a lot of money.

Q: But wait. Doesn't the, doesn't the agribusiness have a lot more leverage, can't they — because they have a monopoly of land of the market in that region — able to?

A: That's an assertion on your part. In an effectively functioning market that would not happen.

## SECOND AFFIRMATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE — MICHIGAN (Joe Thompson)

If the market could manage resources sufficiently Africa wouldn't be dying right now. Topicality at the top. First the counterstandards should not be limited. There are a number of topics available allowing clash to occur. Limiting to the resolution risks turning all topicality into topicality debate. For the purposes of topicality the resolution has been met. Topicality only serves to provide a starting point. As to our prior discussion we've been running this case since round one of the year.

Second argument. Second argument is we meet: we change the goal. We declare population neutral. Mexico City — we reverse that. Murray, '85:

"The U.S. delegation reversed its decision completely. U.S. delegates argued that population growth was a neutral phenomenon and that the key to slowing the growth in numbers was a free market."

Next argument is, the next argument is that the U.S. right now wants to destroy all family planning. We stop that. Jacobsen '88:

"Many critics believe the revised policy was meant to undermine family planning in general, using the abortion issue as a wedge. Unless the next administration takes steps early to abolish this policy, the toll in women's lives will even rise higher."

"Next argument is we change the goal. Right now we don't fund multilateral agencies, the ones that allow abortion. We clearly change that.

The next argument is infinite regression. You can always find another goal that we don't meet. When making Africa stable or stopping a nuclear war you can say we don't change that goal.

Next argument; it's arbitrary. Depending on who decides what the goals are, there is no way you can decide who meets it.

Next argument is foreign policy methods or mechanisms. Foreign policy for foreign rights. Legal Dictionary, '48:

"As far as instituting methods for achieving (unintelligible) you can also claim use of the mechanisms of foreign policy."

Next, it's not abusive. They can always just run not substantial or something and change that. We massively increase foreign family planning aid; I think we're topical. I just said abortion above.

Bush disad. At the top. First argument, first argument if he was that powerful pre-Tower he should have gotten Tower through. That proves the disad can be denied. Hence a turn: Most people hate family planning, they fear a domestic tradeoff. Galston and Makins '88:

"They cannot justify foreign aid, even economic assistance to the poorer countries, at a time when in their view so many essential needs are going unmet at home"

Next is that people hate family planning aid. Menken '86:

"But the debate on population has now been reopened. U.S. support for international family planning assistance has come under concerted attack from elements of that political right from those who are opposed to what they view as inappropriate governmental interference and from the anti-abortion movement."

Next argument: its not unique. Bush will do more to our African policy in the near future. Wayne on February 22nd, '89:

"Bush has identified three initial priority areas: Angola-Namibia, revising approaches to apartheid and getting a handle Horn."

Next argument is that Congress will use budget policies as litmus test no matter what he does. Felton in February 25th of '89:

"Members of Congress are focusing instead on what they cannot yet see: The President's underlying intent on the budget and his approach to Central American, arms control and relations with the Soviet Union."

Next argument is the Tower fight didn't kill him. Felton, February of '89:

"We don't believe this speaks to any larger question of bipartisanship, Fitzwater said. Those words could have been spoken by just about any Democrat in the Senate."

Next argument is Contra Aid package makes it not unique. Feldmann in March, March 27th:

"The White-House-Congress compromise for a kinder, gentler policy toward Nicaragua is a watershed event.

The new policy also represents for the first time in more than 10 years, a rare level of bipartisan agreement."

The Next argument is, next argument: not unique. Gingrich nomination as the minority whip kills the Bush agenda. Hey in March of '89:

"Gingrich has been long known for confrontational tactics. It is that approach that makes it very difficult for Bush to gain bipartisan cooperation and agreement on key issues."

Next argument is that domestic issues are critical. Hey in March of '89:

"The only hope of getting anything done was in working with Democrats in both chambers. Mr. Mann says, and to deal successfully with issues like the budget and child care."

Next argument is -- no, next argument is not unique: Middle-East Peace Plan. Wayne in March of '89:

"The Bush administration is shifting into gear on the Arab-Israeli peace process."

Next argument is there's no indication people would perceive us. We give some family planning aid now. We just increase the level.

Next argument is if he really wanted something to get Congress on his side he'd just invent something, right? He'd go sign a treaty with some stupid little nation and wave it around and get everybody on his side.

Gorbachev. At the top. First argument: Not unique. We give bilateral aid right now. It should be scaring the Soviets. It's not happening.

Next argument: it's not unique. (Unintelligible) that should cause it.

Next argument: There's no link. They allow population programs. Valkenier in '87:

"Moscow's acceptance of growing global interdependence permits and invites the search for a constructive approach to such problems as overpopulation."

Next argument is that paranoia doesn't cause war. It deters. Gaddis, '86:

"Institutionalized suspicion in the USSR resulted from weakness, not strength. As a consequence the Kremlin was most unlikely actually to initiate military action. The whole theory of deterrence has been based upon the assumption that paranoia and prudence can co-exist. By this logic then the domestic structures of the Soviet state

have not been seen as likely in and of themselves to produce a war.”

Next argument is that commitment works. It is necessary to halt the lashout. Kagan in '87, he's from Yale:

“An analogy with (unintelligible) and Germany (unintelligible). The Soviet leaders have much more to lose and time to consider alternatives. And Imperial Germany might have been deterred by a major military effort by the British. Similarly there is reason to hope that the Soviet Union can be deterred. Solid policy requires strength, determination, patience, and containment. Containment is necessary because unchecked, Soviet space is dangerous.”

Next argument is turn: reform causes aggression. Nixon '88:

“Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been more skillful and subtle. It has become more aggressive as Gorbachev seeks to expand the influence and power of the Soviet Union.”

Next argument is that downfall was inevitable. Conciliation now makes us worse off later. New Republic '89:

“If we take these steps only to see him fall from power anyway — a very real possibility — we will face his successors, a reactionary and militaristic bunch at a grave security disadvantage.”

Next argument is — you want this? YEAH. Next argument is turn: West German and Japanese. No? NO, THE ONE AT THE TOP. Oh. The Next argument is U.S. encirclement. Kagan, '87:

“The USSR's gains in allies, resources and locations increase its capacity to challenge the West as it weakens the West's capacity to resist. The psychological effects of further changes in the balance of power are too obvious to need description. At some point concessions made from good will and hopeful expectations become retreats made from fear. The outcome is less likely to be surrender than a sudden reversal, confrontation and disaster.”

Next argument is next U.S. president will intervene. A hard-liner at the Kremlin can stop him from doing it. Klars in '88:

“Unless there is a dramatic upset in international politics such as a power struggle in the Soviet Union leading to the ascendancy of a hard-line anti-Westerner, we can expect that American military policy will coalesce increasingly around an interventionist policy in the Third World.”

Next argument is new thinking causes West German neutralism. Miller in '88:

“The new political thinking poses serious problems for Eastern Europe as well as the West. There is a very real danger that it will gain for the Soviets the dismantling of the western alliance. A disarmed and disunited West is sure to be the eventual target of Soviet blackmail or worse, once the Kremlin leaders feel confident enough of success to revert to earlier methods. Paradoxically for the new political thinking to remain at all advantageous to the peoples of Eastern Europe will require the maintenance of western solidarity and a commitment not to yield anything to the Soviets on the cheap.”

Next argument is, next argument is that the right wing isn't following this. Sime in '89:

“Still it is important to consider the amount of demonization of Poltburo conservatives. They disagree with Mr. Gorbachev about the scope and pace of perestroika but not about the necessity of reform. They do not advocate a return to Stalinist methods.”

Next argument is, that's it. S.A. The first argument is that Affirmative not prevent. IMF. The IMF is making an effort to do this because of their debts which we can't, which we don't solve. Second, the link is not specific to impact. Their card just says focusing on environmental problems. There is no indication today we are focusing on it. Our own evidence indicates we don't and there is no perception that we do it.

Next argument: Structural adjustment fails. There is no existing capital. Hodjar in '87:

“Any change presupposes the existence of resources which can be more effectively deployed but Africa doesn't have the capital to build its potentially rich resources. Changes being canvassed by the IMF will do nothing to integrate Africa's domestic economies or to make use of its resources on a continental basis.”

Next argument: price increases don't solve. The barriers are too high, the time frames too long. Mellor in '88:

“Market forces alone will not solve the agricultural price problems. Even if food production expands the primitive conditions of transportation, communication, and production infrastructure means that the response would take much longer. Market resolution to an imbalance between food supply and food demand is all to likely to be higher food prices to reduce food demand, not increased food supply.”

Next argument is crisis liberalization fails. All successful attempt have liberalized early on, which is too late for Africa. Sales in '87:

“The strategy can find little historical support. The success stories of East Asia, so frequently pointed to as illustrations of the benefits do not demonstrate the utility of trade liberalization in the midst of a macroeconomic crisis. These countries solved their macroeconomic and financial difficulties before they embarked on the path of export-led growth.”

Next argument. Next argument is turn: increased prices leads to instability and revolution. Hendry in '88:

“Many developing countries face problems with volatile masses of unemployed. The provision of cheap food becomes necessary if the government wishes to avoid trouble over price increases on staple food items. Troops have to be called out to quell food related riots in Brazil, Egypt and Tunisia in recent years.”

“Next argument is backlash destroys the program. Journal of Modern African Studies in '87:

“When laissez-faire policies have been adopted, the public outcry has often brought about reversals. Policy reversals have associated in recent years with food-price increase coups or riots in the Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Liberia, and Zambia.”

Next argument is it won't increase production. Now the world economy can't absorb them. And so they can't solve. Shaw in '88:

“The fund bank assumption is that devaluation and deregulation will serve to revive and restructure African economies. The new orthodoxy is optimistic because there is little evidence that the global economy is expanding sufficiently fast to absorb Africa's exports of raw materials. And it is so preoccupied with Northern trade wars and NIC graduations that southern development is low on its agenda.

The next argument to turn: population destroys development. Kirchner in '85:

“When human populations are kept in balance sustainable development is possible. When human populations grow too quickly they damage their essential natural resource base, thereby making sustainable development impossible.”

Also remember we're turning this off case.

Case side. At the top. Basic population growth is solving. First argument is they say that they're resolving their conflicts. That's at the expense of the carrying capacity. Contention two evidence indicates, indicates that they're uh, exploiting the land to do this. Second, a demographic transition means that because the eco, the economic climates, the birth rate will go up higher again, also the Ungar '89 cards indicate this is not true.

AIDS. First of all, we still get the death (unintelligible) check because AIDS has an insignificant effect on growth rates. Merritt, '88:

"The independent effects of HIV may contribute to a worst case decline of as little as 0.5 percentage points in the growth rate. The long-term demographic picture is certainly nothing like the negative growth rates informally suggested."

Next AIDS population and growth co-exist. Torrey '88:

"The effects of AIDS on growth rates should be considered neither definitive nor sophisticated. But they provide an estimated offer of magnitude that suggests that the problems of population growth and the epidemic of AIDS will coexist rather than substitute."

On the Tech arguments. Group down to (unintelligible) next to the last answer. First, they don't indict specific studies. Our cards are predictive and our economies talked about Africa. Second, it's at the expense of the environment. They may be able to grow, but it's because they screw up the environment trying to do it. Third argument is it's empirically denied. Incomes are racing backward right now. The fourth argument is that it's not talking about renewable resources, it's talking about minerals; our card's specific to destroying the ecosystem. Next argument, we don't stop population growth, they can still develop. We slow down the rate, bringing it back in line with carrying capacity. Next argument is turn, turn: family planning empirically equals development. Simmons in '86:

"It is interesting to observe that most countries that have been successful with family planning have also been relatively successful in assuring income growth. East Asian countries such as Korea or Taiwan have experienced very rapid economic growth during the period that fertility has been falling. The same can be observed of many countries in Latin America."

Next argument is turn: A population with better workforce. National Research Council, '86:

"Lower fertility is likely to raise average levels of household expenditure on health and education. Such changes should result in a more productive labor force."

Next argument is a take off in adaptation, because you don't need that much more population. Extend the Meinke card. Also Markets uniquely fail in Africa because they modernize late and they don't have the political independence to deal with it. Those are the American NAS cards. I'll also deal with that down below. He says internalize, I'll deal with that when I get there.

A subpoint. They say they will internalize. This causes poverty, right? You fence off the property, it means the poor people can't use it. Harrison '81:

"Private property in land is emerging but in most areas it does not seem to have speeded up technical progress fast enough to cope with population growth."

It causes a rich/poor gap. Harrison '81:

"But private property in land, as the next two chapters will show, is an extremely dangerous institution for the welfare of the poor. It leads to social polarization, increasing degrees of inequality and grinding poverty."

His next argument says they can adapt. It's happening too fast. The cards up above indicate that. He says not decrease the environment. The next two. First argument is that growth is slow right now, proving that our arguments are true. Second, Kasun evidence. It talked about Africa. Our cards say they have unique barriers there. It doesn't indicate it can't happen. Also we don't reverse population growth, we just slow.

Deforestation. He said that our cards indicate that Africa's unique; it's happening there.

Cooling. Group it. First argument is that the consensus is we're warming. Pain in November '88:

"The greenhouse effect is no longer controversial. Most climatologists believe that the overall rise in temperature will be about 3 degrees centigrade in the next fifty years with a small increase in the tropics and a much larger increase towards the poles."

Wirth in '89:

"Broad scientific agreement exists on the underlying theory of climate change. The range of consequences is sufficiently clear and the magnitude of the resources at stake so enormous that policy action is required sooner rather than later."

Next argument is that general warming causes an ice age. Dauthwaite, April of '89:

"Average air temperatures have risen 0.6 degrees celsius in the last century. At the same time the Antarctic ice sheet has expanded, the seas in northern latitudes have grown colder."

Next argument is that change itself that causes destabilization where they can adapt; note the Wirth '89 card. He says increased agriculture and the oceans. Group it. (Wirth) '89 card says that you can't adapt fast enough. It's the change in agriculture, the change in (unintelligible) that causes war.

He says species (unintelligible) cuts this above, incremental will be down below.

The war stuff. Please group it. The first argument is the best studies, the empirical studies. The (unintelligible) cards indicate it's impending in the past. Second, Africa is unique: we're approaching the carrying capacity for the first time. Third argument: we give empirical examples. That's Ethiopia. Fourth argument: His turn isn't true because we don't, we decrease income inequality within the country because we help development. Fifth argument: empirical solvency. Zimbabwe down below indicates that we don't solve. The deserts (unintelligible) North says, that's the link cards, the cards indicate that because the carrying capacity crisis, we're going to have a war. He says Soviets won't escalate. That's not true. Because we think they won't escalate, they will. That's the Brown card.

Solvency. At the top. Actually, group solvency. First argument is, first argument: empirically denied. We have four empirical examples. Second argument is that attitudes are changing. It's in the Presser '87 evidence. Next argument is that you don't need the (unintelligible) transition. That's the Brown evidence. Fourth argument, you don't need community based distribution, you need to talk about some kind of family planning aid. Next the culture is pro people, it'll change, Whitaker in '88 says it'll change:

"Social change will continue to be accelerated by Africa's permeability to imported cultural models. In Africa today the current European norm of two or three children is well known and could help legitimize the small family."

Next argument is that you only need to increase the rates, that's the Harrison card. He says momentum arguments. Next argument: empirically decrease fertility. That's the World Bank card. This has happened in the past. Also our cards indicate we change the attitudes when you educate them.

### CROSS EXAMINATION (Plants questioning Thompson)

**Q:** Alright. I have a couple of questions for you. On the cooling, can we have the cards you've got on cooling? What's your second answer?

**A:** The Wirth evidence? It's on adaptability.

**Q:** To adaption or to the cooling argument?

**A:** To cooling.

**Q:** The second answer that you made. First, consensus we're warming, the Pain evidence, and secondly, I don't know . . .

**A:** I read two cards there. Yeah, I read two cards under the same subpoint.

**Q:** The next argument is that warming equals an ice age?

**A:** Yeah. Do you want me to explain it?

**Q:** You can try.

**A:** Well, it's pretty easy. What happens is that warming happens in the tropics. That leads to more evaporation of the water which in the

**Q:** Ah, Ah, naw

**A:** in the air currents

**Q:** Naw, that's talking about the normal warming cycles, that's not going to affect El Nino and La Nina.

**A:** No, it's not. It's talking about, it's talking about the average increase in the Earth's temperature. It even quantifies it within the card. The argument is that when we warm at the equator, the clouds get up in the air and they drift north, covering up the poles and the icecaps, and the glaciers expand south. It says you can have simultaneous warming in the middle, and the ice age coming in from the poles.

**Q:** Ok. So,

**A:** It's highly consistent with your cards talk about cooling coming, our cards talk about warming coming, it's at the equator, that's all.

**Q:** How can you have warming and cooling at the same time?

**A:** Because you warm in one part and cool in the other part. I mean, that's what the card indicates is happening.

**Q:** Let me have that evidence.

**Q:** Temperatures have risen .6 degrees celsius in the last century; at the same time the Antarctic ice sheet has expanded; the seas in the northern latitudes have grown colder.

**A:** Cooling and warming have co-existed. And what I said is the argument within the article.

**Q:** Alright. Give me all your structural adjustment answers. So, your argument is that the markets, essentially all your arguments boil down to that Africa economies are not developing, they're not mature enough to be developed market systems, they don't have capital, the price increases

**A:** Right, well, structural adjustment is simply abandoning the free market and turning them into big export processing zones.

**Q:** What is the answer to that then? If it's true that they can't, that they're not

**A:** The answer to that, the answer to that, Danny, is stabilized population, let them spend the capital that they're now spending on educating their kids and feeding their people, on sustainable development, building a solid base with renewable resources.

**Q:** How does that answer your arguments like they can't trade? Like export led growth fails, the world economy can't absorb it all?

**A:** Because they don't.

**Q:** How can lowering the African birth rate solve that?

**A:** Because they don't have to have export-led growth. They can have off-target development strategies. They can trade with other countries in the south, as long as the other countries have the money to trade with them.

**Q:** The plan?

**A:** Sure. That's especially true given the cards that say that when you try and do structural adjustment during the macroeconomic crisis it fails 'cause you don't have the resources. And all the other countries that have successfully done it got their house in order before they tried.

### SECOND NEGATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE — BAYLOR (Martin Loeber)

Solvency take outs and we'll win some risk with Bush. Gorbachev at the top, concede the first three links. He answers, that proves that there's no empirical correlation. Drop down to the intervention argument. On hard-liners, this



proves propensity. First argument is that popularity increases the risk. Ostrom in '88:

"The impact of public support on presidential decision making extends to the use of other prerogatives. The most noteworthy example involves the President's decision to use U.S. military in shows of force. The probability that a President will use major military force exceeds .67 when approval is greater than 58 percent and drops below .50 when approval is less than 43 percent. The President's prerogative of using the military is dramatically related to his public standing."

Which means we're turning the intervention argument. The impact evidence is the stuff they're reading on the case.

At the top with Bush. Now, we'll kill then on the link. He says first that pre-Tower equals no ASATs, but he was trying to do ASATs in the next year's budget which means Tower killed that. And plus there were, ah, our brink evidence is post Tower. He says second, people hate aid tradeoff. First argument is planning and the public perceives that as being popular. The plan does an internal trade off which means that they don't perceive the plan as being unpopular, they like it.

The third argument: he says that they hate family planning. First argument: bipartisan support outweighs the abortion lobby. Simmons in '86:

"Private individuals and organizations based in the United States have done much to shape the climate of support for family planning. In large measure political support for family planning has been bipartisan. Many leaders who oppose public support for abortion support U.S. efforts to encourage family efforts in the Third World."

Next argument is that the UNFPA is no longer objectionable to anti-abortion groups. They've changed their stand. Feldman, January 3rd:

"The UN Agency UNFPA in collaboration with China, has revised its program of population activities that addressed the objections of the Reagan administration"

Feldman, January 3rd:

"The UNFPA's new program which goes before the agency's 46 nation governing council for assessment this spring eliminates involvement in China's census program"

Which is what the abortion people were mad about.

The next argument is that the anti-natalist lobbies are more powerful than their sources. From McCoy in '88:

"The pronatalist forces have proven unable to match the organization, leadership or resources of the anti-natalists. The struggle has taken the form not so much of overcoming organized pronatalist opposition as of convincing a basically apathetic Third World that population control is in its best interests."

McCoy in '86:

"The anti-natalist shapers of global action directed against rapid population growth constitute an impressive force. In less than ten years they have coalesced and emerged as a well-organized, well-financed global movement for population control in the Third World."

Our next argument is that the pro-abortion lobby offsets the anti-abortion lobby. Wall Street Journal, September:

"Democratic pollster Hickman says that only about 10 percent of voters actually choose their candidate based on the abortion issue and these are evenly divided for an against abortion rights. Polls have long found that a majority of Americans including a majority of Republicans support legalized abortions."

The next argument is that he's conceding the Morain evidence. It says that even if there's a lobby that opposes it, 76 percent of the American people will support it.

The next answer is that family planning is popular. Simmons in '86:

"Some of the organizations that have been active in promoting family planning in the developed countries have been active participants in the international effort. In addition, the example from the industrial countries of public support for programs offering access to contraceptives has done much to legitimate family planning programs in the Third World."

Next argument is that it sways public opinion. Shaw says in September:

"In the '60s we heard much of an impending population explosion. It never happened. What did happen was that population control became a standard part of the US approach to Third World aid. With a new administration soon to take over in Washington, one anticipates renewed efforts along these lines intended to sway public opinion and alter governmental policy. The myth of a population explosion has been a useful tool in the hands of the ideologues of contraception and abortion for many years now."

Next is that family planning is perceived as a human right. Simmons in '86:

"Access to contraception is viewed as an important human right, allowing individuals to determine how reproduction affects their own welfare and to act accordingly."

That's popular. Vance in '86:

"No foreign policy can gain the American public's support unless it reflects their deeper values."

Caldwell in '80:

"A universal respect for human rights is an aspiration we all share. It is proper and desirable for the American people to promote observance of internationally recognized human rights."

He says number four: they're not unique. He'll do more in the future. First, this is all pre-Tower. Second, I'll read uniqueness evidence below. Third argument: Tower controversy erased all pre-Tower success. Dionne in March 13th:

"The most striking part of the impression of an administration adrift was the ordeal over Tower. The supernova of John Tower whited out the rest of our agenda."

Next argument is that current inactivity will doom Bush. Our evidence post-dates it. It also proves he has no opportunities. Harbrecht, March 20th:

"But to keep the new breeze promised in his inauguration from turning into an ill wind the President must advance a positive program. And here he is hampered by the meagerness of his legislative agenda. All he has offered so far are less costly versions of Democratic proposals and his stumbling has already raised questions about his effectiveness as a leader. If his Administration continues along the current path, bipartisanship in Washington may soon mean little more than letting the Democrats have what they want."

Next argument: no opportunities in the Status Quo. Harbrecht, March 20:

"Such opportunities are limited. There are no quick wins to be had in the budget battle which promises to be long and arduous. New arms control incentives are on hold until the Administration finishes a review of defense and foreign policy."

Next argument is that this evidence is old. It says he was going to do things that were part of Reagan; he needs new successes.

He says number five: use budget as a litmus test. First, this is not a turn. Second argument is that it doesn't deny that foreign policy can be key. Third argument is that spending is no longer popular. Morris, March 17th:

"With the sudden blooming of Bush's unexpected honeymoon with Congress and the news media the deficit issue is rapidly fading from view."

Next argument is that foreign policy is key. Dionne, March 13th:

"While the focus of attention has been on Bush's domestic agenda, Cheney believes the final assessment will center on foreign policy. This is where you remake the world in fundamental ways."

Next is Africa's key. World Press Review, March of '89:

"The real test for Bush will be in the sensitive areas of foreign policy. The Third World, generally and Africa in particular, has yet to receive any signal that the usually lackadaisical U.S. attitude toward poor states may change for the better."

Is it possible that Bush may change? That's pretty good link evidence.

He says number six the Tower fight didn't kill him. First argument is that it put him on the brink. That's the INC evidence. Second argument is that he needs a fast success in order to overcome that. Will, March 27th:

"The New York Times reports with depressing plausibility that the White House leaders recently retreated to Virginia to think and came to a conclusion "we're in trouble, we need an issue, and we need one fast."

Next argument is that he needs speed to overcome Tower. The faster the better. Goodgame, March 20th:

"The trick will be to impose coherence without stifling the President's spontaneity. If the White House can do so it should be able to recover quickly from the Tower disaster. Otherwise America's 41st president may become hostage to outside events and forces."

Next argument: Carter proves; quick success key. Berger, March 6:

"To worsen matters further, an early loss without an early win would dissipate the Administration's power. Both Bush and Democrats remember the sour days of Carter, barely a month into his presidency, proposed a disastrous plan to demolish politically sacrosanct water projects. He lost, never to recover."

He says, and remember, their evidence just says it kind of put him on the brink.

He says number seven: Contra peace plan. First is that El Salvador elections offset. Doerner on April 3rd:

"The wars in Central America have never had much in common except the angst they give the U.S. The Bush Administration seems unsure on how to manage the collapse of the U.S. effort to build a strong centrist government. But it accomplished a sharp break with Reaganites to wind down their futile Contra war in Nicaragua. The reversal leaves U.S. policy with an uncertain future."

The next argument: it's irrelevant, Africa's key. Third, it's not a victory. Bush made big concessions. Feldmann, March 27th:

"In an unusual concession of power to Congress, Bush has agreed that for Contra aid to continue beyond November 30, four Congresses must write a letter to the President clearing release of the aid."

Next, it's an admission of failure. Dallas Morning News, March 28th:

"The new initiative, 45 million in humanitarian aid, also tacitly admits that the Reagan administration policy failed."

Next is C: Boyden Gray dispute equals no perception of success. They bitch about Presidential power, that proves it wasn't perceived. Seib, March 28:

"The Administration aides were peeved at Gray for clouding what most considered a big Administration achievement. They asserted that concerns Gray raised had already been addressed by Baker, Sununu, and National Security Adviser Scowcroft during negotiations with Congress."

Next it's too vague. Feldmann, March 27th:

"The Nicaraguan communique complained about ambiguities and contradictions in the bipartisan U.S. declaration. In fact the U.S. statement is vaguely worded. But that's the only way that Baker could forge unity on such a polarized issue."

Next, it won't cause bipartisanship. Wieker, March 28th:

"Baker tried hard to place it in a direct line of descent from bipartisan foreign policy actions back to President Truman's support for NATO. Baker tried hard to picture the agreement as a restoration of Presidential powers. Nice try. Neither Baker's first nor his second statement can stand much looking into."

Next, it's insignificant. Feldman, March 27th:

"We do not claim the right to order the politics of Nicaragua. The executive-legislative compromise amounts to little more than a gentleman's agreement."

Next, it won't last. Feldman, March 27th:

"Whether this new unity can last remains to be seen. The administration has left open the possibility of a reactivated Contra force. Liberals, for their part, are declaring that the Contra war is over for good."

Alright. He says eight, Gingrich kills. This evidence proves he's on the brink because it says it's difficult for him to get things through Congress. That proves he needs a new test. Ninth, the answer he says domestic issues are key. I answer that above. Ah, he says ten: not unique, Middle-East Peace Plan. First this just says he's looking toward peace. Second, is the new Mubarak, ah, the Shamir visit is insignificant. Cincinnati Enquirer, April 2nd:

"Mubarak will accompany Bush to the opening day Baltimore Orioles-Boston Red Sox game Monday and there will be a White House dinner for him."

Also, it won't affect the Mid-East policy. Cincinnati Enquirer in April:

"So far the Bush Administration has declined to do this. It opposes rushing into an international conference on the Middle East, an idea favored by the PLO, but has not ruled out having such a conference eventually."

I mean, they have to prove it would happen in the short term. Otherwise, it would have no effect on popularity.

He says eleven: no perceive. We're proving that. He says twelve: he'd invent one, but they don't read any evidence on that. I read evidence that says he can't. And the impact is absolutely conceded. Once ASATs are deployed, there's a war, and there's no answer to that which means any risk of this in the short term outweighs what level they're going to win on case.

B subpoint war. He says in the past, but it's empirically denied, the Ziegler evidence proves that. Also the Ng evidence proves that. He says second, it doesn't assume Africa, but our evidence assumes all the world which means you can't extrapolate from Africa. Second argument is turn: Family Planning increases internal conflict. Warwick in '82:

"By reducing fertility or by doing so differently across ethnic groups, a country might aggravate political tensions which in turn might set off domestic conflicts."

He says number three: Ethiopia. But they're not overpopulated. They have an (unintelligible) that's a vast desert. There's no reason why it's overpopulated. Plus they have a lot more problems with Marxism than they do with population. Also, crowding is good. Affirmative sources assume animals, not humans, Seitz in '88:

"Past studies of animal behavior have often been cited as evidence that crowding is unhealthy. This is probably true for animals but not for human beings. Isolation is what harms human beings, not animals."

He says four: they decrease income equality. There's no impact to that. He says empirically it solves. Where? Our evidence, extend number three, that crowding doesn't equal war; refugees empirically deny, and also number six, that you can't solve.

He says death takes it on the AIDS argument but there's no reason why AIDS is a death check that will cause war. That death checks evidence assumes famine or something but not a sexually-transmitted disease.

The escalation evidence. He just says we'll escalate. Our evidence proves that the Soviets are cautious. War evidence on Heller claims are exaggerated. Eberstadt in '86:

"McNamara once warned that the threat of unmanageable population pressures is very much like the threat of nuclear war. Few of the true believers are nonplussed when events prove them wrong. Like disappointed prophets of the millennium, they simply move the day of reckoning forward or refashion their dire predictions in terms too vague to be disproved."

Solvency. He doesn't get here with enough time. He says first, empirically denied. Four examples. But first of all, their studies assume distribution levels, not results. Schultz in '88:

"Most family planning evaluation schemes are flawed because they focus analysis on measured contraceptive use rather than on the final fertility outcome."

Next argument is that profit motive is overstated. It's all biased. Simon in '87:

"More such dollars are always welcome: And for those who work for family-planning organizations, cutting aid funds breaks their rice bowl, and removes such perks as trips to Mexico City for a UNFPA conference."

Next is that he's dropping substitution. This evidence proves that the people who use contraceptives are the people who would use them anyway. Which means that all their solvency evidence that's empirical, it's based on usage rates, is flawed. Also Schultz in '88:

"The intensity of motivation because it is not held constant in such comparisons, will tend to overstate the net effectiveness of the program. The program services substitute in part for birth control methods that otherwise have been obtained from the private marketplace."

He says second, that attitudes change. But even if that's true it won't solve, ah, change the attitudes. Harrison in '87:

"The uncomfortable fact is that Africa's high birth rates and high population growth rates are not the result of chance or ignorance. The conclusion is inescapable: most African women know at least some methods of contraception but choose not to use them. They want large families. Seven out of nine African countries, women's ideal family size was even bigger than their actual family size."

He says number three, that they don't need to get the transition. First of all, he says . . . what is this argument? (you don't need the demographics) Oh. The demographics (the trap, the trap) Alright, Andrew. He says you don't need the transition. First of all, is extend the INC evidence. Second argument is extend the male attitudes, and the substitution and the culture arguments. He says four, that the CBD is unique. But you can't solve for religion and the cultural norms that are inherent in the culture. More evidence on Caldwell in '87:

"Much disquiet surrounds fertility control practice that has not been long sanctioned. Innovative behaviour is likely to be regarded as unnatural and hence, sinful. It is also likely to have unpleasant side effects."

He says culture will change, but that's not true. This is Caldwell in '87:

"This essay has interpreted continued high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of a traditional religious belief system that is still active and that has molded a largely intact culture. In its traditional form it was not only pro-natalist, but it was centered on the fact of reproduction and its associated mysteries."

#### CROSS EXAMINATION (Thompson questioning Loeber)

Q: Ok, now, Marty, Marty. The reasons why the Contra aid, the Contra deal, didn't buy Bush support are things like C. Boyden Gray dissented. Right? There were signs of dissention

A: No, no, no,

Q: Well, that's what it says. It says he came out and said it wasn't, it wasn't that big of a deal, or he had his reservations and you say that means it wasn't successful, right?

A: Right. And because he was close to the administration, and that wouldn't happen under your plan because our evidence says that after this controversy C. Boyden Gray was hauled into the White House and

Q: Wait, wait, wait, I'm not making an argument that C. Boyden Gray is always going to contradict what happened. I'm just saying that your argument here, to answer this argument, is that he admitted it was a failure. There's a little ambiguity. It wasn't that simple . . .

A: Not a little ambiguity? The evidence says that ah,

Q: It says

A: It says that this agreement is terrible because it undermines Presidential power.

Q: And all these things were enough to ah, break up what ever bipartisan value it has, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Now the second, the second

A: The argument here says . . . now if Bush comes out with this peace plan, here comes somebody in the administration saying

Q: Right.

A: Now, the link story to the disad is that uh,

A: No, the link evidence to the disad

Q: The link story as supported by the link evidence (laughter)

A: Ok.

Q: Says that uh, your argument is that he can point to the plan and unify Congress and unify the people behind him and use that, and use it like money to, to buy ASATs, right?

A: Right.

Q: Ok. Now the argument, the argument depends on the unity of the people, right? Your arguments are all over

A: No

Q: This destroys the bipartisanship, this means they can't cooperate, I mean that seems to be your argument.

A: Right, but his

Q: Now even if this was true, that it didn't enhance bipartisanship, if it made him popular in the public's eye, that gives him leverage over Congress. That's the INC, let me see that card, please.

A: Yeah, it's in the 1N.

Q: Now, um, how popular does he have to be?

A: Well, since the March evidence on ASATs is conceded, not very.

Q: What does, how much does conceding the March evidence get you? What's the March evidence say?

A: It says

Q: They're on the Brink cards? (unintelligible) on intervention that even quantify percentage of public support.

A: Well that's linear. That's completely linear.

Q: How much, how much more popular does he have to be?

A: Well, I can't give you a percentage account, but a quick victory.

Q: Uh huh?

A: for the, Ok, let's see. The faster it is to the, the closer it is to the Tower debacle, the more likely it is to have an impact.

Q: Ok, what, what Bush needs is a quick victory, that would take some of the sting out of the expected losses of the Tower nomination and help refute charges that the Administration is floundering. All it does is if he gets a quick victory he might, it says he might get back to where he was before he lost Tower.

A: I read all these internal link cards that says quick victory saves Bush.

Q: Ok.

#### FIRST NEGATIVE REBUTTAL — BAYLOR (Daniel Plants)

I'll finish where Marty was on Solvency. Then the disad. And then back to the case.

Ready? He drops the best arguments against this case. It's the momentum is now is already too large. They can't, the plan can't solve for this. It's the population is already too large. They can't get any impacts without a turn, economic assets and availability does not equal use. These solvency arguments are not answered by the affirmative; you should extend them.

ON the top, at the disad. Economic adjustment. The first argument here is that you can't turn this. It's inevitable. That's established by the INC. The second argument is he concedes the B subpoint point, that African economies are growing now. The B Subpoint, March 13th evidence in INC, which also takes out his arguments about how can structural adjustment be working if Africa is starving now.

Now, the next argument. He says that they can't form, that the IMF (unintelligible). Also, that's irrelevant. We're not claiming that the IMF does require it. (unintelligible) all forms of the cards in the INC are carefully selected for that. He says in the second subpoint that the link evidence is specifically not focused on the birth rate. But they do, they try to decrease the birth rate. The Eberstadt evidence says that foreign aid moves away from reform because it gives them the excuse to not do it. Simons in '87:

"Foreign aid programs can also do damage by directing policy makers attention away from the fundamental mechanism of economic growth. This is the gravamen of Bauer's charge that the concern about population growth and for family planning programs that are intended to reduce population growth have caused great damage."

He says third subpoint: No capital. First of all, extend subpoint B, they're doing it now. Also the second subpoint is they're solving for it now. That's on the case. Also, we'll win charges that they have this right? The argument that they're doing it now proves that they have enough capital.

He says fourth subpoint: price increases don't solve. The first argument here is empirically, structuralism doesn't work. Simons in '88:

"The assumption here that economic growth proceeds hand in hand with (unintelligible) internal and external economic balances."

The most recent evidence, Zhixiong, March 17th, '89. This is from the China Daily:

"The policy reforms and economic structural adjustments carried out in 32 sub-Saharan African countries since early 1980s have begun to yield positive results in promoting their economic recovery and development."

And he says number four, oh, this is four. Next argument here is increased price equals output. The supply is less, (unintelligible) in '88:

"The fact that farmers (unintelligible) shows strong shifts in the relative price of individual . . . by now well documented within agriculture. These are plans which improve the efficiency of resource use."

Which is also turned to case.

He says five: crisis liberalization is bad. That's not dependent on crisis, they're getting it now. Also they're solving now. He's conceding that. He says, also, our empirical examples answer that.

He says six: increased productivity equals increased prices equals instability. First argument is it's inevitable, it's only going to be worse. Second, it doesn't hurt the poor, [Nicholsen] in '88:

"The income adjustments may be less in low income Africa in the Latin American countries. Empirically the poor in Africa concentrate in rural areas which will benefit from trade liberalization (unintelligible) and agricultural markets."

Next, no organization means can't food riot. Bienen in '87:

"Efforts to reduce overvalued exchange rates probably would be opposed by elites. But urban unrest originating in the informal sector perhaps has been an exaggerated fear of urban elites. Inhabitants of the informal sector are dispersed and poorly organized and have a difficult time sustaining pressure against government elites."

He says eight, the backlash will kill. But they're not doing it. Also, it's underway now, he concedes that in the IAC. Which means that its empirically untrue because the rights haven't caused them to back down.

He says number eight, that the world economy cannot absorb that. We get an edge off development because the markets solve. Also, it doesn't depend on that. If we can prove that we increase the abilities of the economy to grow, then it doesn't necessarily depend on trade. He doesn't read any card that says it does.

He says number nine: turn population increases. First that will be flipped on case. Second, high population equals impetus to do. Njoku '86:

"Population growth is the only force powerful enough to make such communities change their methods and, in the long run, it helps transform them into more advanced and productive societies. The world has immense physical resources for agricultural and mineral production still unused."

It's in the impact. That's in the INC. It's also on to case. We'll prove that they can get development.

Now. On the case. Up at the top. You can extend all the (unintelligible) population rates will slow down. He says carrying capacity and demographic transition. What's he say? February 18th evidence? Rates will slow. Off the AIDS argument, he can have that, but we're going to (unintelligible) off that which means they don't stop the rich/poor war.

Contention II: the [disad] (unintelligible) of war. He doesn't even answer my arguments that indict the methodology. Number one: he says the evidence is empirical. He says the experience with the environment. He says empirically denied. But they're solving now. That's on the disad. He says not specific to (unintelligible) and since he does not solve population growth all indirect, but the rates is important. That's what the evidence delineates. He says on the next that family planning equals (unintelligible). First argument here is that reverse of growth equals family planning, not the reverse. Second one here is we're solving this off of the disad. Next is that turn: equals innovation Leroy in '86:

"Population growth has been beneficial in various ways. The psychological stress associated with such growth has led to new socio-cultural systems, promoting needed organizational change. It has led to technological innovations and improved living conditions."

Next is that poverty Wattenberg in '85:

"The rate of poverty is going down and is going down substantially. In fact, life expectancy has increased, indicating that the something is better. All in spite of the alleged population explosion."

He says (unintelligible) rights. But fertility increases productivity, and he's dropping innovation, so we'll flip that because if you're more innovative then you're more productive. He says you don't need to have it but the evidence says that we do. He says number nine markets are bad in Africa, but that's on the disad. He says number five: it increases food. That's a turn. Number six: it increases resources. It increases innovation. These are all turns, these are all unanswered. It increases the capacity. He says markets fail, that's on the disad.

Now. On the environment. At the top. There's no extension on why bad environment equals war. He doesn't make that argument. Off for more: population internalizes. He says poverty equals fence off the land. There's no impact there. Also the market is solving for that now. Also the growth arguments turn it because it increases their capability to do it. Extend our affirmative turn: population equals adaptation. The (unintelligible) arguments is dropped. He says (unintelligible). He's not reading the evidence. We give you the evidence off of Kasun below that says that population helps the environment because it causes them to internalize the costs, which answers the arguments about market imperfection. When you have higher population growth, then that causes them to internalize the cost which solves for the imperfection. And there's no answer to that.

Number three: it doesn't hurt the environment. The Hendry evidence. Number four: the evidence overclaims their case and the evidence is dropped. Number five: their sources are flawed. This is an indict. That evidence is dropped as well.

Now. On the cooling arguments. He says convince us that, that warming is temporary. Temporary oceanic disturbances are to blame. Stevens on January 16th:

"Last year's killing drought in the United States was caused by massive naturally occurring climatic forces in the tropical Pacific Ocean and had little to do with global warming caused by the green house effect, new evidence indicates."

Next is Groupthink. Warming is bad, sources are flawed. Lagerfeld '88:

"Hubert H. Lamb, a leading Climatologist, is also wary because the long-term warming may also have natural causes. Even scientists, he cautions, follow fashions. A particular theory catches on and gains a wide following and while the situation reigns, most researchers aim their efforts at following the logic of the theory and its applications and tend to be oblivious to things that do not quite fit."

He says number next, turn: that warming equals ice age. First the evidence is terrible. The increase in the ice sheets

does not mean that the world is cooling. The second argument here is that CO<sub>2</sub> stops this. And that's from the card in the INC, it says CO<sub>2</sub> stops warming. He concedes my link evidence that says it offsets it. Also, deforestation increases warming. (unintelligible) in '85:

"The carbon dioxide let off by burning tropical forests will contribute to the greenhouse effect through a decline in photosynthesis."

Coming because we're still decreasing the amount of carbon dioxide we remove from the air. Extend my arguments that cooling is bad. There's no answer to that. And, he's conceding the link. Extend number five, it increases agriculture. He says you can't adapt but you can. This is from Hileman in '82:

"Even if the globe warmed up substantially, it might be possible for humans to adapt. The sea level, for example would probably rise slowly enough to build sea walls around such cities as New York."

The agriculture turns are dropped. It's also because of carrying capacity.

And he doesn't have an answer to this. And that's all that he has time to get to here. This cooling argument is impacted and more and he has nothing to say about the impacts.

#### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL — MICHIGAN (Andrew Schrank)

On Gorbachev. Extend number four, (unintelligible) '86. It takes out the impact of ASATs independently. Now, I'll hit his answers on Bush. Look at (unintelligible) '84. He drops that hardline Soviet Union is inevitable. That would deter Bush as long as he is President. Second, we still get a long term war off case post-Bush, and also we get the environmental harm. Third, we'll beat this answer on the Bush disad.

On the Bush disad. The first answer, we still get their turn. He never answers the argument. That's the argument that if he was so powerful before the Tower nomination he would have gotten in the Secretary of Defense. It proves he's not going to have power. Tower also proves our arguments down below, that they're independent barriers which we're checking and getting off the affirmative independently. Now off of number two. Group there. First of all, the public doesn't perceive the trade-off. They assume increased spending. They'd have to read evidence saying that they would perceive this and influence public knowledge. Group the same for number three. First, we change the guidelines. Remember? Their cards are about population control, which we ban. Their evidence says that the public links with the Chinese program which we ban. Second, we try to get the link-up with the most important group is the new right. They're the ones that our evidence says. Also our evidence says that the people who dislike family planning mobilize. Their evidence just says 76 percent support, not that they'll activate on it. Third, southern Democrats are the critical backers. Right? They're the swing voters. They have the affirmative because they associate it with abortion. That's the evidence in the 2AC. Fourth, 76 percent support it, but not if it's associated with abortion or increased spending fears. That's the evidence in the 2AC. And they don't prove that people care about this for human rights reasons. They don't prove that they perceive it as human rights.

Group the answers to number four. One, policies prove . . . oh, these policies remain and you can still use them in the future. FOUR. Second, why can't he use those? These aren't associated with that. These policies aren't associated with Tower. Also they are not associated with Reagan. Third, his uniqueness evidence is too good, it says he must have complete, overall power over the foreign policy agenda, and we don't certainly do that. Group their answers to the budget argument. First of all it subsumes foreign policy agenda, and we don't certainly do that. Group their answers to the budget argument. First of all it subsumes foreign policy key evidence. Also the evidence on number eight from the 2AC proves the budget is critical over the foreign policy. Second, it updates their evidence.

On the Contras, group their answers. First of all, the Contras were post-Tower, should have happened. Second, foreign policy, oh, ah, it was a foreign policy issue. it meets all his reasons for it ah, being an important issue, too. Third, it is a success, that's evidenced in the 2AC. Four, his El Salvador argument and all the other arguments proves they're independent barriers. The affirmative might get one as an independent barrier, too. Like the Angola agreement could break up or people could perceive that we're not taking a hard line on South Africa. That could deter (unintelligible), too. This, five, the Graves evidence proves that they're independent barriers.

On Gingrich, he just says that proves it's unique. No, it proves an insurmountable barrier on Mid-East. If this didn't do it why would the affirmative extend number 12? He can invent an issue; they don't have any counter evidence. Now. And we decrease bipartisanship even if not everybody — Oh. Also we decrease bipartisanship even if not everyone supports. Remember, their evidence says he needs a complete consensus. If the southern Democrats put up, that's all we need.

Group their answers on Structural Adjustment. At the top. Two arguments, First of all, it's their inevitability evidence. It doesn't assume the backlash. Remember we're reading evidence off number seven in the 2AC, the Journal of Modern African Studies article that says seven different countries cited specifically in the card are dropped out of it. Third, there is growth now, but it's not up to the rates of population growth. Population growth outstrips. That's Ungar evidence in the 1AC saying income's racing backwards.

Group their answers to number three: no capital. First five nations kicked us out, that proves no capital argument empirically. We're reading empirical examples there. Second, it doesn't answer that the rest of the countries can't do it because they don't have capital. Even if some have done it successfully, the ones that are remaining could never do it, proving that we get a turn. Third, it doesn't assume the gap. Right? Even if it's increasing growth, it doesn't increase equity, it leads to poverty, which kicks in the case wars.

Off number four: price increase. Extend it. He just says working now, but doesn't assume the countries that backlash. Same argument as above. He says they're not in crisis now, the crisis liberalization. But the 1AC proves that income's racing backwards in the countries that are left over.

On the instability turns. Group them. First of all, it's not inevitable, that's answer to both. Second, it hurts the poor in the short term. His evidence doesn't assume the transition. Third, hurting the poor hurts the environment. That's evidence in the 1AC saying they rape the poor, just more. Also, it would cause war after war scenario.

On answers to his argument on backlash. It is empirically true. Extend number eight: the world economy. Our evidence says they do need global trade. Off-number nine: population growth. Extend resource arguments, that turns the arguments off case side.

Top of the case. Our cards are a lot better. Group — on the development arguments on Contention II. Group 2AC's, group his answers to 2AC one through five. First of all, development now is at the expense of the environment. That's evidence on contention II from Harrison, Hough. That's why there are famines now. Second, the markets fail. That's



NAS evidence specific to Africa, also it gives about fifteen different reasons which they don't understand. Also the Merrick evidence indicts his sources proving that our sources are eco-(unintelligible). That they just assume that the market fails which is true. That's on the Merrick card. Third, population growth outruns. That's Ungar evidence in the 1AC. Also Francis, March 13th:

"African economic progress is not yet strong enough to do much more than keep up with the burgeoning population, growing 3 to 4 percent a year."

Also it will double in the future. Also, his answers on Structural Adjustment. On the rest of these arguments extend, first of all, that empirically family planning will lead to growth. That's Simmons evidence talking about East Asian nations which are the best examples. Second, we don't stop population growth, we just slow it down, increasing resources for development which is the Hendry and Simmons evidence in the 1AC. On the seventh (turn) from the 2AC, that's productivity. Extend that productivity outweighs, which is the 1AC mechanism that's turning the arguments. Remember, even if they have technology, if it's not productive to population, it can't work.

Now. On the arguments on Contention III A. On internalization, extend that in the transition it will cause poverty and that the markets can't solve the transitional problems. That'll cause war off contention III B. On adaptation. First of all contention II proves it's not happening now. Also it can't happen anytime. The Faruquee evidence which is specific to deforestation in Africa says that if population growth is outrunning. Also Africa unique evidence from Jablonski says that the habitats will be gone therefore it can't adapt.

On the cooling arguments. Off number one: consensus forming now. First of all, we post-date. Our evidence is from March 30th or something like that. Second, his evidence just assumes the last bit of the warming trend, not the overall trend, our evidence lines up with consensus. On the argument on 2AC, that CO<sub>2</sub> causes cooling. First, his link evidence doesn't assume, oh, doesn't assume differential impact. Second, another card, Douthwaite, April '89:

"The tropics are getting hotter because of the greenhouse effect, the build-up of carbon dioxide. The cooling effect further north also flows from this experts believe. The simultaneous warming of one part of the world and the cooling of another is known as the differential greenhouse effect. It may not have to proceed far before it triggers an ice age."

On the adaptation arguments at the bottom. First of all, it doesn't assume it happens too fast, that's the (unintelligible) evidence.

GO

On war. On one and two, Africa-specific evidence. Also, we give them empirical examples. They don't update them. Also, (unintelligible) leads to conflict. It's talking about population control, which we ban.

HALF

That's community based distribution which would solve it. Also, it's empirically not true. Botswana and Kenya do not. But on their empirical examples, they never prove Ethiopia is overpopulated. Also the (unintelligible) evidence gives us four empirical examples.

GO

On North-South, extend that we'd stop it off the poverty risk. On escalation, extend the 2AC evidence.

On Solvency. Group it. First of all, 1AC evidence beats it. It's not talking about distribution, it's talking about results. Second, there's no profit motive. Their evidence doesn't better our empirical examples. Third, substitution. They aren't doing it now, that's evidence from the World Bank. Also empirically we've decreased the rates, which is on-balance. Next argument: they're not doing it now, that's the World Bank. Next argument: net decrease in fertility, Whitaker in the 2AC. On the arguments that they're making about substitution. First argument, culture is permeable, that's Whitaker in the 2AC.

Also empirical solvency, also it's culturally based. Momentum's answered by the 1AC evidence. We decrease the rate, which is all we need, which is answered above on the other argument even if I didn't say it specifically there.

## SECOND NEGATIVE REBUTTAL — BAYLOR (Martin Loeber)

Overview, I think we win. First argument here is Bush is quick. Momentum proves that solvency at best is a generation away which means the ASATs impact happens in the short term. Second, we're killing them on solvency which means the disad on Structural Adjustment outweighs. Third, that population is decreasing now; he drops that in the 1AR which proves no harm. And fourth, the DA turns carrying capacity which means we win short term link but the solvency only occurs in the long term.

Gorbachev at the top. He says paranoia deters. That takes out the case impact: it proves no intervention. But it wouldn't take out ASATs because there could be crisis for other reasons. But (unintelligible) said those reasons, but those could all escalate. He said that it deters Bush, et cetera, which means there would never be any kind of intervention, but if there is going to be intervention, it's more likely when Bush is popular.

Top at Bush. He doesn't read any cards, he's going to die on this argument. The first argument: pre-Tower. He says would have gotten (unintelligible). First of all, this is all pre-Tower, which means that the uniqueness of arguments are irrelevant. Second, it's pre-90 budget. The budget's only being started to be discussed now, Tower erased that. The third argument is that the Brink evidence post-dates.

Second argument is that people hate aid trade-off. First of all, they hate aid tradeoff because of deficits. There's no reason why they would perceive increased spending. And second, he's not answering my turn, that the plan decreases economic aid, something unpopular, and puts it in something popular, which is an independent link. No answer.

Third argument: hate family planning. He says guidelines, and cuts against the link. FOUR. Not answering my argument, that all that link extension, that all link outweighs, that UNFP is no longer objectionable. The anti-natalists outweighs and the pro-abortion lobby offsets. Family planning is popular and this evidence is all specific to family planning. He says third, that the movement's mobilized, conceding my outweighs evidence. And the second argument is the objections of the anti-people have been removed. Next argument is extend that our link outweighs. He says Southern Democrats is key. The evidence here is compelling. He says number five: not 76, they wouldn't like it, they'd do abortions. First of all, the evidence proves they like it. Second of all, the abortion part has been removed. Third argument is that abortion cuts both ways which means there's no net link. Next argument is that our evidence proves it has bipartisan support. Even people who support, ah, I mean even people who oppose abortion still support it. Next argument is that their

evidence is terrible, and also extend that it sways popular opinion. And also, he's conceding the human rights argument which proves there's an independent link. He says they don't care, but they mobilize around it. And there's no answer to the human rights argument.

Fourth argument: he would do more in the future. He says policies remain but he needs a new one, and Tower erases all pre-Tower successes. He says it's not Tower, and he needs it overall, but he needs a quick success to overcome it; our evidence answers that. He says five: he would use budget. He says it subsumes foreign policy key. Not answering African key, foreign policy key, and the budget overall. THREE. But extend number six, the Tower fight: that doesn't kill him, he needs a foreign policy success.

The seventh argument: the Contras. He says it's post-Tower, but he's not answering any of my arguments. I would like to extend them. Extend El Salvador upsets, Africa is key, it's not a victory, it's a mission of failure, ah, the Grey Boyden upsets, it's vague, it's bipartisan, and it's insignificant. He says it's a foreign policy issue, so what? He says it's a success, not answering my reasons why it's not. He says El Salvador is a barrier, so Angola would crop up. His evidence here is compelling, and he says Gray proves the independent barrier. (unintelligible) is compelling. There's no reason why that would be the case, especially since it has bipartisan support. He says Gingrich kills. Their evidence just proves it's difficult, which feeds the Brink. He extends Mid-East peace, but that would happen too late to help Bush. Then he says they'd invent an issue. First, he's dropping the evidence I read above that says he can't. And second, they don't decrease bipartisanship. Family planning has bipartisan support and the objectionable parts, that their turns talk about have been removed.

Structural adjustment. He says inevitable, doesn't assume backlash and growth not key to race. Not answer, ah, he says it doesn't assume backlash on the inevitability. But the inevitability is economic inevitability, not political inevitability; in order to have balance of payments you have to do adjustments. He says, ah, extend off of number one, that the African economies are growing now, and that, that takes out all the case. Off number two, TWO extend the independent link, the Simon evidence that says that they decrease support for reforms. Off the third argument: no capital. He says five nations, but this argument, that they'd, uh, they'd inevitably be forced to go back to it because balance of payments. And second, extend the impact evidence that says they're growing now. He says it doesn't answer for the rest of the countries: even if they win that some countries are failing, (unintelligible). The fourth argument: that price increases don't solve. He says that it doesn't assume backlash. Extend that it empirically works in Senegal. That the March 17th evidence says recovery, and an increase in prices solves. Which answers his arguments.

Off the fifth argument: crisis liberalization. He says incomes, not answering our argument that they're doing it now. The sixth argument, that price increase equals revolution: not inevitable, et cetera. Extend that it doesn't hurt the poor and food riots are no impact plus it's inevitable which means that you can't turn it.

Seventh argument: backlash destroys. He says it's empirical. Only in a few countries. We outweigh. Extend off number eight that it won't increase production. Their evidence doesn't assume that you need global markets (unintelligible) is bad. Off the ninth argument, extend the Njuko evidence that says that high population is impotent.

Solvency. He says IAC and no profit motive. Extend the evidence that says it only assumes distribution and there's a profit motive (unintelligible). All they're doing is substituting and all their studies are biased. He says no substitution. This evidence is terrible. He says no, doing it now. Extend the evidence that says that they are doing it now and it's not working. All empirical studies are flawed. He says culture will permeate, not answering our argument that the culture is, ah that fertility is an inherent part of their culture, which means they can't solve. He's conceding all the solvency arguments about how Africa is (unintelligible) religion, male attitudes, substitution, culture, best studies, testing competition, and momentum. Which means that even if they solve it happens way too long, in the long term.

Top of the case. Extend the evidence that says population growth has slowed. Population on the development argument; extend the evidence that says specific studies prove. It increases capital: all he does is extend the markets fall and fifteen reasons, HALF not answering our evidence on innovation it doesn't equal poverty. HALF extend it increased food, doesn't cause famine, and increases innovation.

The environment arguments. They extend the internalization. He says it causes poverty. But structural adjustment will solve. Plus there's no impact to do that. He says population, that it wouldn't adapt in time. But our evidence proves they would internalize fast. Extend three and four, it doesn't hurt the environment, and their sources are flawed. He says their evidence overclaims. Ah, oh, off the cooling arguments. Extend our argument here about how population increases cooling, and plus the consensus and their evidence is flawed because it's groupthink.

Off the war arguments: extend it, it's empirically denied. And, it doesn't assume population control. It assumes family planning. And extend

TIME

Extend that they can't solve. And remember, even if you give them everything on the case, so what? They don't solve, and it happens a generation away.

Well, I guess this is the last speech, and I remember when I saw Lynn and Griff up in the final round of the NDT a couple of years ago, thinking man, there would be nothing like that. It's just indescribably. How can they debate like that, how can they be there? And, I imagined what the feeling would be like, and last year — when we were here — it didn't feel like that. And I'm not saying it's not great to do a lot in debate, and spend a lot of time, but it's not what you think it might be. At least, what I think you might be thinking. So, it's not worth ruining your life or spending a lot of time. And I think Danny and I have come really close to doing that. And I'm glad it's over and I can go back to living. Thanks.

#### SECOND AFFIRMATIVE REBUTTAL — MICHIGAN (Joe Thompson)

The IAC evidence is great. It says we've reached the point we're trying to solve a population resource problem by expanding resources is counter productive. You're destroying the resource base you're trying to protect. Their argument is that you should have enough people so that they ah, so they fight over the resources — in a free market is that means they starve to death.

His little interview. He says Bush happens quick because momentum. That's not true. Momentum answers are dropped on case; I'll point that out. Also, the solvency evidence is clear from the IAC onwards. We're indicating there'd be zero link to the Bush disad. Also he's conceding the case (unintelligible) which we know to be absolute.

The Gorbachev arguments. We say it takes out; he says it takes out the case. That's not true. The case scenario is specific, the Brown card in IAC indicated that they miscalculated in Africa because no one thinks it's very important. Plus

the fact you have the turns here: it doesn't matter, we say Africa's unique; we have the cards on that. Intervention: he says intervening anyway with popularity. That's not true. There's no indication and I'll be taking that out on link to the disad. Also there's, — It's only an increase. The card's not very good.

At the top of Bush. Remember, his link argument says that Bush needs unanimity to push his mandate through. Our family argument is that whether the majority of the people support family planning or not, a lot of people are going to be fighting about it. His own argument, the take out on the Contra aid, is that one guy dissented on Bush's policy and that was enough to make it a failure for him. And if the entire New Right is mad because of this, FOUR it's going to be clear. At the top. We say pre-Tower. He still does not understand this argument. His link evidence says that he needs a success to recover to how it, what it was before Tower. But if he couldn't even get Tower through the Senate, that certainly proves that he's not a very powerful person, and he couldn't get ASATs. The second argument: development aid. He says turn. That's not true. It doesn't prove that people would perceive development aid as our funding mechanism. Also, they would see it as the same thing. Alright, when we turn family planning, we similarly turn this.

On the turn solve: he says the link outweighs and that the UNFPA is not an obstruction anymore. This is because the UNFPA changed their abortion policy. But we don't do that. We fund them with the old guidelines THREE AND A HALF we also fund the IGPF which does have the same restrictions. Alright? We still get the abortion people mad at us. His next argument says that outweighs the evidence. In the (unintelligible) that's not true. That just says the UNFP will reform. But we don't make them reform, we go back to the way they were before. He says we have no evidence on the Southern Democrats. Come on, guys, the IAC, the 2AC evidence also on it, in case they don't win it. He says, he extends the 76 percent of the people. The evidence likes, but that's not true. The evidence doesn't say the abortion, pro-abortion people like it, it just says birth control. Also, it doesn't indicate that they like more birth control, and more family planning than the status quo has. He says it has bipartisan support. That's not true. It just says it has some people, like there are some Republicans probably who like it THREE — THREE. It doesn't assume abortion. Also the fact that there is any dissention is enough to trigger the link to this disad. He says human rights is dropped. That's not true. Andrew's last answer is that we don't perceive it as human rights.

Now, extend the line flow fourth and fifth from 2AC. Right? He's reading all these independent barriers, the unique complications like the current inaction and the opposition in the status quo and it's unpopular. The independent barriers takes out. If it's so unpopular, it proves that we're not (unintelligible) to cause it.

Contra aid. He says it's not absolute and it wasn't a victory and is a failure. Our argument is that if this is true and he's so far off the Brink, then how can we make, be able to redeem the Contra air failure? TWO AND A HALF We certainly can't and redeem Tower in addition to that. He says that's successful. That's not true. He proved one guy was a barrier to this. El Salvador was a barrier, it makes Bush look terrible, and there's no indication it would happen. He says we increase bipartisanship. That's not true. If Bush really wanted to do something, he'd been a foreign policy success, why'd he tread around (unintelligible)?

Structuralism. At the top. He says it's economically inevitable. That's not true, that may be true. Our argument is that you should give them the resources to develop first. Therefore, when they actually do the reforms they're in the position to take advantage of it because they can develop effectively. We're granting his argument and turning it. He can have his link card. Also off the, now not have the capital. He says other nations are doing it. First argument is that these are only, the nations that are doing it are the ones that could do it. That's our argument. The ones that aren't doing it are the ones that can't. You force them to do that, that's why they have revolutions arise. Second argument is, second argument is the way they succeed is to get them out of the land and raising the food prices. Our argument is that rich-poor gets this specific off the case, that's the disad. We say proves increase, and he says it doesn't assume, he says empirically Senegal. Well, we're also reading empirical examples from Zaire, Egypt, Tunisia, Liberia, and Zambia where they had food price riots. I think our cards are better.

He says crisis liberalization fails. All the empirical examples of the East Asian nations ONE AND A HALF prove that they weren't doing it during a crisis. Extend the instability turns. He says increased food prices increase production and there's no impact to this. Remember, he's granting case-side escalation. Also, there's no indication that they would increase food prices. Our cards say that they decrease demand, and that would be an independent link, right? They'd try to solve this problem by starving people. That's ridiculous. Extend the eighth argument that they don't have the world markets to support structural adjustment. It on point to World Bank.

At the top. Contention II. He says population growth rate slowing. That's not true. Andrew reads a card in the 1AR down below that says that it's outstripping right now. Also, it doesn't indicate it'd be enough to solve. We have '89 evidence that indicates they're outstripping. Contention II stuff where he says they're increasing capital right now, they can reform. That's not true, population sucks it up. Our cards are specific to Africa ONE, ONE that say they're approaching their carrying capacity, they no longer have the resources to develop. He says it is Africa. That's not true. He had two specific cards to African markets saying they can't keep up with population growth. That's Merrick and (unintelligible) let's go back and look at them. He says not the cause of famine. That's empirically denied. We read two cards at the top of the 1AC that says its happening right now.

Ecocide. He says that structural adjustment solves in internalization. They do cause internalization. That's right. That kills people. He's granting the rich/poor gap because you fence up the forest, FORTY SECONDS you don't let them cut it down.

Here's next. On the cooling stuff. (unintelligible) that they got above. He says population equals cooling. Extend our card. He doesn't say that the market can solve for cooling. Our card says that warming causes cooling. It causes the Ice Age, it's on balance up above.

International conflict. He says empirically denied. We read four empirical examples on Africa. He says not about population control: that's above.

Solvency evidence. ESCALATION Escalation? That's the Brown card. Solvency. First agreement is that there's not substitution. Empirically decrease fertility, that's the World Bank card. Second argument is that attitudes are changing (unintelligible) the Press card. Third argument is that you only need to increase the rates a little bit, that takes out momentum. Those are the Birdsall and Sai cards and the Simmons cards. Fourth argument, the net increase in fertility. The Harison cards says you decrease fertility enough to solve. Fifth, evidence from community-based distribution, reactions from the (unintelligible). We only have to free up the resources to solve. We're turning on the case arguments. Their disad links depend on us getting the case. Like structural adjustment.

# Judges Critiques

JOHN BART, Augustana College

I would like to begin with a word of congratulations to the debaters and coaches from both Baylor and Michigan. Appearing in the final round is a goal most strive for and few achieve. Both of these teams have represented their programs and institutions very well during the course of their debate careers.

I would be remiss if, as a Forensic educator, I did not address the comments made at the end of Marty Loeber's final speech. I fully understand the time and effort which goes into being a successful debater. However, I also believe that debate is a competitive activity. All too often, we, as a community, apologize for the competition and attempt to over-emphasize the educational benefits of the activity. Debate is a game and to do it well requires commitment and hard work. Just like other competitive activities individual players make choices about their level of competition. I am sorry that Marty was unhappy with his choices; however, I believe that many debaters who have gone before him feel that the effort was worth it to experience that moment when they were the best at what they did.

This was an excellent debate. I believed that the fact that Michigan chose to run their regular affirmative rather than a new case made this a debate many will remember. The issues in this debate were very clear and well debated. I should mention that many days have gone by between this debate and the writing of this critique. Forgive me if this all seems rather vague.

There are three major positions extended at the end of the debate. I essentially decide that the structural adjustment disadvantage outweighs the minimal case side advantage. For me, the Bush Disadvantage is not a factor.

First, the affirmative defeats the Bush disad. Initially, the affirmative argues that Bush's inability to get Tower confirmed is a sign that Bush is not powerful. The negative treats this issue as though it is a uniqueness argument indicating that all of their evidence is post-Tower. However, this is not the argument. The affirmative argues that Bush is weak and there is no indication that the affirmative plan would both overcome the Tower setback and then be enough to enhance the President's credibility enough for ASATS. Second, the affirmative makes inroads into the disadvantage by indicating that there will be a split over the abortion issue. The negative is correct that they have the majority of people numbers wise, however, the affirmative wins that they have the vocal minority which will influence the President's popularity. Third, the affirmative wins some off the Contra package. Again the argument is not that the Contra package dooms the President, but that past experiences with things like the Contra package indicate that Bush is fragile. At the end of the debate, the negative wins that Bush's credibility will be enhanced. However, there is no confidence that this increase in credibility will be enough to push through ASATS.

Second, the negative clearly mitigates affirmative solvency to virtually nothing. Due to poor coverage of the solvency arguments, the affirmative is unable to answer four important arguments. The negative wins that momentum precludes solvency; that the success of the empirical programs is overstated; that cultural elements will erode effectiveness; and that substitution will occur. These taken together are argued as absolute solvency take outs. The difficulty in this debate is that the coverage precludes the affirmative from answering the specific reasons that family planning will fail. As a result, the extension of the general solvency evidence indicates that there will be some degree of solvency, but not nearly enough to avoid the population crisis which gets the advantage.

Third, the negative wins the debate on the structural adjustment position. This argument states that the symbolic nature of the plan will forestall structural changes in Africa. These changes would result in solutions to the affirmative scenarios. There is no denial that the plan will stop structural adjustment. As a result, the debate turns on whether or not the adjustment will solve more than the modest decrease in population. The affirmative wins that there may be some problems through the transition, however the transitional problems are not greater than the long term benefit.

In the end, there will be a population disaster in the future. These disasters can be averted by either decreasing population growth or by adjusting structures so that the harms do not occur. The two courses of action are mutually exclusive. There is no solvency to decreasing population. There are empirical examples where structural adjustment has worked. The transition period will be difficult, however, the intermediate risks are worth it for structural adjustment is our only hope.

ERIK DOXTADER, Northwestern University

On more than one occasion it has been remarked that the stress and sheer duration of the elimination rounds at the National Debate Tournament combine to produce a final round lacking the intensity and strategic foresight which ought to characterize the meeting of two of the nation's best teams. May no such charges be leveled against the teams in the final debate of the 1989 season. In combining well evidenced, carefully constructed positions, and fast, clear delivery, Baylor and Michigan demonstrated the merits and potential of NDT debate. For their efforts, not only at the tournament but also throughout the season, both the teams and their coaches are to be congratulated for their remarkable achievements.

Initially, I applaud Michigan's decision to run family planning. In the day and age where teams come to the NDT with three or four new affirmatives, debates are won more often by surprise than argument and, in some ways, this may work to the detriment of the activity. Debates in which affirmative teams run new cases are often no more than a crap shoot which tests the ability of the negative to research the arcane corners of the topic. In contrast, Michigan's decision to "dance with the one they came with" allowed the central issues of the topic to be productively debated. While some may lament the decision of the affirmative to run family planning, the choice made for a debate worthy of the final round.

As trite and simplistic as it may seem, it strikes me that the negative won this debate by following the advice that the best way to win on the negative is to minimize the case significance and win a disadvantage. In this respect, the structural adjustment argument is of subtle but unquestionable importance. There is little debate over the initial link that family planning disrupts market reforms in the Third World and indeed, the 2NC Simon evidence, noting that population levels tradeoff with economic reform efforts, is largely conceded by the affirmative. The crux of the 2AC position is that structural adjustment fails because of a lack of capital resources, a counterproductive rise in prices and ensuing indigenous instability. However, the negative evidence suggests something to the contrary. The Chibber evidence argues that structural adjustment increases the output of Third World economies in part, by increasing the efficiency with which available resources are used. Additionally, the China Daily evidence is an account of how just such a process has achieved some success in Senegal.

The affirmative also argues that structural adjustment leads to political turmoil and revolt. The arguments advanced by Baylor as to why structural adjustment does not lead to unrest are not as clearly developed as the rest of the position but there are two arguments which undermine the assumptions of Michigan's position. The negative maintains that structural adjustment assures the poor in rural areas of the Third World of some minimal comfort, thus minimizing the incentive for dissent. In addition, several pieces of evidence from the negative also call into question the organizational ability of Third World elites to create food shortages during times of austerity. Given that Michigan's evidence is premised on food depletion being the instigator of rebellion, this evidence challenges that possibility. Thus, what seems to emerge out of this set of arguments is that while the structural adjustment transition will not be pain free for the Third World, neither will it result in wholesale political instability.

The final major bone of contention is whether unhappiness with changes in the economy will cause a backlash capable of stamping out the entire structural adjustment process. To a large degree, this argument is answered by the negative evidence already referred to, but the 1AR specifically makes the argument that such a backlash proves that structural adjustment is not inevitable. However, Baylor's evidence from Camdessus on the inevitability question is largely uncontradicted and speaks to the fact that while the process will not be easy for developing nations, it must and will come. This argument, coupled with the evidence addressing the empirical success of the adjustment process seems adequate to establish that structural adjustment is inevitable and that family planning severely disrupts the transition.

The impact of structural adjustment on the Third World is much less clear and is very closely tied to the outcome of the positions advanced in the first affirmative. Most basically, the affirmative did not use the case evidence to its fullest advantage, resulting in a much closer debate on structural adjustment than was probably necessary. Nonetheless, the 1AC argues that overpopulation has implications for the environment, the climate of the planet, access to food and future international conflict.

The environment/species debate is short-lived and the negative wins several arguments which indicate both that there is little relationship between population and war and that there would be little risk of superpower escalation in the African arena. Thus, by the last rebuttals the case debate turns on what effect population has on agriculture and climate. To what degree structural adjustment would solve the need for the Third World to cut down the tropical rain forests is never debated and thus the resolution of the argument rests on whether an increase in the planet's temperature would offset a trend toward cooling. The 2NR condenses the climate argumentation into two claims: Advocates of the warming theory work from incredible scientific assumptions and, that population stops cooling. There is ostensibly no answer to the evidence indictment in the 2AR but it is difficult to calculate the degree to which this takes out the affirmative position. The cooling debate proper is not comprehensively extended and I think that the 1NR evidence indicating that oceans act as a buffer to cooling while also allowing for a beneficial rise in carbon dioxide is not completely answered. The 1AR does read evidence that carbon dioxide would not stop warming but it does not address the fact that oceans may serve to compensate for atmospheric warming. In sum, while there may be something left to the affirmative's advantage, it is long term and is not developed in rebuttals in such a way as to make it a central determinant of the outcome of the debate.

Perhaps the best example of how the evidence in the first affirmative is underutilized is in respect to the question of whether family planning is a viable tool for curbing population. By the end of the debate the negative wins that population momentum will moot much of the effect of the plan and that many cultural attitudes, including those of males and religious sects, preclude a substantial reduction in population. It seems to me that the negative's advantage on this issue is largely illusory. The affirmative claims that it is possible to relieve population pressure simply by reducing the birth rates and that such a shift would eliminate the momentum problem. Additionally, the evidence from both the 1AC and 2AC that culturally acceptable methods of distribution may work to change the perceptions of those affected is not adequately addressed. However, the problem is that the relationship of these competing claims, especially the rates argument, is never coherently explained by the affirmative and there is little, if any comparison of the assumptions behind the evidence being read. This lack of analysis lends credibility to Baylor's position and, by the end of the debate there is at least some doubt that the plan significantly reduces population levels.

The outcome of the case debate in conjunction with structural adjustment lead me to several conclusions: First, that while the structural adjustment position does not seem to turn the case, in its strictest sense, much of the impact of the case will be solved if current economic adjustments are allowed to continue. Second, there is nonetheless a risk that population pressures will give rise to income inequality and conflict, although any such upheaval will be most likely contained on the continent. The affirmative does then win an advantage to the case and at least some chance that family planning would help alleviate Third World political conflict.

In many ways, the key to the rest of the debate is the effect that U.S. sponsored family planning programs have on George Bush's domestic credibility, a position which ultimately depends on two questions: does the public like family planning? and second, have previous administration policies influenced George Bush's credibility? Initially, Michigan's link argument is premised on public dislike for family planning/contraception for the Third World and, second, that the public fears that family planning assistance would compromise the integrity of various domestic reforms. In the course of the debate the negative establishes a preponderance of the evidence on this issue and several arguments seem to undercut Michigan's position (turn). The negative evidence claims that there is broad-based support for family planning and the Calwell evidence goes so far as to suggest that it is perceived domestically as a human rights policy and not some sort of liberal secular humanism gone amok. Similarly, the abortion issue is answered by evidence indicating that despite some opposition on these grounds, 76 percent of the public supports family planning for the Third World. Finally, the 2AC Galston evidence is not entirely specific in regard to public perception, and several pieces of negative evidence indicate that foreign policy initiatives are crucial in Bush's drive for credibility. The federal budget problem is thus not as important to the public and thus, there seems to be little risk of a damning condemnation by Americans as a result of the plan.

Really, once the link has been established it becomes clear that the negative has far more evidence on Bush's domestic standing than the affirmative. It seems counter productive in the space allotted to go through each of the uniqueness arguments except for the effects of the rejection of John Tower and the passing of Contra aid on Bush's domestic standing. The negative evidence relating the Tower affair to Bush's stature is extremely impressive and, suggests, in fact, that past successes may well have been erased and that Bush's near term actions will determine the fate of his influence with Congress. The Contra aid issue is less clear and depends a great deal on the evidence read from Seis in the second negative indicating that aid to the rebels was the result not of George Bush's crafty agenda but of a great deal of haggling and compromise with Congress. This answer is not entirely satisfactory, but it does support the position that Bush is in need of a policy of his own.

In sum, the negative does establish that family planning would increase the credibility of the president with Congress and, given that the impacts are for the most part conceded, there is near term risk of destabilizing deployment of ASAT's. Michigan argues that the conceded arguments on the Gorbachev disadvantage minimize the risk of any superpower conflict, but the 2NR seems correct in indicating that the evidence is not talking about a policy of deploying hostile space weapons and certainly does not assume ASAT deployments by the United States. The negative then is in a position to argue that much of the case advantage will be solved by structural adjustment and that there is sizable risk associated with increasing George Bush's credibility. It is extremely difficult to accurately evaluate the extent to which structural adjustment would solve for the case advantages but in conjunction with a short term deployment of ASAT's, I am compelled to vote negative.

While the final round of the National Debate Tournament is an opportunity to display the talents of the nation's top teams, it also celebrates the community's work and effort throughout the year and serves as a visible token of the ideals which undergird the activity itself. In this context, Marty Loeber's somewhat startling commentary in concluding the 2NR is worth reflection, because whether we agree with it or not, it seems to inquire into the ability of debate to add to the education of undergraduates.

It is certainly true that college debate is time intensive and that the research necessary to achieve consistent success has grown significantly. And realistically, there is little doubt that for many participants, debate comes at the expense of other extra-curricular activities and just plain old leisure time. However, success in anything requires a commitment in both mind and spirit and it is only through such a commitment that education takes place. This aspect of the activity is not what is at issue. Rather, what is in question is whether the burdens of success have overwhelmed the satisfactions of excellence.

In an era where the number of NDT programs is beginning to dwindle it seems imprudent to ignore an issue which strikes at the heart of the desirability of participating in debate. If success comes at the cost of a well-rounded undergraduate education, then the standards of success need to be altered. It may simply be the case that undergraduates need to be aware of, and consider more carefully, the time constraints which debate places on the achievement of other goals or it may be that substantive changes in the activity are necessary to make debate more attractive. Whatever the answer it must surely begin with a more focused dialogue about the goals of NDT debate in relation to the needs of today's undergraduates. As this round most clearly demonstrates, NDT debate is an activity unparalleled in educational benefit and it seems crucial that in the wake of expressions of concern *by debaters* about the activity that we not let debate become a burden to itself.

These reflections are in no way intended as a commentary on the final round itself and if anything, the quality of the latter overwhelmingly proves the intrinsic value of NDT debate. Again, my congratulations to the debaters and coaches at Baylor and Michigan. The debate was thoughtful and extremely enjoyable.

#### **GLORIA CABADA-LEMAN, Wake Forest University**

I would like to congratulate Marty, Danny, Andrew, and Joe for a highly successful season and an excellent final round. I vote negative on the risk of the Structural Development disadvantage against very little (if any) solvency on the case. The affirmative's coverage of the solvency arguments is weak from the 2AC on. The negative reads good evidence indicting the predictions of the solvency evidence, creating a high probability that distribution of birth control won't result in enough use to overcome the built-in momentum of population growth. By the end of the debate I see only a very slight chance of plan solvency, which may outweigh the Bush disadvantage, but cannot outweigh the Structural Development position.

The negative reads superior evidence proving that structural adjustment is beginning now, delay would doom the poor, and that programs such as family planning thwart market solutions. The affirmative evidence indicting the success of market mechanisms is two years older than the negative's evidence of empirical successes in Africa and of current trends toward effective adjustment. If structural adjustment is inevitable and is proceeding successfully now, then adopting a policy that probably cannot solve population problems will merely prevent adjustment and worsen problems in the transition. I see the negative's scenario of successful market solutions to the population problem in Africa as being more likely than the affirmative's solvency.

The debate on the Bush disadvantage was deep and complex. Both teams read much evidence on whether recent policies have affected Bush's credibility, but the negative's short-term impact is undeniable. While the negative's claims that a new and successful Africa policy would provide the necessary "fast success" are persuasive, the affirmative casts serious doubt on the uniqueness of the link to their plan by proving that there are other highly visible issues and that there are too many other barriers to Bush which the affirmative plan could not overcome. Although these takeouts are not absolute, they do undercut the probability of the disadvantage, and the actual impact scenario is not really assessed against the solvency that is left on the case.

Overall, I see a small chance of the Bush disadvantage with a fast time-frame on a vague nuclear war, against a small chance of a little decrease in population rates by the affirmative. But, there is a higher probability that the status quo's structural adjustment will continue, and will successfully reduce population problems without risking the Bush disadvantage. The affirmative plan would block that adjustment.

#### **ROSS SMITH, Wake Forest University**

It's great being the one in a four-one decision: the winner doesn't care that you voted against them and the loser gets a consolation ballot. Meanwhile, others might think you're a fly and disprefer you in the future, reducing your judging burden. I don't want to dissuade the potential strikers, so my critique will leave some holes. However, there are a few lessons to be learned from this round which I believe the lone dissenter can teach.

First, I am happy a new case was not run in the final round. As a showcase event as well as a one-round competitive determination of the "champion" the final round's value was enhanced by Michigan's case choice. The corollary is that time-waster T by the negative was not appreciated. Paper waste alone may have broken a tie in favor of the aff, had the aff. not wasted their own time overkilling the Soviets disad. Here lies the first lesson: don't run too many impact turns with weak link take outs. Had the neg. desired to go for the disad they could have crushed the link answers. If the aff. really wants a favorable time exchange *and* a way to win the debate while losing everything else they should have just run the turns.

Lesson number two has to do with the closing comments of Mr. Loeber. He said that when he was a sophomore and



saw Lynn Robbins in the final round he dreamed of someday being there himself. But now that he was there, it wasn't as great as he has imagined it, and, in terms of the sacrifices he made to be there, it wasn't necessarily worth it. In my opinion he was half right. It is true that debaters should not make sacrifices that they judge to be counterproductive, too painful, or fundamentally damaging to themselves and others. No one in any walk of life should. Where Loeber goes wrong, I believe, is in expecting the reality to be like the dream. All of us, when we start out as novice debaters or coaches, form unrealistic idealistic images of what it's like to be among the "elite". Once we get there (and we all do in one way or another) we do find that it is different than we had imagined. It is no longer so *extraordinary* once it becomes our ordinary place, the place we belong as opposed to the place for which we long. But the value isn't in the place, it's in the process. And there is as much to be lost by not engaging in the process for fear of not finding satisfaction as there is in over-reaching. With apologies to Mr. Loeber lest I exaggerated his feelings, I congratulate not only all of the finalists but all who set high goals and strive to reach them.

The third lesson is that many debates at the level of this one are very difficult to judge, and the decisions are even more difficult to defend in a relatively short written format. The value of an orally announced decision is that debaters can ask the "What about x?", questions. Some judges (a minority these days) hide from these questions with "secret" decisions. But the ballot inherently is incomplete. To write a fully satisfactory ballot would require more time than any coach has. In contrast, the oral decision allows the judge to sketch the reason for the decision and the debaters to then get just the other feedback they need. And sometimes judges find they were mistaken! When debaters and judges can both improve so can debate itself. But, the NDT, in its wisdom, has decided through its no revelation policy to transform the minority of judges into a nearly unanimous majority. Meanwhile, the circumvention (that *does* occur) reveals outcomes shorn of the intellectual value of discussion about reasons.

Now that I have established an excuse for my inadequate ballot, here's why I voted: no disads, some (albeit marginal) case risk.

First the Bush disad. First the setting of the stage. As the internal link "brink" we have a card that says Congress could be persuaded, March 6. At the top of the disad we have evidence that the Tower affair put Bush on the brink (of something) and on b1 we have March 20 ev. that Bush needs a quick victory. Michigan says he got one: the Contra aid package. The neg. answers here were fatal. They proved that the Contra deal was not a victory, it was a defeat. And the reason it was a defeat is that *one* person (C. Boyden Gray) in the administration who was to the right of Bush on this issue raised a ruckus. As a result, the evidence says, U.S. policy has an uncertain future, this was a big concession of power to Congress, Gray clouded what could have been a success, and even what success there might have been from this won't last. The stage is set and there are several implications.

First, there's a lot more negative to overcome than the disad originally claimed. Even if the plan gives Bush a boost it's not clear that it would offset more than the Contra loss, much less the Tower loss. Post-Tower, the evidence says, Bush can't come back to Congress for help, a quick victory would take away some sting, but the Tower defeat wiped out the entire administration agenda (at least for a while we presume). This is the gist of the question the aff. is asking with their first "answer". The neg never made it clear to me how much a boost they are claiming is necessary to get the disad and how much a boost the aff. is, assuming maximum link. But maybe there's "some risk".

The second implication of the Contra mess is more damaging to Baylor, however. The aff. argues that the fact that Gray could turn a seeming victory into a defeat proves that a similar result would follow their plan. All they need to prove their plan a Bush defeat is evidence that *some* people will oppose their plan. Surely, they argue, the right-wing ideologues of the Jesse Helms and C. Boyden Gray ilk will oppose the plan (no evidence denies the 2AC #3 ev. that says family planning is under attack from the right even if a vast bipartisan majority support it). If one person can snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, (the 2AR says at the bottom of the disad, summing up what I have described in my first two "implications") how can we expect the affirmative plan to overcome the Tower *and* Contra defeats? Still, you might say (in spite of no direct neg. response to this argument) there's some risk, and there's no evidence that *this* plan would be sabotaged the way the Contra deal was.

Well, so far I have been assuming the most for the neg. on the link: that the plan will be popular. And the neg. read a lot of evidence about the popularity of family planning. But none of this evidence necessarily proves *this* particular aff. plan will be popular. 1AR's first argument here (off 2AC #3) is that the aff. changes the guidelines that the neg. popularity ev. assumes. The neg. answers I have are "our link outweighs" and a reference to the evidence. This is basically non-responsive, as the 2AR points out. Status Quo family planning may be popular, but the aff. plan, which no longer discourages abortions and may even promote them is hardly likely to get Bush the bipartisan support he needs to recover from the Tower-Contra double whammy. Finally I must answer a possible Baylor "What about x?" query. 2NR claims the 1AR dropped the human rights link. He didn't. The last 1AR answer off 2AC #3 was no perception of human rights. Not a great answer, but enough for the 2AR to rightfully say no we didn't drop it.

A summary and a caveat. In sum, we have a disad that was transformed from a brink issue to a threshold one with about as much chance that the plan will move us further from the threshold and with motion in either direction being unquantified in terms of magnitude — and as of March 6 Congress "could be persuaded" about ASATs. As a caveat, the building blocks of the aff. victory here were quick, sketchy statements. *This time* I understood them for what they were and flowed them where they were, but I can't blame any judge or Baylor if they didn't. I probably followed the Bush debate in this round as well as I ever follow anything.

I can't say I followed the structural adjustment issue so well. This was more of a pure card war, including a number of cards on case. So, I had to "reconstruct" (or guess) by reading ev. I was, however reading under the light of a useful cross-ex by Mr. Thompson, and the synthesis of the conflicting evidence provided in 1AR and 2AR: that structural adjustment works in the status quo only where nations are ready for it, elsewhere it ends in backlash. This dovetails well with the *explanation* provided in the cross-ex and in the lack of explanation found in Plants's answers to c-x questions and in the 1AC evidence about market failure because of unequal economic and political power distortions. Inevitable or not, there is no reason to vote for a non-solution, the prevention of which can't have worse impacts than the case. Partial plan-meet-need implications are the best I can assign to this argument. For further details see Solt's ballot, as I concur with this part of his opinion.

As for case, there are no absolute take-outs or turns. The cooling turn is clearly won by the aff. There is some war risk, too. Lack of 2NR coverage on case impacts was fatal. All I got were a couple of tag-line repeats. As for solvency, read the evidence. The aff. ev. is better, at least good enough to make the take-outs non-absolute.

The important point to be made in reference to the case debate is not the line-by-line or how I weighed the evidence, but the character of the debate on the case. The 1AC was well-structured, with good, qualified, long, explanatory evidence. The 1NC, as is too frequently the practice, just grouped each chunk of case and read a string of relatively short cards at a speed where one could not, as was the case with the 1AC evidence, evaluate the quality of the evidence as it was presented. It may have been out of desperation to cover (remember the Soviets?), but the 2AC returned the favor: grouping the strings of 1NC arguments, and, for the most part reading *no* evidence, referring instead to built-in answers in 1AC evidence. 1NR mostly went off the 2AC structure, read some cards, sometimes claimed particular 1NC subpoints were dropped (were they any more dropped than the 1AC ev.?), but did not really make comparisons of ev. or args. 1AR regrouped on solvency and did various other grouping on case. 2NR mostly repeated tags, saying "pull" this or that from 1NC or 1NR. 2AR . . . grouped.

So, either both teams essentially dropped all of their opponents arguments or they both answered all of them. The neg. won the ink paradigm, a no-flow might have said the last thing that was persuasive was the 1AC, and the rest of us have little choice but to wade in and see how the arguments match up when there is no actual line by line — we have to draw the lines ourselves. My line drawing wasn't literal. I read the evidence fairly quickly, in some cases twice and formed a relatively impressionistic judgement that the plan was still a good idea, had enough of a chance of solving some undoubtedly huge problems, enough so that, absent a disadvantage, we should adopt it. If my method of judgement in this instance strikes you as too hasty, subjective, or whatever, consider my sketch of how the debate unfolded on these arguments. That portion of the debate received what it deserved.

Final Comments. My critique may mislead some to think I thought Baylor debated poorly, were badly beaten, or something along those lines. I think none of those things. This was a balanced, close debate. I have judged this Baylor team many times and usually found them to be great. In this debate, what may have had me leaning aff. was, in a number of places, most significantly in the 1AC, cross-ex, and the 2AR, the explanation and *use* of evidence. (On Bush, the aff. used the *neg.* team's ev. to make what I found to be the winning arguments.) Basically, Michigan was, in my opinion, more persuasive. The lesson here, preached by Steve Mancuso to his own debaters for years, is, unfortunately, tainted by the fact that I am the only one who thought so. Maybe it's just that at an NDT where I was on the bottom of four out of five elim decisions Steve Mancuso and I were on the same wavelength.

#### ROGER SOLT, University of Kentucky

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of judging debates held in the mode to which we are accustomed is the frequency with which they turn on issues of argumentative equity rather than argumentative substance. This round, although it matched two of the most substance oriented debate teams of recent years, proved no exception to this rule. The debate turns almost entirely on what standard one employs for evaluating arguments mentioned very briefly in earlier speeches which receive substantial elaboration in the 2AR. My impression has been that on issues of argumentative substance, clearly argued, the opinions of judges tend to converge. But on issues of argumentative equity, even the "best" judges will diverge considerably — and indeed it is doubtful whether any judge is ever terribly consistent in his or her evaluation of these kinds of issues. Hence the frustration.

Debate is both an intellectual inquiry and an educational game; questions of substance and fairness are both important. In establishing guidelines governing the "fairness" or procedural aspect of judging, I would posit one cardinal rule: arguments should be made so as to allow the opposing team adequate opportunity for rejoinder. To the degree to which such opportunity is lacking, the argument should be proportionately discounted. Such judgments are sometimes clearcut, but often they inhabit a vast gray area of marginally acceptable, marginally abusive argument practice. The need to assess these kinds of argumentative equities makes the already complex process of judging even more so.

This round was complex enough purely in terms of its substantive issues, especially because a relatively large number of issues were extended throughout the debate. Of the two major affirmative advantage claims, I believe that the intervention impact is at least moot by the debate's end, but that while at least marginally minimized, the affirmative climate advantage still carries considerable weight. The structural adjustment disadvantage is also, in my view, substantially moot, with no advantage to either side large enough to sway the debate. This leaves two major issues, solvency and the Bush popularity DA, which were pivotal in my decision.

The solvency debate is difficult to evaluate because it raises one of the equity dilemmas mentioned above. In response to a string of solvency cards in the 1AC, the 1NC reads a number of pieces of evidence indicting solvency. The 2AC and 1AR basically emit tag lines grounded in the 1AC evidence, and the first real application of this evidence does not occur til the 2AR. A couple of things can be said in the affirmative's defense: the negative evidence is not applied very specifically to the 1AC solvency analysis either, and the time pressures of the internal affirmative speeches may make it impractical to deal with these arguments in detail. Certainly in light of the time pressures to which both 2AC and 1AR are subject, intelligent use of 1AC evidence and analysis is an essential strategy (and this 1AC is a model of intelligent and economical construction). But even conceding all this, it should be added that tag pulling is not a model of good debating (if in fact it constitutes debating at all). Discrete negative arguments, such as the momentum position, merit some specific affirmative response prior to the 2AR. I believe that several of my colleagues may have given more weight to the momentum position than I ultimately did. I certainly believe that it raises doubts about the time frame of affirmative solvency (implying that the threshold of the affirmative harm scenarios may have been passed before solvency kicks in). But, because there are balancing equity concerns, I am unwilling to view this argument as absolute simply because of lack of specific affirmative application til the 2AR.

The momentum argument does, however, cast a fair bit of doubt on solvency. But more importantly, I think there is a great deal of doubt about whether the affirmative will produce a very significant reduction in fertility at all. A wide variety of specific barriers to solvency — religion, male attitudes, ethnic competition, and the economic value of children — are not specifically denied. Both sides have general cards on the susceptibility of culture to change, but certainly the negative evidence is much more specific in terms of the precise components of African culture. Obviously it would be very difficult for the affirmative to respond specifically to each of these cultural barriers, and if they can win the empirical solvency debate, it would seem to logically subsume the rest. I believe, however, that on the empirical effectiveness of family planning the negative has a significant edge. It seems clear that family planning will increase contraceptive *Use*; it is not clear, however, that this translates into fertility reduction, especially since the two pieces of negative evidence which claim a

substitution effect would explain a contraceptive increase without a fertility decline. As to whether contraceptive use decreases fertility, the key affirmative evidence seems to be the World Bank card, highlighted in 2AR. My reading of this evidence is the following; where contraceptive use has increased (presumably, given Africa's present high fertility, in other parts of the world), fertility has fallen. While this is a good piece of evidence, several considerations undercut its impact. First is the negative evidence/argument that the best studies show a minimal effect of family planning on fertility. Second, there is also evidence read in 2NC which indicts the credibility of pro-family planning sources. This kind of sweeping indictment is not terribly compelling in and of itself, but coupled with the counter-studies evidence (the only evidence which specifically assesses the credibility of the conflicting research), it casts extreme doubt on the credibility of empirical solvency claims. Finally, these indictments all gain added credibility from the range of elements in African culture which are pro-natality and the evidence documenting a substitution effect specifically in Africa.

Given minimal affirmative solvency, it would not take a huge risk of the Bush DA to win the round for the negative, and I think in fact that the risk is rather substantial. The direction of the link seems quite clear: the plan should be generally popular. Several factors support this conclusion. First, 76 percent of people support family planning; it enjoys bipartisan, though not universal, support. (76 percent seems as close to consensus as one is likely to get on most public policy issues.) Second, in contrast, the public dislikes development aid which the plan cuts. Confronted with contradictory assertions about whether the public would perceive this aid shift, my assessment is that there should be some perception; the evidence from both sides seems to indicate a fair bit of sensitivity to and ability to discriminate among aid issues. Third, the public seems to be swayed by foreign policy initiatives/successes, and it's particularly concerned about Africa. Fourth, the negative evidence seems to indicate that family planning is perceived as a human rights issue and that the public is very pro-human rights.

Because of all this, even given new right opposition, I think that the plan would be an overall foreign policy success. The impact of new right/anti-abortion opposition is considerably blunted by several negative arguments. First, the evidence that anti-natality forces outweigh suggests limited new right influence. Second, negative evidence indicates that abortion is a major issue for a relatively small number of people and that pro and anti-abortion partisans tend to offset each other. Third, UNFPA has eliminated some of the more objectionable aspects of its family planning program. It is never clear to me how or why the plan would cause a reversal of this policy shift — hence I give the to me rather cryptic 1AR tag that the plan is population control little weight. It seems, at any rate subsumed by the above evidence indicating the general popularity of the plan as well as the evidence indicating the relatively low salience of the abortion issue.

The real debate on the DA, however, is not so much on the direction of the link as on its threshold; given a variety of alleged Bush defeats, would the plan be a sufficient victory for Bush to gain such questionable aspects of his agenda as ASATs? Threshold arguments are commonly "throw away" positions for the affirmative. This may be misguided — questions of the magnitude of a link are as important as questions concerning its absolute direction. Still, to summarize, several factors blunt the force of the various affirmative threshold arguments (Tower, Central America, etc.). First, there is the problem of the press. Threshold arguments are commonly "presses," arguments that negative proof is insufficient rather than constructive counter-arguments. The threshold presses articulated in the 1AR (in response to negative evidence) are not handled especially well in the 2NR. Nonetheless, they are still just *presses*, which means that any but the most tabula rasa of judges is likely to feel obliged to evaluate the substance of the analysis behind the press in order to determine its weight. In this round, I think that the question of threshold remains just that, a question. The Central America issue seems ambiguous in terms of its effect on Bush's standing — claimed as a victory, arguably a defeat, most probably in my judgment an indecisive muddle. Similarly, the Tower nomination was a major defeat, but the negative evidence seems to imply that a large enough victory could overcome its effects and entrench Bush's primacy and agenda. The plan could well constitute a large victory for Bush, and though the realm of political popularity seems inherently speculative and uncertain, it seems reasonably likely that the plan could overwhelm previous Bush setbacks. Certainly the claim that the plan would have to enjoy unanimous support is, for me, lacking in credibility — what even marginally controversial policy ever enjoys unanimous support?

As is the common fate of the threshold press, in this round it serves to raise doubts but is far from absolute. The impact of these arguments is further mitigated by a second problem, the problem of placement. As is often the case, the 2AR tells a good story, but in the case of the threshold debate, that story is a massive elaboration off of a couple of extremely elliptical arguments first made in the 1AR in response to 2NC evidence. Working backwards, one can find something in the 1AR which sanctions the 2AR's story, but in this case it seems fair to say that quantity changes quality and that the extent of 2AR elaboration requires a highly critical judge response. Given that, it seems to me that the magnitude of the link proven is great enough to raise a reasonable likelihood of triggering the impact.

The ASAT impact (an increased risk of nuclear war) is undenied, whereas there is at least doubt concerning the impact of climate change. Further, though I believe time frame to be an exaggerated decision principle, the ASAT impact does figure to occur decades before the impact to climate, giving this argument for me more weight than usual. There is doubt about the sufficiency of the link to trigger the impact to the Bush DA, but I think there are even greater doubts concerning the solvency of the plan. Given that resolution of the individual issues, the overall equation seems to pretty clearly favor the negative.

Approximately twenty years ago, NDT debate seems to have made the collective value judgment that it wished to be primarily a dialectical rather than a rhetorical activity. Hence, packing debates with as much relevant data as possible came to take precedence over the elegance with which arguments were presented. I have no quarrel with the basic value judgment which emphasizes substance over style, but pushed to its extreme, this tendency has led us to a situation where perhaps half of all close debates are decided based on lapses of communication, teams losing either because they failed to understand some significant argument(s) of their opponents' or because the judge failed to understand some of their own. And because we continue to conduct our activity at the outer limits of intelligibility, debates are all too often decided on the kind of swampy and subjective fairness grounds on which for me this debate turned. Thus, in a kind of perverse way, questions of style have once again come to dominate questions of substance. This tendency is not just disturbing; it seems to me that the long term viability of our form of debating depends on our ability to overcome these all too frequent communication breakdowns. Debates have become too much like a blurry television, in which the screen comes clear only for the last few minutes of the show. Our programs have lots of good moments, but something needs to be done to improve the reception.

The 44th National Debate Tournament will be hosted by West Georgia College beginning March 30th thru April 2nd, 1990. If you are interested in visiting you should contact the host, Chester Gibson, for information:

Professor Chester Gibson  
Department of Speech  
West Georgia College  
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
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Treasurer, NDT Board of Trustees  
Department of Communication  
Miami University,  
Oxford, Ohio 45056

As Director of the NDT Alumni Organization I am responsible for the yearly NDT Newsletter which goes out each January and for editing this publication. If you wish to include your name on the Alumni Mailing List or have any "notes" you wish in the Newsletter please contact me at the following:

Professor William Southworth  
Director of NDT Alumni Relations  
University of Redlands  
Redlands, CA 92373-0999

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